Crow, In re

• Decision Date: 26 April 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 13682
• Citation: 483 P.2d 1206,4 Cal.3d 613,94 Cal.Rptr. 254
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 483 P.2d 1206 In re Guy Thomas CROW on Habeas Corpus.

Page 254

94 Cal.Rptr. 254

4 Cal.3d 613, 483 P.2d 1206

In re Guy Thomas CROW on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 13682.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 26, 1971.

Guy Thomas Crow, in pro. per., and Douglas C. Busath, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

This case involves the application of the doctrine of res judicata to a final judgment of the superior court granting relief in habeas corpus. We shall explain why we have concluded that the judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County granting petitioner habeas corpus relief became a final judgment on the merits when the People failed to appeal under Penal Code, section 1506. The merits of petitioner's claim and the jurisdiction of the Sacramento court to grant relief in habeas corpus were fully and fairly litigated before that tribunal. We see no reason why the People should be permitted in this collateral proceeding to relitigate the merits of the case. We hold that the writ should issue and the petitioner should be remanded for proceedings consistent with the judgment of the Sacramento Superior Court.

1. The facts.

On April 30, 1958, petitioner, Guy Thomas Crow, was found guilty in Los Angeles Superior Court of violating Penal Code, section 288. The trial court suspended judgment and sentence and appointed a doctor to examine petitioner to determine whether he should receive treatment at Atascadero State Hospital. As a consequence of that examination the court on May 21, 1958, further suspended the criminal proceedings and committed petitioner to the hospital for a period not to exceed 90 days. Then, on July 31, 1958, the court committed petitioner to the Department of Mental Hygiene, Atascadero State Hospital, for an indeterminate period. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6316, formerly Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5512.) He subsequently escaped.

Petitioner was apprehended and returned for trial on the escape charge. ¹ On January 12, 1959, in the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, petitioner pleaded guilty to the escape--a violation of Health and Safety Code, section 5522 (presently Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6330)--and the court sentenced him to the state penitentiary. While serving his term in prison, petitioner filed a formal request with the Los Angeles Superior Court for prompt resumption of the section 288 proceedings. Both the Los Angeles Superior Court and the Los Angeles District Attorney's office refused to proceed immediately with the sentencing. ² Petitioner served two and one-half years on the escape conviction and was due to be released on parole. The Los Angeles District Attorney's office, however, exercised a 'hold' on petitioner and returned him for the conclusion of the trial on the original section 288 charge. On August 28, 1961, the Los Angeles Superior Court sentenced petitioner to state prison for the term prescribed by law.

On February 19, 1962, while confined at Folsom State Prison, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Sacramento County Superior Court, alleging that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial on the basis of the facts stated above. (Pen.Code, §§ 1473--1474.) The Sacramento court granted the writ and ordered it returnable before that court on April 10, 1962. (See Pen.Code, §§ 1476, 1481.)

On that date, petitioner, represented by an assistant public defender, appeared before Judge Raymond T. Coughlin of the Sacramento County Superior Court. A deputy district attorney represented the People. A transcript of the hearing indicates that the parties stipulated to the truth of the facts stated in the petition. Petitioner's counsel argued that since the court has disregarded his demand for prompt sentencing, the court should discharge him from custody under Penal Code, section 1381. ³ The People argued that Penal Code section 1381 should not apply to this delayed sentencing case but, instead, that the sentencing provisions of Penal Code, sections 1191 and 1202 were appropriate. ⁴ Lastly, the deputy district attorney contended that petitioner had not been prejudiced by the two and one-half-year delay in sentencing and that this procedural error should not be cognizable on habeas corpus. Arguing that the right to a speedy trial was fundamental, petitioner submitted that the lengthy delay had prejudiced him by the loss of the time in which his sentences could have been served concurrently. The court took the case under submission.

On June 29, 1962, the superior court found that all of the allegations of the petition for writ of habeas corpus were true and that petitioner was entitled to a new trial pursuant to Penal Code, section 1202. The Sacramento court ordered petitioner into the custody of the Los Angeles Superior Court and directed the District Attorney of Los Angeles County to commence a new trial against petitioner for a violation of section 288 as originally charged. ⁵ The People did not appeal under Penal Code, section 1506 and the Sacramento Superior Court judgment became final.

