Crow v. Whitfield
Decision Date | 02 March 1962 |
Docket Number | 39235,Nos. 39234,No. 2,s. 39234,2 |
Citation | 124 S.E.2d 648,105 Ga.App. 436 |
Parties | Mercer CROW v. Maxine C. WHITFIELD. Mercer CROW v. Maxine C. WHITFIELD et al |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where the statute of limitations has not run a judgment of nonsuit does not operate as res judicata six months after such judgment of nonsuit is rendered.
2. Where an Administrator has been appointed to administer the estate of a deceased who supposedly died intestate the later production and probate of a will of such deceased serves as a revocation of such letters of administration except as to such part of the estate as has been fully administered, and the holder of such letters of administration, unless otherwise interested in the administration of such estate, is not a proper party to file a caveat to an application for letters of administration with the will annexed.
On February 1, 1960, Mercer Crow, as Administrator of the estate of Nancy M. Crow, filed an application with the Ordinary of Forsyth County seeking permission to sell certain land as a part of the estate for the purpose of making distribution to the heirs. On February 27, 1960, Mrs. Maxine Whitfield, Ray Crow and Rex Crow filed their objections to such application for leave to sell such land and alleged: A copy of the order of the Court of Ordinary of Forsyth County wherein the will of Nancy M. Crow was probated in common form was attached as an exhibit to such objections. Thereafter, Mercer Crow filed a plea denominated as a plea of res judicata in which it was contended that the issues raised by the objectors had been decided adversely to them in separate litigation in the Superior Court of Forsyth County.
On February 27, 1960, Mrs. Maxine Whitfield also filed an application for appointment as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Mrs. Nancy M. Crow, the applicant's grandmother, and on May 2, 1960, Mercer Crow filed a caveat to such application in which he alleged: .
The Ordinary of Forsyth County found for Mercer Crow on both applications and on separate appeals to the Superior Court of Forsyth County such findings were reversed and judgments adverse to Mercer Crow rendered. Thereafter, the motions for new trial of Mercer Crow were overruled and in separate writs of error he excepts to such judgments adverse to him.
Stow & Andrews, Robert E. Andrews, Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
Everett C. Brannon, Sr., Gainesville, for defendants in error.
1. The cases were heard by the Judge of the Superior Court without the intervention of a jury and on stipulations that the pleadings were to be considered as evidence. In case number 39235, wherein the application to sell real estate for the purpose of distributing the estate was being resisted, Mercer Crow filed a plea of res judicata and attached as an exhibit the petitions and answers in two former cases as well as a judgment of nonsuit rendered against the mother of the objectors in one of such actions. In the brief of the plaintiff in error it is stated: 'There is only one issue to be determined in this cause: Did the trial and judgment in the former cause in Forsyth Superior Court, amount to res judicata of the issues raised by the objections filed by defendants in...
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