Crouch v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 21 March 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 28157.,28157. |
| Citation | 390 Ill. 112,60 N.E.2d 879 |
| Parties | CROUCH v. MURPHY, Director of Labor. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Michael Feinberg, judge.
Proceeding on certiorari by Arthur B. Crouch, doing business as Marland Cartage Company, to review findings of Francis B. Murphy, Director of Labor, that petitioner had six employees during 38 calendar weeks of the year 1940, and was therefore liable for contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Act. From a judgment of the circuit court quashing the writ of certiorari, affirming the decision of the Director of Labor and entering judgment for the amount found due under the Act, petitioner appeals.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Klohr & Merrick, of Chicago (Hubert C. Merrick, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The question involved in this lawsuit is whether one William Bastyr had five or six employees during thirty-eight calendar weeks of the year 1939, as contemplated by the Unemployment Compensation Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 48, par. 217 et seq. Bastyr was engaged in the trucking business as the Marland Cartage Company. He died early in 1940 and appellant, Arthur B. Crouch, his son-in-law, took over the trucks, he having a lien on them for money advanced, and operated them. If Bastyr had but five employees during the period referred to in 1939, then no liability exists in this case. If he six employees, it is conceded that the sum of $568.45 assessed against appellant as his successor, is correct. Specifically the issue is narrowed down to whether one Harriet Nelson was an employee of William Bastyr in 1939. Appellant contends that she never was an employee of William Bastyr but was, during all that period, in full time employment with Phillips Petroleum Company, of whom appellant, Crouch, was the manager.
William Bastyr in 1939 owned and operated four dump trucks under the name of Marland Cartage Company. He and his employees hauled limestone from different stone quarries on a day-to-day basis. The evidence is that the quarries kept all books and rendered statements together with checks to Bastyr. During this time appellant Crouch was manager of the Phillips Petroleum Company, located in Cook county, and Bastyr's name was listed in the telephone directory under the same number as the Phillips gasoline station. Harriet Nelson was a full-time, paid employee of the Phillips Petroleum Company as bookkeeper, stenographer, stock and order clerk. The evidence shows that she also at times received hauling orders for Bastyr when he and appellant were not present. She occasionally helped Bastyr, as an accommodation, when he became confused in keeping his books, but received no pay for any services she performed for him. She was in no sense under his direction. He kept his own books in so far as he had any. Harriet Nelson never at any time did nay stenographic work for him or work of any other kind for remuneration of any sort. She had no contract of service with him and the evidence shows that what she did for him was simply occasional and as an accommodation, as her full time was taken by Phillips Petroleum Company.
One Miller, a field auditor, for the Department of Labor, on examination of the books of the Marland Cartage Company in March, 1940, reported the Marland CartageCompany as having six employees for thirty-eight weeks of the year 1939, of whom Harriet Nelson was one. This report was affirmed over the protest of appellant who sued out a writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Cook county, which writ was quashed, the decision of the Director of Labor was affirmed and judgment entered. Appellant insists here that the finding of the Department that Harriet Nelson rendered services in the employment of Bastyr, and therefore was in employment with appellant, not only is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, but there is no evidence in the record to support such a finding. This constitutes the issue in the lawsuit.
Appellant argues here that the act should be construed as designed and intended to cover persons whose work or services were performed for remuneration in some form, while appellee, on the other hand, insists that the act being remedial legislation should be liberally construed, and that under the facts of this case Harriet Nelson's services constituted employment as defined by section 2(f)(1) of the act, and that, as the act no longer contains requirements that the services be performed for wages, the fact that she was paid no wages does not militate against the contention that she was in employment.
This court has construed the Unemployment Compensation Act to be remedial legislation and held that it should be liberally construed to the end that intended benefits under its provisions be received by employees, and that the act is to be strictly construed against an employer claiming exemption from liability. Grant Contracting Co. v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 137, 56 N.E.2d 313;Zehender & Factor, Inc. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 258, 53 N.E.2d 944. It was held in the cases cited that the common-law concept of master and servant does not apply to this act. These holdings, however, afford no ground for any unusual or tortuous construction of the language of the act. As originally enacted and until the amendment of 1939, employment was defined as ‘service, * * * performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.’ Sec. 2(f)(1), Unemployment Compensation Act 1937, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 48, s 218(f)(1). The amendment effective May 24, 1939, omitted the words ‘for wages.’ It did not exclude, however, remuneration in any form as the basis of employment under the act. The effect of the amendment was to widen the definition to include remuneration in any form. Van Ogden, Inc. v. Murphy, Ill.Sup., 60 N.E.2d 877.
The Unemployment Compensation Act declares its policy and moving purpose to be to alleviate the evils flowing from widespread unemployment and to provide benefits to those workers coming within the act as at least a partial...
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