Crowell v. Zahradnick

• Decision Date: 20 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-1186,77-1186
• Parties: Anthony CROWELL, Appellant, v. Robert F. ZAHRADNICK, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1257

571 F.2d 1257

Anthony CROWELL, Appellant, v. Robert F. ZAHRADNICK, Superintendent of the Virginia State

Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 77-1186.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 7, 1977.

Decided Dec. 20, 1977.

Karen Zokoff, Third Year Law Student (Michael E. Geltner, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D. C., and Patricia H. Char, Third Year Law Student, on brief), for appellant.

Linwood T. Wells, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va. (Anthony Troy, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before WINTER, RUSSELL, and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

Anthony Crowell appeals from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, wherein he raised two claims: that he was arrested without probable cause to believe that he had committed an offense, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The district court found, with respect to the claim of lack of probable cause, that Crowell had not yet exhausted his state remedies. However, the court proceeded to find there existed ample evidence to show that neither claim possessed merit.

On appeal to this court, Crowell does not take exception to the holding of the district court that there was evidence sufficient to support the conviction, but has injected into the case a new issue, the admission into evidence of inculpatory statements made while in police custody. He argues before us that the admission of the statements violated the Fourth Amendment because the statements were obtained after an illegal arrest. He also maintains, for the first time, that the confessions were not voluntary because of allegedly illegal conduct of the interrogating officers.

We agree with the district court that the petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies. He has not litigated the admissibility of the statements on constitutional grounds in the Virginia courts or in the district court, raising it for the first time here. No objection was made at trial to the use of the statement, so, of course, no reasons for the objection were given. Moreover, neither the constitutional issue nor even the admissibility of the statement was raised in his direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court as the notice of appeal indicates and his brief admits, ¹ nor was either raised in a state habeas corpus proceeding. ² As the petitioner's constitutional claim has been raised initially in the federal courts on appeal from the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus, Crowell has failed to exhaust the state remedies available to him, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the decision of the district court dismissing the petition is

AFFIRMED. ³

WINTER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

I.

I think it overtechnical to hold that, when Crowell acting pro se alleged in the district court that his conviction was invalid and that he was entitled to release because the arresting officers had no probable cause to make the arrest, Crowell interjects a "new issue" when his counsel appointed to represent him before us argues that the admission into evidence of Crowell's inculpatory statements was illegal because they were tainted by his illegal arrest. We are taught by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), to construe pro se pleadings liberally and not to dismiss an application for a writ of habeas corpus for a failure to allege a good cause of action unless " 'plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " 404 U.S. 521, 92 S.Ct. 596, quoting from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Certainly it is a well-established principle that a federal habeas court will not inquire into the validity of a state prisoner's arrest in the abstract, and that such inquiry will be made only if the arrest resulted in the obtention of evidence, physical or oral, used to convict the applicant. Obviously the district court recognized this rule. It did not dismiss Crowell's claim of lack of probable cause for his arrest on the ground that he had failed to allege any consequences from the arrest other than restraint of his person and subjecting him to trial. Instead, the district court dealt with the issue on its merits, thereby implying that it knew that more was at issue than the mere validity of the arrest. We should do no less. Crowell's entire claim that he was illegally convicted on the basis of his inculpatory statements rests upon the assertion that they were tainted by the violation of his fourth amendment rights. The premise was squarely raised in the district court and squarely decided there. I think that we should address it. ¹

II.

On the merits, I think that the district court was incorrect in concluding that Crowell's arrest did not occur until after Crowell was taken to police headquarters, advised of his Miranda rights, and made incriminating statements about a break-in at the Arco Service Station. Rather, I think that on the present state of the record, the conclusion is ineluctable that the arrest occurred earlier when Crowell was taken from his home to the police Station. ² At that time, Crowell had not made incriminating statements, and without them I think that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. I would therefore conclude that at the time the arrest was made, it was illegal. Whether that illegality tainted the subsequent inculpatory statements is an issue on which I will comment later.

The facts pertinent to my views are these: A certain Ronald Colina locked up his Arco Service Station at 8:15 p. m. on August 16, 1974. When he reopened at approximately 8:15 a. m. on August 17, he found the outside soft drink dispensing machine broken into and two panes in the front door of the station were broken out. Various cartons of cigarettes were found outside the building and others had been moved to a point near the broken door. Other personal property was missing.

During the early morning hours of August 17, a policeman, in responding to an unrelated call, saw an unoccupied automobile parked at the end of a dead end street approximately 100 feet from the Arco station. The policeman parked at the Arco station and shortly thereafter the automobile came by. The policeman stopped the vehicle and found that Crowell was the driver, and there were three other passengers in the car. At the request of the policeman, Crowell exhibited his driver's license and other identification; he and the policeman conversed; and the policeman, finding nothing amiss, permitted him to go on his way. At this time, the policeman had no knowledge that there had been a break-in at the Arco station.

After 8:15 a. m., when the break-in had been discovered, the policeman went to Crowell's address, which he had learned a few hours earlier, advised him of the break-in, and told Crowell that he was under suspicion of burglary and he must go to the police station. Enroute to the police station, the police took Crowell to the Arco station. They told him that this was where he had broken in; and when he denied knowledge of their charge, they took him to the police station. There he was questioned extensively and told, apparently falsely, that the police had a witness who would testify that Crowell perpetrated the crime. Eventually Crowell made a statement putting the blame for the burglary on his companions, but incriminating himself.

Although Crowell was not formally arrested until after he had made the incriminating statement, on this record, ³ I can only conclude that the arrest occurred when he was taken from his home to the police station for questioning. At that time, he was given no alternative about accompanying the police. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). More importantly, at that time, in my view, the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. See, Henry, supra; Jones v. Peyton, 411 F.2d 857, 861-62 (4 Cir. 1969).

If Crowell was arrested without probable cause, it is possible, although by no means certain, that the illegal arrest so tainted the subsequent inculpatory statements, even though Miranda warnings were given, that the statements were constitutionally inadmissible. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

III.

The major problem which this case presents is whether the district court, on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, should have adjudicated the validity of the arrest and if it found that the arrest was illegal when made, whether that illegality tainted the inculpatory statements thereafter made. At his state trial, Crowell made no objection to the admission of the inculpatory statements on the ground that they were tainted by a violation of his fourth amendment rights. He did move to strike the Commonwealth's evidence at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case. He did appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, but his appeal was confined to the contentions that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence and that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Crowell's petition for a writ of error. Crowell did not seek any collateral review in the state courts, but it seems clear that he would have had no right to litigate the issue in the state courts since he had not raised it at trial and pursued it on appeal, except to the extent that he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. ⁴ Spencer v. Cundiff, 413 F.Supp. 1246, 1247-48 (W.D.Va.1976).

The majority adopts the Commonwealth's argument that Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), forecloses Crowell from litigating whether his inculpatory statements were...