Hopkins v. Chartrand
| Decision Date | 20 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-3964 |
| Parties | JOHN HOPKINS; GREGG BOYLES, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KEVIN M. CHARTRAND, Individually and as Geauga County Coroner, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
COLE, Circuit Judge. John Hopkins and Gregg Boyles appeal the grant of summary judgment in this Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") overtime-pay dispute. Hopkins and Boyles served as investigators for the Geauga County Coroner. After the county eliminated their positions due to financial constraints, Hopkins and Boyles filed suit in federal court alleging that the county failed to pay them overtime wages as required under the FLSA and Ohio law. The district court granted summary judgment to the coroner on this claim. Because the coroner's belated assertion of an affirmative defense under the FLSA precluded the investigators fromconducting meaningful discovery on their claim, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hopkins and Boyles served as full-time investigators for the Geauga County Coroner's Office for the better part of the last decade. During the course of their employment, both men received an annual salary that the county distributed in bi-weekly paychecks based upon an eighty-hour pay period. As full-time investigators, they worked in the coroner's office during regular business hours but also were responsible for responding to the scene when deaths occurred during non-business hours. These duties regularly required both men to work in excess of forty hours per week, but the county did not provide them with overtime compensation. Indeed, the coroner never undertook any investigation to determine whether his employees were entitled to overtime; instead, he merely paid them their bi-weekly salaries, as his predecessor had done, under the assumption that the investigators were not entitled to overtime.
Hopkins's and Boyles's duties included the following: responding to death calls, processing the scene of a death, interviewing family members or witnesses, taking responsibility for the bodies of the deceased, taking photographs and collecting evidence, and documenting their findings for the coroner's report. In short, they were responsible for conducting investigations and compiling the appropriate investigative paperwork for the coroner's reports. Additionally, both men were responsible for ensuring the security of the coroner's office. Hopkins, who served as "Chief Investigator," also performed certain clerical duties, including preparing financial reports and yearly budgets for the coroner to review; paying the office's bills; dealing with vendors; keeping statistics and entering data; and handling personnel matters, suchas supervising the activities of other investigators, training new employees, and signing off on various work records. Boyles's duties also involved managing the evidence room.
During the late 2000s, Geauga County experienced declining revenues and related budgetary shortfalls. Accordingly, the Board of County Commissioners informed Chartrand in the fall of 2010 that he should consider defunding the investigators' positions. Shortly after, Chartrand notified the investigators that the county was abolishing their positions due to the downturn in the economy and related budgetary restrictions. The layoffs went into effect on February 28, 2011.
Believing that they were classified civil servants and therefore protected from the layoffs in question, Hopkins and Boyles filed this action against Chartrand in federal district court in November 2011. They alleged violations of the FLSA and the Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as supplemental state-law claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. On appeal, Hopkins and Boyles challenge only the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count IV of their complaint, which alleged that Chartrand violated the FLSA's overtime requirements and a companion provision from Ohio Revised Code § 4111.03(A), which provides that employers have the same state-law obligations to pay overtime as mandated by the FLSA.
Chartrand answered the complaint on December 14, 2011, and denied that Hopkins and Boyles were eligible to receive overtime pay under the FLSA and Ohio law. He also raised the following affirmative defense: "Defendant has complied with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and all applicable amendments." Chartrand's answer did not, however, specificallyreference any of the overtime-pay exemptions contained in the FLSA or expressly assert that Hopkins and Boyles were exempt employees.
At the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Hopkins and Boyles noted that the FLSA's overtime exemptions, set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213, are affirmative defenses that Chartrand had not specifically pleaded in his answer. Therefore, they argued that Chartrand had forfeited the benefit of those exemptions and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Chartrand filed his motion for summary judgment the same day. Despite not pleading the statutory overtime exemptions in his answer, he argued that both Hopkins and Boyles were exempt from the FLSA's overtime wage requirements as bona fide "administrative" employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). In addition, Chartrand argued that Hopkins, who served as Chief Investigator, also was exempt as a bona fide "executive" employee. See id.
A month later, Chartrand filed a motion "to clarify and/or amend" his answer with specific reference to both the administrative and executive exemptions set forth in § 213(a)(1). Hopkins and Boyles objected, arguing that such a belated amendment would prejudice them given the fact-intensive nature of the FLSA exemptions and their inability to develop the record. The district court granted Chartrand's motion to amend in a marginal entry order, and Chartrand amended his answer the following day.
On July 18, 2013, the court granted Chartrand's motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' FLSA claim. Hopkins v. Chartrand, No. 1:11 CV 2558, 2013 WL 3787596, at *7 (N.D. Ohio, July 18, 2013). The court concluded that both investigators qualified as exempt administrative employees under the FLSA's implementing regulations. Id. at *6-7(citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(1)-(3)). The court did not, however, pass upon Chartrand's argument that Hopkins also qualified under the executive-employee exemption. Id.
Hopkins and Boyles timely appealed. They first argue that the district court abused its discretion by permitting Chartrand to amend his answer to include specific reference to the FLSA's statutory exemptions. Hopkins and Boyles next argue that even if the amendment were proper, the district court erred in determining, at this stage of the proceedings, that they were exempt from the FLSA's overtime-pay requirements.
The district court had jurisdiction over the FLSA claims under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law overtime claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to allow a party to amend a pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 837 (6th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine dispute as to a material question of fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of proof on both points. Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether this standard is met, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferencesin its favor." Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 720 F.3d 333, 338 (6th Cir. 2013). "Before ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must afford the parties adequate time for discovery, in light of the circumstances of the case." Id.
Hopkins and Boyles first argue that Chartrand forfeited reliance on the FLSA's overtime-pay exemptions by not specifically raising them in his answer and that the district court abused its discretion by granting Chartrand's belated motion to clarify or amend. We agree in part because the district court granted summary judgment without affording additional discovery.
The overtime-pay exemptions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213 are affirmative defenses that defendants must prove. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F. 3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2010). As such, defendants must generally claim an exemption in their first responsive pleading or we will consider the defense forfeited. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 911 (6th Cir. 2004). The purpose of Rule 8(c)'s pleading requirement is to give the opposing party notice of the defense and a chance to rebut it. Mickowski v. Visi-Trak Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 506 (6th Cir. 2005). To be sure, Chartrand's answer failed to cite with specificity the overtime exemptions upon which he relied in his motion for summary judgment.
Nevertheless, the "failure to raise an affirmative defense by responsive pleading does not always result in [forfeiture] of the defense—such as, when the plaintiff receives notice of the affirmative defense by some other...
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