Crosthwait v. S. Health Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–CT–00526–SCT.,2010–CT–00526–SCT.
• Citation: 94 So.3d 1070
• Parties: Ruth Agnes CROSTHWAIT v. SOUTHERN HEALTH CORPORATION OF HOUSTON, INC. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital and Marcia Morgan.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

94 So.3d 1070

Ruth Agnes CROSTHWAIT

v.SOUTHERN HEALTH CORPORATION OF HOUSTON, INC. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital and Marcia Morgan.

No. 2010–CT–00526–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 7, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 23, 2012.

William C. Walker, Jr., Jackson, attorney for appellant.

John G. Wheeler, attorney for appellees.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CARLSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Chickasaw County, Judge Andrew K. Howorth presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital, and Marcia Morgan, a registered nurse. Aggrieved, Ruth Agnes Crosthwait appealed to this Court, and we assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. In a four-four plurality opinion (two judges not participating), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corp. of Houston, Inc., 94 So.3d 1126 (Miss.Ct.App.2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 20, 2011). We granted Crosthwait'spetition for writ of certiorari. Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corp. of Houston, Inc., 78 So.3d 906 (Miss.2012) (Table).

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. We set out the facts pertinent to today's discussion. Most of these facts come from the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals. Crosthwait, 94 So.3d 1126, 1128–29 ¶¶ 1–7.

¶ 3. On May 22, 2008, Ruth Agnes Crosthwait was admitted to Trace Regional Hospital for treatment of fluctuating blood sugar stemming from diabetes. Crosthwait was eighty-two years old, lived alone, and generally could walk without assistance. While she was hospitalized, Crosthwait's attending physician instructed her to ring a bell to have a nurse assist her when she rose from her hospital bed.

¶ 4. On May 24, 2008, Crosthwait was preparing to leave the hospital, and she decided to take a shower. Crosthwait called for Marcia Morgan, a registered nurse, who assisted her with undressing. Crosthwait walked into the bathroom unassisted. Morgan offered Crosthwait a shower stool, which she accepted. Morgan then left and returned with a chair, which she placed in the shower. While Crosthwait showered, Morgan told Crosthwait she would have to leave to attend another patient. When Morgan returned, she turned off the shower and Crosthwait exited the shower. The facts are disputed as to what happened next.

¶ 5. According to Crosthwait, water had puddled on the bathroom floor during the shower because the shower curtain was not closed. Once Morgan returned from attending the other patient, Crosthwait asked her to turn the water off and she obliged. Crosthwait then asked for a towel, and Morgan handed her one, which Crosthwait used to dry herself. Crosthwait's shoes had been on the bathroom floor during the shower, and they were wet. Crosthwait tried to put on the wet shoes, but she could not. When Crosthwait was preparing to leave the bathroom, Morgan was standing in the doorway between Crosthwait's hospital room and the hallway outside. Crosthwait stated, “I need some help—I've got to get out of here,” several times, but Morgan did not offer to assist her. Crosthwait then tried to walk, barefoot, back to her bed, but she slipped and fell while passing through the doorway between the bathroom and the hospital room.

¶ 6. Morgan's version of the events differed from that offered by Crosthwait. In her deposition, Morgan stated that she had laid two towels on the floor before Crosthwait started showering. Morgan claimed that after the shower, she had helped Crosthwait dry herself, and then used several more towels to dry the floor. Crosthwait refused to use her shoes, even after Morgan had dried them, so Morgan attempted to lead her back to the bed without her shoes. Morgan took one hand, and with the other, Crosthwait used her quad cane. While passing through the doorway from the restroom to the hospital room, which was not wide enough for both women to walk side by side, Crosthwait fell.

¶ 7. It was undisputed that the fall caused Crosthwait significant injury, including a broken hip and a loss of mobility and independence. Crosthwait filed suit against the hospital and Morgan. Crosthwait's complaint alleged that the following were the proximate causes of her fall and injuries: (a) failure to properly assist [Crosthwait] in taking a shower, including failure to provide an appropriate shower stool and failure to prevent excessive water from accumulating on the floor outside the shower; (b) failure to assist [Crosthwait] in getting out of the shower; (c) failure to assist [Crosthwait] as she stepped on the floor while exiting the shower; (d) failure to provide [Crosthwait] with proper footwear before she stepped on the wet floor when exiting the shower; (e) failure to wipe up the wet floor before [Crosthwait] exited the shower; [and] (f) failure to do other reasonable acts necessary to prevent [Crosthwait's] fall.

