Crouch v. Benet

• Decision Date: 06 November 1941
• Docket Number: 15323.
• Parties: CROUCH v. BENET et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.E.2d 320

198 S.C. 185

CROUCH v. BENET et al.

No. 15323.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 6, 1941

R E. Carwile and F. Ehrlich Thomson, both of Columbia, for petitioner.

John M. Daniel, Atty. Gen., and M. J. Hough and T. C. Callison Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.

A. L GASTON, Acting Associate Justice.

This proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of Section 102 of Act No. 260 of Acts of 1941, 42 St. at Large, p. 421. The petition asks that respondents be enjoined and restrained perpetually from issuing certificates of indebtedness, as provided in Section 102 of said Act. The rule and temporary restraining order were heretofore, on August 28, 1941, issued by Mr. Chief Justice Bonham, requiring respondents to show cause why said petition should not be granted and respondents permanently enjoined.

Section 102 of Act No. 260 provides for issuance of certificates of indebtedness not exceeding five hundred and fifty thousand ($550,000) dollars at interest rate not to exceed four (4%) per cent per annum and to mature over a period of twenty (20) years. The proceeds derived from the sale of said certificates of indebtedness are to be used by the regents of the South Carolina State Hospital in providing additional buildings and facilities at said hospital and the State Training School. Both of these institutions are owned and operated by the State of South Carolina.

The petitioner appears in his own right and as a citizen and taxpayer of the State of South Carolina and in behalf of all other persons similarly situated who may come in and contribute to the costs of and expenses of this proceeding.

The sole contention of the petitioner is that the Act in question is unconstitutional, and should be declared null and void for the reason that it violates the provisions of Section 17 of Article 3 of our State Constitution which provides that: "Every Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."

The title of Act No. 260, which is generally referred to as the "General Appropriation Act," is "An Act to Make Appropriations to Meet the Ordinary Expenses of the State Government for the Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1941; to Provide Revenue to Defray the Same; for Borrowing Money; to Authorize the Issuance of Certificates of Indebtedness for Constructing Additional Buildings at the South Carolina State Hospital and at the State Training School and to Provide for the Payment Thereof; to Provide for Additional Revenue from the Tax on Alcoholic Beverages; to Limit the Sale of Certain Wines to Licensed Liquor Stores; and to Further Regulate the Fiscal Affairs of South Carolina." (Italics added).

The petitioner contends that there are three subjects expressed in the title and embraced in the body of the Act, which are diverse in their nature, have no necessary connection and are wholly unrelated, one of them being temporary in nature and two being permanent in nature as shown by Section 107 of the Act. The petition alleges that the Act relates to the immediate fiscal affairs of the State for the fiscal year 1941-1942, and that the issuance of bonds as provided for in said Act does not relate to the immediate fiscal affairs of the State, but provides funds for the construction of buildings for the institution in question (the bonds being payable over a period of twenty years) and "that it therefore violates the provisions of the above quoted section of the Constitution in that the title to and the body of the Act relates to more than one subject."

The law on this subject has been fully declared by this Court. This Court has consistently held that: "When general subject of act is expressed in title, any details of legislation which provide means, methods, or instrumentalities intended to facilitate accomplishment of general purpose and are germane to act may be embraced in body thereof without violating constitutional provision requiring that every act should relate to but one subject which should be expressed in title." Crawford v. Johnston, Governor, et al., 177 S.C. 399, 181 S.E. 476, and cases cited; Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S.C. 1, 164 S.E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1068; State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269; Freeman v. Holliday, 165 S.C. 408, 164 S.E. 20; Arthur v. Johnston, 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151.

Counsel for both parties have ably argued their positions in this case and have cited other authorities, but we think the recent decision of this Court amply sustains and settles the views herein expressed. In the decision in the case of Arthur v. Johnston, Governor, 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151, the opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Baker most clearly, convincingly and conclusively expounds the meaning, purpose and intent of this constitutional provision. We quote as follows (from page 332 of 185 S.C., page 155 of 194 S.E.):

"The title of the act indicates that its real purpose is to provide for the construction of buildings for certain state educational institutions. That is the subject of the act and the one subject thereof. To accomplish this purpose the act allocates a certain portion of the income tax, and since such allocation would reduce the revenues of the state now being used for school purposes, the liquor tax was increased. It is no doubt true that in the body of the act the connection between the various articles thereof might have been stated more explicitly.

"But it is no novel principle to construe an act with reference to its title, and the body of the act taken in connection with the title manifests the legislative purpose, to wit, to construct the much needed buildings, using the income tax for that purpose, and increasing the liquor tax to replace revenue available for school purposes depleted by such use of the income tax. Robson v. Cantwell, Supervisor, 143 S.C. 104-116, 141 S.E. 180, 181. Section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution must, of course, be liberally construed in the light of its purpose, which is really to prevent fraud on the Legislature by hodgepodge or logrolling methods. It certainly should not be so construed as to defeat the legislative will merely because the language of the act might have more clearly shown the connection between its various articles and sections. In the case of Poulnot v Cantwell, 129 S.C. 171, 123 S.E. 651, 653, the court held that as used in this section of the Constitution 'subject' 'is the thing legislated about, or the matter or matters upon which the legislation operates, to accomplish a definite object, or objects reasonably related one to the other."' In the light of these decisions an examination of the Act under consideration will disclose that it is not repugnant to Section 17, Article III, of our State Constitution. This Act provides for the fiscal affairs of the State government for the year beginning July 1, 1941, this being the primary object. To consummate this primary object certain certificates of indebtedness are authorized to be issued and sold, the proceeds derived therefrom to be used only in payment of the expenditures incurred in providing additional buildings and facilities at the South Carolina State Hospital and the State Training School. The Legislature is duty bound to make provisions for these State Institutions which care for those persons who are suffering from mental disease and who are incapacitated by reason of mental defects, this being the solemn duty of the State. The verified return herein shows that the prevailing greatly overcrowded conditions at these institutions has forced those in charge of the said institutions to deny requests for treatment and admission thereto to numerous persons suffering...