Crowley v. Courville

• Decision Date: 26 January 1996
• Docket Number: D,No. 99,99
• Citation: 76 F.3d 47
• Parties: Marshall O. CROWLEY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward COURVILLE, as ZBA Member; Edward Courville, Individually; Kevin Guidera, as ZBA Member; Kevin Guidera, Individually; Ronald Hill, as ZBA Member; Ronald Hill, Individually; Richard W. McMahon, as ZBA Member; Richard W. McMahon, Individually; Planning Board of the Incorporated Village of Southampton; Peter Enstine, as Planning Board Member; Peter Enstine, Individually; Benjamin Foster, as Planning Board Member; George Lewis, as Planning Board Member; George Lewis, Individually; David Ricereto, as Planning Board Member; David Ricereto, Individually; Mardooni Vahradian, as Planning Board Member; Mardooni Vahradian, Individually; Benjamin Foster, Individually; Gerald Kemp, as Building Inspector of the Incorporated Village of Southampton, Defendants, and Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Southampton; Board of Zoning Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Southampton; Elise Korman, as ZBA Member; Elise Korman, Individually; Harold Steudte, as former ZBA Member; Harold Steudte, Individually, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-7160.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 47

76 F.3d 47

Marshall O. CROWLEY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward COURVILLE, as ZBA Member; Edward Courville,

Individually; Kevin Guidera, as ZBA Member; Kevin Guidera,

Individually; Ronald Hill, as ZBA Member; Ronald Hill,

Individually; Richard W. McMahon, as ZBA Member; Richard

W. McMahon, Individually; Planning Board of the

Incorporated Village of Southampton; Peter Enstine, as

Planning Board Member; Peter Enstine, Individually;

Benjamin Foster, as Planning Board Member; George Lewis, as

Planning Board Member; George Lewis, Individually; David

Ricereto, as Planning Board Member; David Ricereto,

Individually; Mardooni Vahradian, as Planning Board Member;

Mardooni Vahradian, Individually; Benjamin Foster,

Individually; Gerald Kemp, as Building Inspector of the

Incorporated Village of Southampton, Defendants,

and

Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of

Southampton; Board of Zoning Appeals of the Incorporated

Village of Southampton; Elise Korman, as ZBA Member; Elise

Korman, Individually; Harold Steudte, as former ZBA Member;

Harold Steudte, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99, Docket 95-7160.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 18, 1995.

Decided Jan. 26, 1996.

Marshall O. Crowley, Jr. Southampton, New York, pro se, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John R. Wright, New York City (James Pitarro, Marshall, Conway & Wright, P.C., New York City, Frank H. Wright, Wright Manning & Rips, New York City, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: MINER, MAHONEY, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Marshall O. Crowley, Jr. appeals pro se from a judgment entered January 13, 1995 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Arthur D. Spatt, Judge, in favor of defendants Edward Courville, Kevin Guidera, Ronald Hill, Richard W. McMahon, the Planning Board of the Incorporated Village of Southampton (the "Planning Board"), Peter Enstine, Benjamin Foster, George Lewis, David Ricereto, Mardooni Vahradian, Gerald Kemp, as Building Inspector of the Incorporated Village of Southampton, and defendants-appellees Board of Zoning Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Southampton (the "Zoning Board"), Elise Korman, and Harold Steudte. ¹ This judgment incorporated: (1) a June 7, 1994 order that granted summary judgment to all defendants with respect to Crowley's substantive due process claim; (2) a trial ruling awarding judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) to all defendants except the Zoning Board, Korman, and Steudte on Crowley's equal protection claim prior to its submission to the jury; (3) a jury verdict in favor of the Zoning Board, Korman, and Steudte on Crowley's equal protection claim; and (4) a posttrial memorandum and order of the district court that granted judgment as a matter of law to the Zoning Board, Korman, and Steudte on Crowley's equal protection claim; and (4) a posttrial memorandum and order of the district court that granted judgment as a matter of law to the Zoning Board, Korman, and Steudte on the bases that (a) there was inadequate evidence to support a judgment against them, and (b) Korman and Steudte were entitled to qualified immunity. ²

Affirmed.

Background

This suit involves a parcel of property located in the center of the business district of the Village of Southampton, New York (the "Village"). Crowley purchased the property in 1978. However, because Crowley's constitutional claims are based upon a parking variance issued prior to Crowley's purchase of this property, we briefly review the prior uses of this tract of land.

Before 1975, Crowley's property was used as a gas station, auto repair shop, and auto junkyard. The single building located on the land fell into disrepair. In 1975, one Anne Johnston purchased the lot as a site for her real estate brokerage business. She developed a site plan that contemplated the renovation of the gas station into a 2,400 square foot office building, and the construction of a new two-story, 7,200 square foot office building.