On September 27, 1962, petitioner appeared in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The Los Angeles court heard arguments on the matter, 'dismissed' the Sacramento court's order, and remanded petitioner to state prison in accordance with its sentence of August 28, 1961. ⁶ 2. The Sacramento Superior Court determined that petitioner was entitled to a new trial under Penal Code, section 1202.

Having issued a writ of habeas corpus to bring the petitioner before the court for the consideration of his allegations, the Sacramento County Superior Court heard the evidence and arguments of counsel. The deputy district attorney contended that habeas corpus should not reach petitioner's claim, arguing against petitioner's absolute release from custody. The deputy district attorney actually suggested, however, that if the court determined that habeas corpus lay, the court should grant petitioner a new trial under Penal Code, section 1202. After a full hearing, the superior court concluded that habeas corpus would lie, accepted the deputy district attorney's suggestion, and determined that petitioner was entitled to a new trial under Penal Code, section 1202.

The granted relief fell clearly within the court's jurisdiction. Having issued a writ of habeas corpus (Pen.Code, § 1476), the court's power could not be limited to either discharging the petitioner from, or remanding him to, custody (Pen.Code, §§ 1485, 1486), but extended to disposing of him 'as the justice of the case may require' (Pen.Code, § 1484; see In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875 fn. 4, 87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1). It included the power to transfer defendant from the custody of the warden to the custody of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. (Pen.Code, § 1493.) ⁷ The court's order rested on its determination that the Superior Court of Los Angeles County exceeded its jurisdiction (Pen.Code, § 1487, subd. 1) by delaying for two and one-half years to impose judgment, thereby depriving petitioner of the possibility of serving concurrent sentences; and that this delay violated the mandate of Penal Code, section 1202. In determining that petitioner was entitled to a new trial under section 1202, the Superior Court of Sacramento County necessarily invalidated the judgment against him and set the case at large as though it had never been tried. (Pen.Code, § 1180; see In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302, 313--314, 240 P.2d 596.)

Instead of effectuating the order of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County purported to dismiss that order, apparently on the theory that one superior court cannot tell another superior court what to do. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, however did not direct the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to do anything. Rather, the court ordered the warden at Folsom to deliver petitioner into the custody of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles; and 'the District Attorney of Los Angeles is directed to commence a new trial against petitioner Thomas Crow, for a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code of the State of California as originally charged in Superior Court Action No. 199533.' The court merely recognized that upon the order of the court setting aside the judgment and determining the petitioner was entitled to a new trial, the District Attorney of Los Angeles was then obliged to proceed with such a new trial, or move to dismiss in the interests of justice. (See Note, Individualized Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Study of Dispositional Decision Making (1968) 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1260, 1278 fn. 90.)

Even if we assume that the Sacramento Superior Court's order, directed to the district attorney, exceeded its jurisdiction, such excess would in no way invalidate its order setting the case at large for a new trial. Under these circumstances, the order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles purporting to reinstate its judgment and re-commit petitioner pursuant thereto cannot stand. There no longer remained any underlying conviction on which such judgment could be based. (Pen.Code, § 1180.)

3. Since the People failed to appeal, the Sacramento Superior Court judgment became res judicata.

The People had the right to appeal the decision of the Sacramento County Superior Court granting petitioner habeas corpus relief. ⁸ Penal Code, section 1506 provides: 'An appeal may be taken * * * by the people from a final order of a superior court made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant or otherwise granting all or any part of the relief sought * * *.' (See In re Ketchel (1968) 68 Cal.2d 397, 399, 66 Cal.Rptr. 881, 438 P.2d 625; In re Chessman (1955) 44 Cal.2d 1, 4--6, 279 P.2d 24; In re Murdock (1936) 5 Cal.2d 644, 646, 55 P.2d 843; (prior to enactment of section 1506 in 1927...