Crotts v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-15-01108-CR,01-15-01108-CR |
| Parties | ALAN NELSON CROTTS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Fort Bend County, Texas
A jury found appellant, Alan Nelson Crotts, guilty of the misdemeanor offense of assault of a family member.1 The trial court, pursuant to appellant's post-verdictagreement with the State, assessed his punishment at confinement for 365 days, suspended the sentence, placed him on community supervision for twenty-four months, and assessed a fine of $2,000. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his amended motion for new trial.2
We affirm.
Jessalyn Cole, the complainant, testified that appellant, with whom she was in a relationship, but never married, is the father of two of her children. She and appellant separated in September 2011, and a court entered a custody order concerning their children. The order provides that, when exchanging possession ofthe children, the complainant and appellant are to meet at the Needville Police Department ("NPD") station. On January 4, 2013, they complainant and appellant communicated by telephone and text message to set a time to exchange possession of the children that evening. The complainant noted that over the course of the day, their conversation "turned extremely angry and hateful." Appellant spoke to her with a "deep sense of hatred," expressed "a lot of negativity," and made disparaging remarks toward and about her. As a result of her conversation with appellant, the complainant felt scared and nervous and, thus, asked her father, Raymond Cole ("Raymond"), to accompany her to exchange possession of the children with appellant.
The complainant, Raymond, and the children arrived first at the NPD station, and when appellant arrived, he "pulled [his truck] along behind" the complainant's car. She then exited her car from the driver's seat and "walk[ed] around to the passenger-side . . . back door" to help her son get out of the car. The complainant "passed [her] son off" to appellant, who put him in his truck. She then returned to her car to "start unbuckling [her] daughter" from her car seat.
As the complainant stood at her car, appellant "walked up to [her] very fast," "spit in [her] face," and "hit [her] with his hand." His spit landed on thecomplainant's face and on her car,3 and he hit her with his open hand, striking her on the right side of her face.4 The complainant then yelled, and Raymond told her to go inside the NPD station to ask for help. (Internal quotations omitted.) As appellant started "going toward" Raymond, the complainant went into the station and found a law enforcement officer.
The complainant further explained that she felt pain when appellant struck her in the face and he "knocked [her] back pretty good[,] . . . a couple feet." Moreover, this was not the first time that appellant had assaulted her.
Raymond testified that the complainant had asked him to accompany her on January 4, 2013 to exchange possession of the children with appellant. He and the complainant arrived at the NPD station before appellant. When he arrived, appellant, who was driving erratically, "pulled [his truck] up behind" the complainant's car. She then exited from the driver's seat of the car, helped her son get out of the backseat on the passenger's side of the car, and handed him over to appellant, who put him in the backseat of his truck.
As the complainant returned to her car, appellant "hit her." Raymond saw appellant "lunge[] forward," the complainant's entire body "go[] backward," and thecomplainant's "wrist hit the car." After the complainant said "[o]w," Raymond got out of the car. (Internal quotations omitted.) The complainant, who "st[ood] there holding her head," said, "He hit me, Dad." (Internal quotations omitted.) And Raymond told her to "go get the police." Raymond noted that he did not see the actual "point of impact," when appellant's hand struck the complainant's face. However, when asked at trial, "Did you see what [appellant] did?," Raymond testified, "Yeah, he hit her."
NPD Officer C. Rader testified that on January 4, 2013, he was on duty at the NPD station when the complainant, who was "very upset, crying, and kind of hysterical," came into the building. After speaking with the complainant, Rader went outside and detained appellant and Raymond. Upon investigating further, Rader learned that there had been "an assault, family violence." He noted that State's Exhibit 1 is a photograph of the complainant's car and in the center of the photograph "appeared to be saliva from [appellant]." And Rader testified that State's Exhibit 2 is a photograph of the complainant's face, showing that the right side of her face had "a bit of redness and swelling" around the "eye area" and "high cheekbone." From his experience and training as a law enforcement officer, Rader opined that the complainant "had been hit."
Officer Rader further testified that appellant initially told him that "he may have accidentally hit" the complainant as he was "trying to get a kid out of the car."And he admitted to spitting on the complainant's car. Rader also noted that the complainant told him that she had been "hit in the face" by appellant with his "open palm."
In a portion of his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not establish that appellant "committed any crime or even that a crime was committed at all."5
We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact's finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We give deference to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at750. However, our duty requires us to "ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed" the criminal offense of which he is accused. Id.
A person commits an assault if he "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2016). As applicable here, a person commits the misdemeanor offense of assault of a family member if he commits an assault against a family member. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (Vernon 2014) (defining family); see also Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (). "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2016).
A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2011). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial risk that the result will occur. Id. § 6.03(c).
Proof of a mental state almost always depends upon circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (). A fact finder may infer intent or knowledge from any facts that tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, conduct of the accused, and the method of committing the offense. Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50; Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Here, the complainant testified that appellant is the father of two of her children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (defining family). On January 4, 2013, the complainant and appellant communicated about exchanging possession of the children later that evening. When she spoke with him, appellant was "extremely angry," spoke with a "deep sense of hatred," expressed "a lot of negativity," and made disparaging remarks toward and about the complainant. The complainant felt scared and nervous as a result of her conversation with appellant.
Further, the complainant testified that during the exchange of possession of the children at the NPD station, appellant, as the complainant stood at her car, "walked up to [her] very fast," "spit in [her] face" and "hit [her] with his hand." She explained that appellant hit her with his open hand, striking her on the right side ofher face. The complainant felt pain when appellant struck her in the face with his hand, and he "knocked [her] back pretty good[,] . . . a couple feet."
Raymond testified that he accompanied the complainant to the NPD station to exchange possession of the children with appellant. When appellant arrived, he was driving his truck erratically. And during the exchange, appellant "hit" the complainant. Raymond saw appellant "lunge[] forward," the complainant's entire body "go[] backward," and the complainant's "wrist hit the car."...
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