To proceed with this development, Johnston had to obtain an off-street parking variance from the local zoning regulations. Section 116-14 of the Zoning and Building Construction Regulations for the Village of Southampton (the "Zoning Regulations"), enacted in 1973, required one parking space per 150 square feet of gross floor space intended for office use and one space for every 200 square feet of gross floor space intended for retail use. ³ Thus, sixty-four off-street parking spaces were required for Johnston's plan to build two office buildings totaling 9,600 square feet. Because only nine parking spaces were planned, Johnston applied for a variance of fifty-five parking spaces. The Zoning Board awarded Johnston this variance (the "1975 Variance") in an effort to eliminate what was considered to be an eyesore at the center of the village.

However, the Zoning Board conditioned its decision to grant the parking variance on the property's continued use for office, rather than retail, purposes. The minutes of the Zoning Board meeting of June 26, 1975 ⁴ that considered Johnston's application state:

There was a discussion regarding the first floor being used as retail shops and it was determined that the applicant would have to come back to this Board for other than office use as the [variance] application was advertised as office building.

After obtaining the 1975 Variance, Johnston renovated the existing building on the lot, but never constructed the new 7,200 square foot office building.

In 1978, Crowley purchased the property and conducted a successful real estate brokerage business on the site for the next ten years. In December 1989, Crowley developed a new plan for the construction of a 12,800-square-foot retail building to replace the existing 2,400-square-foot office building. ⁵ This expansion provided, however, for only nine off-street parking spaces to service the site.

Crowley, then represented by counsel, sought the Planning Board's approval of his proposed development at its meeting on December 4, 1989. Crowley attempted to rely upon the 1975 Variance, but "[t]he [Planning] Board felt that since this is a new and larger building for retail use instead of office [use], it is a totally new application and the parking variance granted in 1975 would not run with the land." Accordingly, the Planning Board requested that the application be forwarded to the Zoning Board "for an interpretation of the 1975 decision as it relates to parking for this new building." ⁶

Crowley did not make such an application to the Zoning Board immediately. Instead, on January 8, 1990, Crowley's counsel appeared before the Planning Board to renew Crowley's application, asserting that Crowley did "not concede to the Board[']s determination that [Crowley] must go back to [the Zoning Board] for a clarification of [the 1975 Variance]." The Building Inspector, however, "was adamant that this was an entirely new application which requires a new [Zoning Board] decision and should not be before the Planning Board at this time." Crowley renewed his application before the Planning Board at meetings on February 5, March 5, April 2, and May 7, 1990, without success.

Finally, on May 29, 1990, Crowley presented an application to the Zoning Board seeking a determination that he was entitled to apply the 1975 Variance to his proposed development, and requesting "any and all other variances or other relief or interpretation necessary to permit the construct[ion] of the ... retail store complex." The Zoning Board considered Crowley's proposal at its meetings on June 28 and July 26, 1990, and rejected it in a decision dated August 23, 1990, stating that "this Board granted the [1975 Variance] based upon representations and testimony given to it with regard to the use of the property for offices and not for retail use," and that the 1975 Variance "only applied to the proposal before the Board at that time for construction of office space."

The Zoning Board reiterated its position in decisions dated November 28, 1990 and December 19, 1991, and Crowley continued to press his case at meetings of the Zoning Board and Planning Board from September 1990 through November 1991. In December 1991, the mortgagee of Crowley's tract took the property in lieu of executing upon its judgment of foreclosure. Crowley thereafter commenced this action, and now appeals from its adverse resolution in the district court.

As a final preliminary matter, we note that in 1981 and 1983, the Village amended the Zoning Regulations to require the payment of a $4,000 "off-street parking space fee" for each parking space for which a variance is granted (absent specification of a different amount by the Board of Trustees of the Village), which payments constitute a trust fund for use by the Village in meeting its requirements for public parking. Thus, a fresh variance providing the 55-space waiver granted by the 1975 Variance would have entailed a cost of $220,000 unless a special dispensation was provided by the Board of Trustees. Crowley indicated a willingness to pay this fee "if necessary" at the April 2, 1990 meeting of the Planning Board, and reiterated this willingness at an October 25, 1990 meeting of the Zoning Board, but took the position at the Planning Board's October 24, 1991 meeting that the fee was not warranted.

Discussion

As previously indicated, see supra note 2, Crowley advances both substantive due process and equal protection arguments on this appeal. We consider them in turn. Because these issues were decided in the district court by a combination of (1) a grant of summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, (2) a jury verdict, and (3) two orders granting judgment as a matter of law, we will review the final judgment of the district court incorporating these prior rulings de novo. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 725...