Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–5775.,12–5775.
• Citation: 720 F.3d 333
• Parties: Larry CROUCH, Rhonda Mae Crouch, Teddy Lee Hudson, and Carolyn Sue Hudson, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants, AVCO Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

720 F.3d 333

Larry CROUCH, Rhonda Mae Crouch, Teddy Lee Hudson, and Carolyn Sue Hudson, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants,AVCO Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–5775.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

May 14, 2013.

ON BRIEF:William R. Garmer, Jerome P. Prather, Garmer & Prather, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, Matthew C. Minner, Hare, Wynn, Newell and Newton, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama, for Appellants. Larry C. Deener, Elizabeth A. Deener, Landrum & Shouse LLP, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: DAUGHTREY, McKEAGUE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.

This case stems from a plane crash that resulted in serious injuries to both pilot and passenger. Among various claims against numerous defendants, plaintiffs allege that the aircraft engine manufacturer is liable for negligently failing to warn airplane owners and operators, and failing to notify regulatory authorities, of defects in the engine and its components. In granting the defendant manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that plaintiffs' allegations failed to make out a claim in avoidance of the applicable period of repose. The court also denied plaintiffs' post-judgment motion for leave to file a first amended complaint, concluding the asserted “newly discovered evidence” was not newly discovered. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's application of the General Aviation Revitalization Act and contend the court improperly denied them opportunity to continue discovery. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

On November 21, 2006, Larry Crouch was piloting his Piper Lance II single-engine airplane on a trip from Mayfield to Frankfort, Kentucky, with Teddy Lee Hudson as passenger. After losing engine power at an altitude of 5000 feet, and finding it impossible to reach an airport, Crouch made a forced landing in a field near Bardstown. Both occupants survived but suffered serious permanent injuries, including paraplegia.

According to at least one of plaintiffs' theories, investigation of the crash indicated the loss of power was caused by detachment of the magneto from the engine, due to a fractured mounting flange. The magneto generates the electrical charge needed to fire the spark plugs that power the engine. The engine was manufactured in 1978 by Lycoming Engines, a subsidiary of defendant AVCO Corporation. The magneto, a rebuilt component, was installed by John Jewell Aircraft, Inc. during a 2005 overhaul of the engine.² According to Jewell Aircraft, the overhaul was performed in accordance with the Lycoming Overhaul Manual.

Crouch and Hudson, along with their wives, Rhonda Mae Crouch and Carolyn Sue Hudson, commenced this action in November 2007, suing multiple defendants who were allegedly involved in the manufacture and maintenance of the aircraft and its engine, including AVCO. Their complaint sets forth a single claim in negligence against all defendants, in broad, general terms:

Defendants, ... in the ordinary course of their business, had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, engineering, testing, manufacture, installation, assembly, maintenance and overhaul of the engine, its components and accessories, and to generate and publish warnings, manuals and other product support material relating to the said engine, its components and accessories.

R.1 Complaint ¶ 24, p. 8, Page ID # 9. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants breached this duty by:

a. Failing to reasonably design, engineer, test, manufacture, install, assemble, maintain and/or overhaul the engine, its components and accessories;

b. Failing to adequately warn the owners and operators of the defects in the engine, its components and accessories;

c. Failing to reasonably and adequately notify the regulatory authorities including the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) of the defects in the engine, its components and accessories;

d. Failing to correct known defects in the engine, its components and accessories; and

e. Unreasonably representing, certifying, and/or warranting as airworthy the aircraft, the engine, its components and accessories.

Id. at ¶ 25, p. 9, Page ID # 10.

In relation to AVCO's asserted liability, plaintiffs contend the engine failure resulted from the separation of the magneto installed during an overhaul performed according to instructions in a manual AVCO was obliged to publish and update. Plaintiffs'theory, not specifically set forth in the complaint, is that the overhaul manual instructions were flawed due to AVCO's negligence.

In December 2009, AVCO moved for summary judgment based on the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”), 49 U.S.C. § 40101 Notes. AVCO argued that GARA's 18–year period of repose bars plaintiffs' negligence claim against AVCO based on actions taken in its capacity as manufacturer because the engine was manufactured in 1978, twenty-eight years before the plane crash. In response, plaintiffs emphasized that the court had permitted only limited discovery up to that point, which had handicapped them in their ability to respond to the time-bar defense. They maintained that AVCO's motion was premature. Plaintiffs also contended (1) that GARA does not apply because AVCO is not sued in its capacity as a manufacturer but as a manual publisher; (2) that even if GARA applies, the revised overhaul manual represents a replacement “part” or “component,” the issuance of which triggered a new 18–year period; and (3) that incomplete discovery had revealed that another potential exception to the time-bar may apply (i.e., that AVCO had knowingly misrepresented or withheld required information from the Federal Aviation Administration).

The district court originally denied AVCO's motion for summary judgment on July 12, 2010. In doing so, however, the court narrowed the scope of plaintiffs' surviving claim against AVCO. The court ruled that the revised overhaul manual is not a “part” of the aircraft such as would give rise to a new 18–year period. Yet, the court ruled that the GARA time-bar did not come into play anyway, because AVCO was not sued in its capacity as a manufacturer, but rather for actions taken as an overhaul manual publisher. Finally, the court rejected the notion that plaintiffs' complaint contained sufficiently specific allegations of knowing misrepresentation or withholding of required information by AVCO to warrant further proceedings on such a theory. Thus, while nominally denying AVCO's motion, the court concluded its ruling in a manner that limited further proceedings to plaintiffs' claim of “negligent overhaul-manual authorship.”

AVCO moved for reconsideration, but plaintiffs did not. On November 1, 2010, the district court changed its ruling, concluding that because AVCO was required by law to produce maintenance and overhaul manuals in conjunction with its manufacturing of aircraft parts, AVCO, for purposes of its alleged liability in this case, was acting in its capacity as a manufacturer. The court thus held that plaintiffs' claim against AVCO was barred by GARA's 18–year rule, because the engine for which AVCO published the overhaul manual was manufactured more than eighteen years prior to the plane crash. The court expressly noted that this reconsideration did not alter its earlier determination that the revised overhaul manual is not a “part” that could be deemed to restart the period of repose.

On November 29, 2010, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the court's order granting summary judgment to AVCO and moved for leave to file a first amended complaint so as to specifically set forth their claim for misrepresentation or withholding of required information. These motions remained under advisement in March 2011, when plaintiffs moved to supplement the motions with newly discovered evidence showing that AVCO published a service instruction on February 11, 2011, detailing the correct procedure for attaching the magneto installation hardware. The district court finally ruled on August 17, 2011, granting the motion to supplement, but nonetheless denying the motions for reconsideration and for leave to amend.

Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on September 14, 2011, but the appeal was dismissed sua sponte on January 19, 2012, for lack of proper “final judgment” certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The district court subsequently issued an improved Rule 54(b) certification, explaining why its interlocutory summary judgment order disposing of plaintiffs' action against AVCO is final and appealable under the standard prescribed in Corrosioneering v. Thyssen Envitl. Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir.1986). Plaintiffs immediately filed another notice of appeal, challenging the summary judgment ruling and denial of reconsideration. The district court's supplemental Rule 54(b) order is facially sufficient and we are satisfied that appellate jurisdiction is properly exercised in this case.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

An order granting summary judgment is subject to de novo review. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir.2008). Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Before ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must afford the parties adequate time for discovery, in light of the circumstances of the case. Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp., Packard Elec. Div., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.1995). The reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. White, 533 F.3d at 390. Not just any alleged factual dispute between the parties will defeat an otherwise properly...