Croteau v. Charter Commc'ns
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 358422 |
| Parties | AMY CROTEAU, Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF RICHARD A. CROTEAU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., doing business as SPECTRUM CABLE, INTRADO LIFE & SAFETY, INC., MICHIGAN BELLTELEPHONE COMPANY, doing business as AT&T MICHIGAN, COMMUNICATIONS VENTURE CORPORATION, doing business as INDIGITAL TELECOM, and PENINSULA FIBER NETWORK LLC,Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 20-114514-NO.
Before: Kirsten Frank Kelly, P.J., and Anica Letica and Michelle M. Rick, JJ.
Plaintiff Amy Croteau appeals by right the trial court's order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) in favor of defendants Charter Communications, Inc., Intrado Life & Safety Inc., Michigan Bell Telephone Company Communications Venture Corporation, and Peninsula Fiber Network LLC on the basis of statutory immunity. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
On the evening of November 27, 2018, plaintiff and her husband, Richard Croteau, were at their home in Clayton Township in Genesee County, Michigan. Richard began experiencing issues with his breathing, and a 911 call was made in an effort to get Richard immediate help. The call, however, was misrouted to the city of Clayton in Lenawee County, apparently as a result of a mislabeling of plaintiff and Richard's home address (both jurisdictions had plaintiff's identical street name). As a result of the incorrect address, there was a delay in dispatching emergency responders.[2] At some point in the evening, Richard died.
Plaintiff brought suit[3] alleging that the failure of defendants to properly communicate and update her correct home address in their databases and street guides was the proximate cause of Richard's death. Plaintiff alleged one count of "Negligence/Gross Negligence," one count of "Negligent and/or Grossly Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress," and one count of loss of consortium.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). In essence, defendants argued that they were immune from suit under § 1604 of the Emergency 9-1-1 Service Enabling Act, MCL 484.1101 et seq. (the "Act"). Under that section, service providers such as defendants are immune from civil liability except where it is shown their acts amounted to criminal, grossly negligent, or willful and wanton conduct. Defendants claimed plaintiff's complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a claim that defendants acted with gross negligence.
The trial court granted defendants' motions, concluding plaintiff's complaint contained only conclusory allegations that defendants acted with gross negligence and did not allege specific facts to state such a claim. This appeal followed.
This Court reviews de novo a motion for summary disposition. Zarzyski v Nigrelli, 337 Mich.App. 735, 740; 976 N.W.2d 916 (2021). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate because of "immunity granted by law." In a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the Court "must consider not only the pleadings, but also any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties." RDM Holdings, LTD v Continental Plastics Co, 281 Mich.App. 678, 687; 762 N.W.2d 529 (2008). "The contents of the complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentary evidence." Id. "If there is no factual dispute, whether a plaintiff's claim is barred under a principle set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law for the court to decide." Id.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Maple Manor Rehab Ctr v Dep't of Treasury, 333 Mich.App. 154, 162; 958 N.W.2d 894. "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery." Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The court considers only the pleadings, and it considers them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations." Maple Manor, 333 Mich.App. at 163.
The core issue this Court is asked to decide is whether plaintiff's complaint alleged facts sufficient to overcome immunity granted to defendants under MCL 484.1604. Plaintiff contends Michigan is a notice pleading state and, therefore, she meets her burden if she reasonably puts defendants on notice of her claims. While this assertion is, by its own terms, an accurate statement of the law, plaintiff ignores the requirement that her complaint must nevertheless set forth factual allegations that would state a claim for the relief she seeks. Plaintiff's complaint falls short in this regard and, accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
We begin our analysis with the words of the statute itself. Scugoza v Metro Direct Prop & Cas Ins Co, 316 Mich.App. 218, 223; 891 N.W.2d 274 (2016). The relevant statute is MCL 484.1604, which states:
Except for pro rata charges for the service during a period when the service may be fully or partially inoperative, a service supplier, public agency, PSAP, or an officer, agent, or employee of any service supplier, public agency, or PSAP, or an owner or lessee of a pay station telephone shall not be liable for civil damages to any person as a result of an act or omission on the part of the service supplier, public agency, PSAP, or an officer, agent, or employee of any service supplier, public agency, or PSAP, or an owner or lessee in complying with any provision of this act, unless the act or omission amounts to a criminal act or to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
As alleged in plaintiff's complaint, defendants are "service supplier[s]" as defined by statute, because they "provid[e] a communication service to a service user in this state." See MCL 484.1102(ii).
By virtue of defendants' roles as service suppliers, they are immune from civil liability unless plaintiff can show defendants "act[s] or omission[s]" rose to the level of "gross negligence."[4] See MCL 484.1604. The Act does not define the term "gross negligence." Our courts have, in other contexts, turned to the definition of the term set forth in the government tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. See Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich. 125, 136; 521 N.W.2d 230 (1994) (); see also Xu v Gay, 257 Mich.App. 263, 269; 668 N.W.2d 166 (2003) (collecting other examples of statutes in which the Court has adopted the GTLA's definition). Under the GTLA, gross negligence is defined as "conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results." MCL 691.1407(8)(a); see also Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich.App. 416, 424; 917 N.W.2d 709 (2018) ( that gross negligence suggests "almost a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks") (quotation marks and citation omitted). As relevant here, factual allegations that a party acted negligently is insufficient to demonstrate that the party also acted with gross negligence. Chelsea Investment Group LLC v Chelsea, 288 Mich.App. 239, 265; 792 N.W.2d 781 (2010).
Defendants urge the Court to analyze this case under the holding of Trezzi v Detroit, 120 Mich.App. 506; 328 N.W.2d 70 (1982),[5] which they claim demonstrates the inadequacy of plaintiff's complaint. In that case, this Court addressed whether the defendant was immune from suit under governmental immunity after it was shown that the 911 dispatch placed a low priority on an emergency call, resulting in a lengthy response time. Trezzi, 120 Mich.App. at 509-510. While defendants are correct that this Court concluded the defendant was immune from suit, it was on the basis that the plaintiff failed to allege the defendant committed an intentional tort. See id. at 515 ("[A]s a matter of law, neither the allegation against the 911 operators nor the allegation against the police dispatcher alleges sufficient facts to make out a claim for an intentional tort."). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Trezzi forecloses plaintiff's avenue to relief.
We find more persuasive Jackson v Saginaw Co, 458 Mich. 141; 580 N.W.2d 870 (1998). In Jackson, the plaintiff, an inmate in the Saginaw County Jail, alleged that the county, the sheriff, and his treating physicians were grossly negligent when they denied him medical care by delaying specialized treatment for throat and ear pain and thereby failing to promptly detect the plaintiff's throat cancer. Jackson, 458 Mich. at 143. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants on the basis of governmental immunity, but this Court reversed that decision as to a treating physician, Dr. Uy, concluding "reasonable minds could differ as to whether his conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted." Id. at 145 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, this Court determined that Dr. Uy's "failure to perform a laryngoscopic examination was sufficient to raise a question regarding gross negligence." Id. at 150.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed this Court's determination that the plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated Dr. Uy's conduct amounted to gross negligence. Id. at 152. The Supreme Court found it unreasonable to infer that "assuming arguendo that Dr. Uy should have...
To continue reading
Request your trial