¶ 8. The hospital and Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Crosthwait's action was for medical malpractice, and summary judgment was proper because, among other things, Crosthwait needed expert testimony to establish the duty of care owed to her by the hospital and to show whether that duty had been breached. Crosthwait responded that the claim was for ordinary negligence, for which expert testimony was not required. The circuit court granted the hospital's motion, and Crosthwait appealed.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

¶ 9. After a thorough discussion of all the issues, the Court of Appeals' plurality found:

After reviewing the record in this case, this Court finds that Crosthwait alleged malpractice and that expert testimony was required to support the cause of action. Consequently, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to the hospital.

Crosthwait, 94 So.3d 1126, 1132 ¶ 19. Presiding Judge Irving, in his dissent, opined that even assuming, arguendo, that Morgan's actions fell within the realm of professional services, the layman's exception to the generally recognized rule requiring expert testimony to prove medical negligence would apply in Crosthwait's case, meaning that Crosthwait need only present lay testimony to prove negligence on the part of Morgan, and thus, the hospital. Crosthwait, 94 So.3d 1126, 1132–33 ¶ 21 (Irving, P.J., dissenting, joined by Lee, C.J.). In a lengthy dissent, Judge Maxwell opined that Crosthwait's claims should have been considered under ordinary-negligence standards, thus precluding a grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospital and Morgan, because there were genuine issues of material fact which could be resolved only by a trial. Crosthwait, 94 So.3d 1126, 1133–37 ¶¶ 22–42 (Maxwell, J., dissenting, joined by Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., and Roberts, J.).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10. An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Treasure Bay Corp. v. Ricard, 967 So.2d 1235, 1238 (Miss.2007). Summary judgment should be granted only if no genuine issue of material fact exists. Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So.2d 134, 136 (Miss.2005).

¶ 11. In cases of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove the following:

(1) the existence of a duty by the defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach of such duty by the defendant.

Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956–57 (Miss.2007) (citing Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So.2d 264, 268 (Miss.1993) (citing Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Miss.1987))). And in proving medical malpractice, expert testimony must be used to show that the requisite standard of care was not followed, and expert testimony must be used to establish that the defendant's “failure was the proximate cause, or proximate contributing cause” of the plaintiff's alleged injuries. Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 957 (citations omitted).

Where a plaintiff fails to present expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care, breach thereof, and proximate causation, summary judgment is mandated. Smith v. Gilmore Mem'l Hosp., 952 So.2d 177, 180 (Miss.2007).

¶ 12. Crosthwait states that the acts of drying a wet floor and ensuring that hospital patients traverse safely through a known, dangerous condition do not fall within the scope of either a hospital's licensed activities or Nurse Morgan's professional services. Instead, Crosthwait argues that these acts fall within the standard of reasonable care incumbent on businesses. The hospital disagrees and argues that Crosthwait's claim was for medical malpractice under Mississippi Code Section 15–1–36(2) (Rev. 2003).

¶ 13. In determining the nature of Crosthwait's claim, we note that Mississippi Code Section 15–1–36(1) (Rev. 2003), relating to medical malpractice claims, applies to “injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services[.]” We have held that “a ‘professional service’ involves the application of special skill, knowledge and education arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation or employment.” Burton v. Choctaw County, 730 So.2d 1, 5–6 (¶ 21) (Miss.1997) (citations omitted).

¶ 14. In Bell v. West Harrison County District, 523 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Miss.1988), this Court recognized that “medical or professional services” are not limited to direct interventions such as performing surgery or administering medications, but include all aspects of medical evaluation, treatment, and care that involve the application of special skill or knowledge. Moreover, we noted that a nurse's decision, based on professional knowledge, falls within the statutory language of “medical, surgical or other professional services [.]” See Bell, 523 So.2d at 1033.

¶ 15. This Court previously has held that whether a bath provided to a nursing home resident for purposes...