Crosson v. Carrollton City Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 May 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 3:19-cv-184-TCB
• Citation: 478 F.Supp.3d 1255
• Parties: Cathy E. CROSSON, Plaintiff, v. CARROLLTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Mark Albertus, and RA-LIN and Associates, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

478 F.Supp.3d 1255

Cathy E. CROSSON, Plaintiff,

v.CARROLLTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Mark Albertus, and RA-LIN and Associates, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 3:19-cv-184-TCB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Newnan Division.

Signed May 28, 2020

Cathy E. Crosson, Carrollton, GA, pro se.

Charles David Mecklin, Jr., Richard G. Tisinger, Jr., Tisinger Vance, P.C., Carrollton, GA, Jason Digges Darneille, Gower Wooten & Darneille, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Carrollton City School District, Mark Albertus.

Keith Martin Kodosky, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant RA-LIN and Associates.

ORDER

Timothy C. Batten, Sr., United States District Judge

This case comes before the Court on the motion [19] to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Defendant RA-LIN and Associates. Also before the Court is RA-LIN's motion [13] to dismiss the original complaint, the motion [8] to dismiss the original complaint filed by Defendants Carrollton City School District (CCSD) and Mark Albertus, Plaintiff Cathy Crosson's motion [14] for leave to file opposition to RA-LIN's original motion to dismiss, and her motion [29] for leave to file oversized memorandum.

I. Background

Plaintiff Cathy Crosson is domiciled in Indiana, but resides part-time with her mother in Carrollton, Georgia. This action arises out of activity at Carrollton High School, which she alleges has rendered her home in Carrollton "essentially unlivable" due to excessive noise, lights, and other nuisances created by the school. [16] ¶ 18.

Crosson contends that the alleged nuisances from the high school began in 2006 and have continued in subsequent years to deprive her of the quiet enjoyment of her home. In 2014, she contacted Defendant Albertus, then principal of the high school, to express her concerns. In 2015, construction on a new school building began and the nuisance intensified.¹

In June 2016, the nuisance reached a "tipping point" when a tree buffer that muffled noise and light pollution from the school's stadium was clear-cut. McIntyre Lumber, a subcontractor hired by Defendant RA-LIN and Associates, removed the tree buffer.

In April 2017, Crosson filed an ante litem notice with CCSD. That same month, she filed suit in the Superior Court of Carroll County against McIntyre Lumber.² She alleged that McIntyre's negligent removal of the trees exacerbated the existing nuisances caused by the "excessive noise, light pollution, and visual blight created by Carrollton High School." [31-1] at 27. She also alleged that the tree removal violated the Carrollton City Code, which requires that schools maintain a tree buffer that "provide[s] an effective visual screen." § 2.04.21(B)(2). The superior court granted summary judgment to McIntyre as to Crosson's initial and first amended complaints in October 2018.³

In August 2017, Defendants erected a parking lot in the location formerly occupied by the tree buffer. Afterwards, Crosson filed suit in the Superior Court of Carroll County again, this time against CCSD. She alleged that CCSD was liable for maintaining a nuisance and that the conduct constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. That suit was settled in November 2018.

On December 23, 2019, Crosson filed this suit against RA-LIN, CCSD, and Albertus. She alleges that the noise and light pollution from the school, which were exacerbated by the removal of the tree buffer, violate local ordinances and constitute a continuing nuisance. Accordingly, she has brought claims alleging (1) a taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) nuisance per se; (3) statutory and common law nuisance; and (4) violations of O.C.G.A §§ 41-1-1, 41-2-2, and 41-2-3.

On January 13, 2020, CCSD and Albertus moved to dismiss Crosson's complaint; separately, RA-LIN moved to dismiss on January 31. After she filed an amended complaint, RA-LIN moved to dismiss the amended complaint, contending in part that her claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and estoppel. CCSD and Albertus filed a response [20] to the amended complaint contending that (1) the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Crosson's claims, and (2) the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.⁴ The Court will construe the response as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint⁵ and consider each argument raised by the parties below.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may either be "facial" or "factual." Morrison v. Amway Corp. , 323 F.3d 920, 924–45 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). A facial attack is based on the allegations in the complaint alone, and a presumption of truth attaches to those allegations. Id. ; Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc. , 524 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2008). Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge subject-matter jurisdiction in fact, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Brown v. Cranford Transp. Serv., Inc. , 244 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2002). To resolve a factual attack, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence, including affidavits and testimony, and the presumption of truthfulness traditionally afforded to a plaintiff's allegations does not attach. See U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States , 562 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting, however, that the court does still take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). "Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction." Ishler v. Internal Revenue , 237 F. App'x 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Chandler v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Transp. , 695 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting id. ). The Supreme Court has explained this standard as follows:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see also Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. , 693 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2012).

Thus, a claim will survive a motion to dismiss only if the factual allegations in the complaint are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). While all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Powell v. Thomas , 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011), the Court need not accept as true the plaintiff's legal conclusions, including those couched as factual allegations, Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Thus, evaluation of a motion to dismiss requires two steps: (1) eliminate any allegations in the pleading that are merely legal conclusions, and (2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Discussion

A. RA-LIN's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Either Rooker-Feldman or Estoppel

1. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

RA-LIN argues that Crosson's amended complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine places limits on the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain matters related to previous state court litigation." Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos , 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 476–82, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) ). It "provides that federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, have no authority to review the final judgments of state courts." Id. (quoting Siegel v. LePore , 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "extends not only to constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment." Siegel , 234 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Feldman , 460 U.S. at 482 n.16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, and Dale v. Moore , 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997) ). "A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment ‘if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’ " Siegel , 234 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)).

Although Rooker-Feldman "is broad enough to bar all federal claims which were, or should have been, central to the state court decision," Goodman , 259 F.3d at 1333, the Supreme Court has since limited the doctrine to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 281, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

Thus, "[a] claim that at its heart challenges the state court decision itself—and not the statute or law which underlies that decision—falls within the doctrine." May v. Morgan Cty. , 878 F.3d 1001,...