Croswell v. People
| Decision Date | 04 February 1924 |
| Docket Number | 10735. |
| Citation | 223 P. 51,74 Colo. 547 |
| Parties | CROSWELL v. PEOPLE. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Charles C Butler, Judge.
Lewis D. Croswell was convicted of robbery with a gun, and brings error.
Affirmed.
John M. Glover, of Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Russell W. Fleming, Atty. Gen., and Harold Clark Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., for the People.
Defendant was informed against for robbery with a gun which, under section 6718, C. L. 1921, passed in that year, is visited with a penalty of imprisonment in the penitentiary for life or for a term of not less than ten years. The defendant, who at the time of sentence was 18 years of age, was sent to the penitentiary for a period of not less than 10, nor more than 14, years. The error here assigned is to the penitentiary sentence, the defendant asserting that the place of imprisonment is the state reformatory. This contention is based upon the theory that our general robbery statute cited upon which the information was based, is qualified by, or is to be construed in connection with, section 7123, C. L. 1921 found in the state reformatory statute passed in 1911, which provides that----
'Courts having criminal jurisdiction in Colorado shall sentence to the state reformatory all male persons, and none other, duly convicted before them of felony for the first time, who shall at the time of sentence be of the full age of sixteen (16) years and not more than twenty-one (21) years of age; * * * provided, that they shall sentence to the state penitentiary at Canon City any male persons between the ages of sixteen and thirty who shall be convicted of crimes involving the penalty of imprisonment for life, or the crime of murder in the first or second degrees or voluntary manslaughter.'
1. If there is an irreconcible or substantial conflict as to the sentence between these two sections of different statutes, the later one of 1921 prevails. It reads:
'Every defendant found guilty of robbery shall be confined in the penitentiary for a term of not less than ten years, or for life,' when the offense is committed with a gun, and in certain other designated circumstances.
In the earlier statute of 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 563), the sentence, as to felonies and for a first offense, is restricted to certain male persons, as determined by age and the character of the offense. Thereby, except as to crimes involving life imprisonment, murder of either degree, or voluntary manslaughter, the place of imprisonment may be the reformatory or penitentiary at the discretion of the trial judge, but as to the more heinous offenses, imprisonment shall be in the penitentiary. As the parties have not discussed the question suggested as to the inconsistency, we shall not further consider it; but, lest our silence might be misinterpreted, we say that possibly the later statute alone should be looked to in ascertaining the place of imprisonment for crimes of the class specified therein. We shall, however, assume with counsel that the question for decision may be--though we do not say it must be--determined from the meaning of the two statutes construed together as one enactment, or that there is present a situation where one statute, relating to a specific class of persons, and the other to persons generally, may be so interpreted as to give effect to both as one harmonious whole.
2. The specific question, therefore, is the meaning of the phrase, 'crimes involving the penalty of imprisonment for life.' The contention of the state is that life imprisonment is 'involved' in a crime when that penalty may be inflicted in pursuance of the verdict. The position of the defendant is that life imprisonment is only 'involved' when it must be inflicted in consequence of the verdict. Defendant invokes the familiar rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. There is no doubt that is a wellknown and recognized rule. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant, yet a statute should not be so strictly construed against the state and in favor of the accused as to destroy the evident intention of the lawmaking body. Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136, 137, 138, 129 P. 201.
Counsel for defendant cites and relies upon Wechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89, particularly the...
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People v. Blue
...that 'involved' referred to 'being connected with * * * in a natural or logical manner.' And this court has itself, in Croswell v. People, 74 Colo. 547, 223 P. 51, affirmed a sentence to the penitentiary of a defendant convicted under a statute authorizing committal to the penitentiary for ......
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People v. District Court, Second Judicial Dist.
...should not be used to defeat the evident intention of the legislature. Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490 (Colo.1982); Croswell v. People, 74 Colo. 547, 223 P. 51 (1924). See generally C. Sands, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.06 & § 59.08 (4th ed. The rule is made absolute. The respon......
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People v. Terry
...to defeat the evident intention of the legislature. Id. (citing Olinyk v. People, 642 P.2d 490, 494 (Colo.1982); Croswell v. People, 74 Colo. 547, 549-50, 223 P. 51, 52 (1924)).5 This construction carries out the legislature's intentions and gives full effect to § 18-3-203(2)(c) and §§ 16-1......
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Thompson v. People
...embody the judicial interpretation found in Snyder. See also Bushnell v. People, 92 Colo. 174, 19 P.2d 197. See generally Croswell v. People, 74 Colo. 547, 223 P. 51; Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136, 129 P. Thus, having recognized that the legislature intended that the greater penalties shou......