Crow v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 08 January 1887
• Citation: 2 S.W. 659,48 Ark. 169
• Parties: CROW v. WATKINS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2 S.W. 659

48 Ark. 169

CROW v. WATKINS

Supreme Court of Arkansas

January 8, 1887

APPEAL from White Circuit Court, in Chancery, Hon. M. T. SANDERS Judge.

Decree affirmed.

Cypert & Sanders, for appellant.

The consideration for the land having been paid by the estate of Travis Crow, and the deed being taken in the name of the widow of Travis Crow, a resulting trust arose in favor of appellant as the only heir of Travis Crow, deceased. 16 Ark 255; 42 ib., 193; Perry on Trusts, sec. 128.

Such trust arises from the fact that the money of the cestui que trust, and not that of the grantee, was used in the purchasing of the land. 40 Ark. 62; Hill on Trustees, 91; Story's Eq. Jur., 631. The trust in this case arose by operation of law, and may be established by parol evidence. (Ib., sec. 137.) All competent evidence is admissible, such as the admission of the nominal purchaser, as well as the declarations of the administrator. (Ib.) Such proof may be admitted as well after the death of the nominal purchaser or the grantee as before, and may contradict the express declarations in the deed to the effect that the money was paid by the grantee. Ib., sec. 138; Bisp. Eq., sec. 83; 9 Ark. 527; 42 ib., 511; ib., 193; 39 ib., 313; 18 ib., 79; 44 ib., 365.

The declarations of the old men, Crow and Barnett, were admissible, and they show that the consideration came from the estate of Travis Crow. Perry on Trusts, secs. 137-8; Bisp. Eq., sec. 83; 9 Ark. 527; 42 ib., 511; 42 ib., 193; 39 ib., 313; 18 ib., 79; 44 Ark. 365; Greenleaf's Ev., sec 108. See, also, Milner v. Freeman, 40 Ark. 68.

Mrs Watkins, in conversation, admitted that the land was bought with money of Travis Crow's estate. Banks v. Green, 35 Ark. 84.

W. R. Coody and J. W. House, for appellee.

From the facts of this case plaintiff has no interest in the land, nor does any trust arise for his benefit.

First--An express trust cannot be created by parol. It can be manifested and proven only by writing. (Mansf. Dig., sec. 3382; Perry on Trusts, secs. 75 to 80.) The deed in this case was absolute, and cannot be disputed by parol evidence.

Second--A resulting trust cannot arise from the fact that it does not appear that one party paid the money and took the deed in the name of another, the parties being strangers to each other.. (Perry on Trusts, sec. 120.) When any near relationship exists, or where a duty or obligation exists, a trust is never presumed, but the presumption of a gift or advancement arises, and must be overcome by clear and positive proof to the contrary. Perry on Trusts, sec. 143; 40 Ark. 62; 41 ib., 301.

J. B. Crow owed the estate nothing. The Confederate money received for the sale of the negro was worthless, and the administrator could have gotten credit for the money. 36 Ark. 396-7; 25 ib., 574.

A trust cannot arise from a previous payment, any more than it can from an after payment, from the fact that a payment, either before or after, can have no reference to the sale or purchase. It must be an actual payment of the money, and result at the time, or not at all. Perry on Trusts, sec. 133; 27 Ark. 86.

Third--We presume that the plaintiff will not contend for an express or resulting trust in this case, but we thought it best to notice them. We presume that their contention will be that S. B. Barnett was the administrator of Travis Crow's estate, and that this Confederate money claim was assets of the estate in the hands of the administrator, and that the lands were purchased with this trust fund, and thereby became part of the estate and subject to the claim of the heirs.

This proposition, if true, as a principle, would seem to be well established, but in this case it has no application.

1. Because, as we have seen, J. B. Crow was under no legal obligation to pay the estate anything; nor did he legally owe it anything.

2. Because the sale of the negro and the receipt of the Confederate money created no right of action against J. B. Crow, in behalf of the estate, which could have been sustained by the administrator.

3. Because the administrator never regarded the land as part of the assets of the estate--never charged himself with them, or regarded it as in any way connected with the estate.

4. If Barnett, as administrator, had a valid claim against Crow, who was solvent, and he failed to collect it, he would be responsible to the heirs upon his bond. Jones v. Graham, 36 Ark. 383.

5. Because no money, or effects of any kind, ever came into the hands of Barnett, as administrator, except what he accounted for.

6. Because the conveyance of the land was the consideration for the settlement, and if J. B. Crow was not allowed to give his daughter-in-law this land as a home, he would not settle at all.

7. Because this conveyance was the sole and only reason of his agreeing to pay anything on this matter, upon which he was not bound to pay one cent.

8. Because J. B. Crow was not bound to account for the Confederate money, and he could give or withhold what he pleased--all or part. He could dictate his own terms of adjustment. He could do what he pleased; and having done this, his reasons cannot be questioned. He settled this way--he was not bound to settle any other. The estate made $ 500; Mrs. Crow got a home for herself and children, and who can deny his right to make choice of the recipients of his bounty?

We would be willing to admit that, if the estate had held the note of J. B. Crow, or a valid, enforcible claim against his estate, and the administrator had taken the lands on payment of the claim and taken the deed to himself, that possibly the heirs might have followed the land, as the trust might and probably would have attached to the lands received by the administrator in payment of this claim, as in the case of Hill, Fontaine & Co. v. Coolidge, 33 Ark. 622.

But that is not this case. Here was no trust fund--in fact, no fund at all; and it is only when a trust fund is converted into another species of property, by the trustee, that the original owner of the fund can follow it. 2 Story on Equity, sec. 1258; 30 Ark. 66.

There is but little evidence in this case tending to establish a trust--in fact, none of any such character as can affect this deed and establish a trust. Before an absolute deed can be treated as a trust, upon parol evidence, it must be clear and conclusive, and of such a degree of certainty as to leave no well-founded doubt as to the fund or its character, or as to the intention of the parties; and more especially after a long lapse of time and the death of all the others in the transaction, as in this case. Perry on Trusts, secs. 137-8-9; Crittenden v. Woodruff, 11 Ark. 82; 4 American Decisions, 66, Snelling v. Utterback; 59 ib., 88, Hollida v. Shoop; 57 ib., 606, Strimpler v. Roberts.

1. TRUST: How established by parol evidence.

OPINION

COCKRILL, C. J.

We cannot regard the evidence adduced to establish a resulting trust in the lands in dispute as sufficient for that purpose. In order that parol evidence may have the effect of converting an absolute deed into a trust for the benefit of a stranger, it must be of such clearness and certainty of purpose as to leave no well founded doubt upon the subject. Robinson v. Robinson, 45 Ark. 481; Crittenden v. Woodruff, 11 Ark. 82; Perry on Trusts, secs. 137-9.

There is but little positive testimony to the point in the record of this case. The appellant relies upon inferences drawn from the declarations and conduct of his two grandfathers, one of whom was the grantor in the deed which he claims should inure to his benefit, and the other was the administrator of his father's estate when the deed was executed. The testimony goes back to periods eighteen years and more before the suit was instituted.

The deed was executed to the appellant's mother by her deceased husband's father, in 1860, and the claim now is, that the consideration paid for the conveyance emanated from the estate of her deceased husband, whose only heir is the appellant.

The facts are that the lands belonged to J. B. Crow, the appellant's grandfather. His son, Travis Crow, the appellant's father, resided upon them with his family by permission of the elder Crow. Travis Crow's chief...