Crowley's Case
| Decision Date | 05 July 1934 |
| Citation | 287 Mass. 367 |
| Parties | CORNELIUS CROWLEY'S CASE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
April 3, 1934.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., FIELD, DONAHUE & LUMMUS, JJ.
Workmen's Compensation Act, Injuries to which act applies, Successive insurers. Proximate Cause. Words, "Injury."
The workmen's compensation act, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, does not require that the injury for which compensation is to be awarded under its provisions be caused by some definite accident. Per LUMMUS, J.
The legal time of the occurrence of an injury not shown to have originated in any definite incident or at any definite time has not been clearly adjudicated. Per LUMMUS, J. The language of the workmen's compensation act tends to show that the words
"personal injury" in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Section 26, are not limited to compensable injuries or injuries that appear likely to be compensable. Per LUMMUS, J.
One engaged in an employment with which heavy lifting was "connected right along," while pushing a heavy barrel on October 30, 1931, felt a pain and a sensation "as though something snapped," but, while he complained of pain to a fellow worker, he did not stop work, but "took it easy" for a while, thinking there was nothing serious about it. Three days later he began service as a juror which continued until December 7, when he resumed his work. He suffered severe pain while lifting five days later, and for the first time noticed a swelling in his left groin, which gradually grew larger. Because of the requirements of dependents, however, he felt that he could not afford to stop work, and continued at work until he strained himself lifting on March 17, 1932, and had to go home. The next day he resumed work, which he continued for seventeen days, and then he underwent an operation for hernia, after which he returned to work cured. His employer changed insurers under the workmen's compensation act on December 1, 1931. At hearings of a claim for compensation under the workmen's compensation act, there was no medical testimony connecting the incapacity in April with the occurrences of October 30. A single member of the Industrial Accident
Board found that the employee received a personal injury on March 17 when the hernia "manifested itself so that the employee had to give up work," and directed compensation to be paid by the second insurer. The board, reciting that the report of the single member contained "all the material evidence," reversed that decision and found that the injury occurred on the preceding October 30, and directed that compensation be paid by the first insurer. In the Superior Court a decree was entered in accordance with the decision of the board. On appeal, it was held, that
(1) Although the evidence warranted a finding that an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment was received on October 30, it did not warrant a finding that the injury, in itself was compensable under the act, for the employee was not then incapacitated thereby;
(2) In the absence of medical testimony, common knowledge unaided was not sufficient to warrant a finding that a "strain" is likely to originate a hernia, much less that it probably did so on October 30 in the circumstances above described; the evidence did not warrant a finding that the incidents of December and March resulted from the injury on
October 30 and were not independent causes of the incapacity occurring in April;
(3) The decree was wrong in directing compensation to be paid by the first insurer;
(4) It not being clear that all necessary findings had been made to enable the liability of the second insurer to be determined, the case must be recommitted to the Industrial Accident Board for further hearing of evidence to determine such liability.
CERTIFICATION to the Superior Court under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act of a decision by the Industrial Accident Board directing that compensation be paid by Century Indemnity Company to the claimant for injuries sustained while employed by Houghton & Dutton Company.
Material facts shown by the record are stated in the opinion. The decision of the Industrial Accident Board stated that the report of the single member contained "all the material evidence." By order of W. A. Burns, J., a decree was entered in accordance with the decision of the board. Century Indemnity Company appealed.
F. J. Hansberry, for the Century Indemnity Company. J. D. Goldberg, for the claimant.
The evidence warranted a finding that the employee "strained" his left groin while pushing a heavy barrel in the course of his employment on Friday, October 30 1931, at five o'clock in the afternoon. He felt a pain unlike any that he had ever felt before. It felt "as though something snapped." He complained of the pain to a fellow workman, but did not stop work, although he "took it easy" for a while. He thought "that there was nothing serious about it that he had to give up." He worked the next day as usual; there was "heavy lifting connected with his work right along." On the following Monday, November 2, 1931, he began service as a juror which continued until he resumed his employment on December 7, 1931. On December 12, 1931, he suffered severe pain in the same place while lifting a box. On that day he noticed for the first time a swelling in the left groin, not larger than the little finger. It gradually grew larger. He did not stop work, for he had dependents to provide for, and could not afford to stop. He continued to work until he "strained" himself in the same place while lifting the carcass of a lamb off a hook on March 17, 1932, and had to go home for the rest of the day. The next day he resumed work, and worked until April 4, 1932, when he had an operation for hernia. The operation was a success, and he went back to work, cured, on May 31, 1932.
He did not report the incident of October 30, 1931, to anyone in authority until he told his "boss" about it on March 17, 1932. He did not mention the incident of December 12, 1931, until he made a written report of all the incidents before described to the Century Indemnity Company on April 1, 1932.
The Century Indemnity Company was the insurer until December 1, 1931, and was succeeded as insurer by the Globe Indemnity Company. A single member of the Industrial Accident Board found that the employee received a personal injury on March 17, 1932, when the hernia "manifested itself so that the employee had to give up work," and held the Globe Indemnity Company liable. That company filed a claim for review. The reviewing board, reversing the single member (Minns's Case, 286 Mass. 459 , 462), found (1) that a personal injury was received "as a result of the strain of pushing a heavy barrel of spare ribs on October 30, 1931, which brought on a left inguinal hernia and finally totally incapacitated the employee" the following spring, (2) that the Century Indemnity Company was the insurer at the time of the injury, (3) that the period of incapacity was not prolonged by reason of the failure of the employee to give written notice of his injury until April 1, 1932, or to bring home to the insurer or the insured any form of knowledge or notice until March 17, 1932, and (4) that the insurer was not prejudiced by such want of notice. The Superior Court entered a decree, based on total incapacity, against the Century Indemnity Company, and it appealed. The first, but not the only, contention of the Century Indemnity Company is, that the injury was received after it had ceased to be the insurer, and consequently that it cannot be held.
The time when a personal injury is received, within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 152, Section 26), is important in several respects. The injury must be received by the employee "in the course of his employment." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Section 26. An insurer is not responsible unless the period covered by its policy includes "the time of the injury." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Section 26. De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531 , 533. Furthermore, a notice of the injury must be given to the insurer or insured "as soon as practicable after the happening thereof," although such notice is excused in certain circumstances. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Sections 41-44. Kangas's Case, 282 Mass. 155. Still further, a claim for compensation ordinarily must be made within six months after the "occurrence" of the injury. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Sections 41, 49. Johnson's Case, 279 Mass. 481 . Gaffer's Case, 279 Mass. 566.
Our statute does not require that the injury be caused by some definite accident. There may be an accident without injury, and there may be an injury without accident. Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223 , 226. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487 . Mooradjian's Case, 229 Mass. 521 . Sullivan's Case 265 Mass. 497. See also G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Section 19, where the two words are contrasted. Where the injury results from the gradual accumulation in the body of harmful foreign matter, it has been said that "a `personal injury' occurs when the accumulation becomes so great as to cause incapacity for work, and not before." De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531 , 534, and cases cited. See also Rousu v. Collins Co. 114 Conn. 24; Michna v. Collins Co. 116 Conn. 193. An injury may be found to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, although it cannot be shown to have originated in any definite incident or at any definite time. Bean's Case, 227 Mass. 558 . Mills's Case, 258 Mass. 475 . Jarvis's Case, 274 Mass. 305 . Slocombe's Case, 285 Mass. 31 . The legal time of occurrence of such an injury has not been clearly adjudicated. Perhaps the time when the injury became manifest would govern, for some...
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