Crowe v. J.C. Penney, Inc.

Decision Date06 January 1986
Docket NumberNo. 70994,70994
Citation340 S.E.2d 192,177 Ga.App. 586
PartiesCROWE v. J.C. PENNEY, INC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Scott Walters, Jr., East Point, for appellant.

John F. Wymer III, Ginger S. McRae, Atlanta, for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Mary Louise Crowe, commenced this action against the appellee, J.C. Penney, Inc., alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment, and asserting a claim for sick pay benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment for the appellee, and Crowe appeals.

Crowe testified by deposition that she had been employed by the appellee since 1972, the last six years in the tailor shop. On March 7, 1983, she was summoned to the security office, where from 8:12 a.m. until 11:20 a.m. she was questioned by John Rozar and Lynn Garland, security personnel of the appellee, about reports of theft of certain store goods. The interrogation was not continuous for the three-hour period: Rozar and Garland alternated in questioning the appellant, and there were 3-to-5 minute intervals between the sessions; the appellant took at least 30 minutes to write a statement; at 11:00 a.m., a break was taken for the appellant to go to the rest room (accompanied by a female security officer). Crowe claimed that Garland called her a liar and was particularly offensive, slamming down his hands on the desk and yelling; Rozar had also called her a liar, but she acknowledged that he had otherwise been courteous. She asserted that when she had asked if she could go fetch her purse, Garland told her that she could not leave the room until they found out what they wanted to know. Crowe, however, admitted that she had not complained to Rozar and Garland that they were upsetting her; that she had not asked to stop the interview; and that she actually had preferred to continue the interview to clear up the matter.

Following the interview, the appellant was sent home, but a few days later she was instructed to report back to work. Upon her return, the company management was pleasant with her, but she was constantly watched by security personnel; she claimed also that her co-workers would no longer speak with her and that her automobile and coat were vandalized by other employees. She worked for approximately two weeks after the confrontation and then requested a leave of absence with sick pay because the incident had made her anxious. The appellee denied the request for sick pay but granted a leave of absence for one month. The appellee paid the appellant for vacation time during part of her absence, and it also granted her subsequent request for an additional month's leave of absence through May 27, 1983; her employment was terminated when she failed to report for work on May 31, 1983.

The evidence presented by the appellee showed that in early February 1983, an anonymous phone caller had reported that the appellant was stealing store goods by concealing them beneath her clothing. This anonymous call was not seriously investigated. In early March 1983, however, two of the appellant's co-workers approached the security office and reported suspicious conduct by the appellant. All of the allegations involved the appellant's suspected removal of store goods by concealing them beneath her clothing, but no one had actually observed the appellant stealing any goods. The appellant had consented to be interviewed on March 7, 1983, regarding these accusations.

Following this interview, the personnel manager stated that the appellant was given a written reprimand for mishandling store property, but was not discharged because the evidence of theft was not conclusive. The appellant's request for sick pay had been denied on the basis that the cause of her absence, i.e., her alleged anxiety, resulted from her own misconduct. Because the appellant had not reported for work on May 31, 1983, and because she failed to contact anyone with the appellee to inform them of any continued inability to return to work (although the appellant claimed that she did contact the appellee), the appellant's employment was terminated for job abandonment, pursuant to the company policy that required such when an employee missed three consecutive work days without notifying the company. Garland and Rozar acknowledged that they had confronted the appellant with the accusations made by her co-workers, but both denied calling her a liar or yelling at her. Both claimed that the...

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18 cases
  • Bozeman v. Per-Se Technologies, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • October 16, 2006
    ...Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 674 F.Supp. 347, 352 (N.D.Ga. 1987) (citing Bridges, 335 S.E.2d at 445 and Crowe v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 586, 588, 340 S.E.2d 192 (Ga.Ct.App. 1986)). Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness is a question of law. The......
  • Simon v. Morehouse School of Medicine
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • September 6, 1995
    ...Gaston v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 674 F.Supp. 347, 352 (N.D.Ga.1987) (citing Bridges, supra and Crowe v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 177 Ga.App. 586, 588, 340 S.E.2d 192 (1986)). Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness is a question of law. If the evid......
  • Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 2014
    ...as a matter of law that Smith was never “detained” at Wal–Mart for purposes of false imprisonment law. Crowe v. J.C. Penney, 177 Ga.App. 586, 588(2), 340 S.E.2d 192 (1986) (where employee never requested that employer's interview of her as to a theft be discontinued, and where she indicated......
  • Southland Propane, Inc. v. McWhorter
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 22, 2011
    ...interrogated plaintiff for allegedly making terroristic threats and called him a terrorist and a liar); Crowe v. J.C. Penney, 177 Ga.App. 586, 588(1), 340 S.E.2d 192 (1986) (affirming summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure as a matter of law to show extreme and outrageous conduct whe......
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