Crowe v. Domestic Loans, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18061,18061
• Citation: 130 S.E.2d 845,242 S.C. 310
• Parties: Daniel C. CROWE, Respondent, v. DOMESTIC LOANS, INC. and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, of which Domestic Loans, Inc., is, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 845

130 S.E.2d 845

242 S.C. 310

Daniel C. CROWE, Respondent, v. DOMESTIC LOANS, INC. and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, of

which Domestic Loans, Inc., is, Appellant.

No. 18061.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 26, 1963.

McLain, Sherrill & Morrisette, Columbia, for appellant.

Smith & Drawdy, Columbia, for respondent.

MOSS, Justice.

Daniel C. Crowe, the respondent herein, brought this action against Domestic Loans, Inc., the appellant herein, and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, to recover damages for alleged wrongful interference with his contractual relation with Eckerd's Drug Stores. The appellant demurred to the complaint on the ground that there was no allegation therein of concerted action by it with Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, and no allegation showing that the independent acts combined and concurred in causing injury to the respondent. The Trial Judge overruled the demurrer of the appellant and this appeal followed. The sole question for determination is whether there was error on the part of the Trial Judge in overruling the demurrer of the appellant.

The respondent, by his complaint, alleges that on December 15, 1961, he entered into an employment contract with Eckerd's Drug Stores as a drug clerk. He also alleges that he was indebted to the appellant and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, and was unable to discharge his indebtedness to these two firms and was in arrears in the payment of said indebtedness. It is then alleged that the appellant and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, through their agents and employees, began to call him by telephone and, contemporaneously therewith, to call his manager and supervisor about his indebtedness and such calls continued over a period of weeks, and as a result and because of such calls to respondent's manager and supervisor, he was, on March 22, 1962, discharged from his employment, the manager stating that his discharge was caused by these telephone calls. It is then alleged that the acts of the appellant and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia, acting through their agents and employees, were a willful and malicious interference with respondent's contract of employment with Eckerd's Drug Stores and caused a breach of his contract with his employer. It is then alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the willful, malicious and unwarranted acts of the appellant and Lenders, Inc. of West Columbia combining, concurring and uniting, the respondent suffered the loss of his employment.

It is elementary that in passing upon a demurrer, the Court is limited to a consideration of the pleadings under attack, all of the factual allegations whereof that are properly pleaded are for the purpose of such consideration deemed admitted. With a fact is well pleaded, whatever inference of law or conclusions of fact that may properly arise therefrom are to be regarded as embraced in such averment. Warr v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 237 S.C. 121, 115 S.E.2d 799.

The case of Smith v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of South Carolina, et al., 241 S.C. 285, 128 S.E.2d 112, was one in which the plaintiff brought an action for damages, asserting that the bank tortuously interfered with his contractual relations with a third party. In the cited case, we said:

'It is now settled in this State that 'parties to a contract have a property right therein, which a third person has no more right maliciously to deprive them of, or injure them in, than he would have to injure their property. Such an injury, without sufficient justification, amounts to a tort for which the injured party may seek compensation by an action in tort for damages.' Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S.C. 262, 1 S.E.2d 162, 163. It is upon the foregoing principles that the present action is based.

'However, in order to constitute actionable interference with a contract, it must appear that the act complained of was the proximate cause of the injury or damage. 30 Am.Jur., Interference, Sections 28 and 29; Annos.: 84 A.L.R. 51 and 26 A.L.R.2d 1249.'

The foregoing doctrine had its genesis in the early English case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl., 216, 118 Eng.Rep. 749, where it was held that malicious interference by a third person, inducing the breach of a contract for personal services is actionable.

The...