Crowley v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange
| Decision Date | 22 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | INTER-INSURANCE,Docket No. 77380 |
| Parties | Chad CROWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DETROIT AUTOMOBILEEXCHANGE, Defendant-Appellee, and The Western Casualty and Surety Company, Defendant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian by James A. Tuck, Joan Lovell, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Brandt, Hanlon, Becker, Lanctot, McCutcheon, Martin & Schoolmaster by A. Randolph Judd, Birmingham, Gromek, Bendure & Thomas by John A. Lydick, of counsel, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
The question presented is whether medical care provided a member of the armed forces pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq. is a benefit provided under the laws of the federal government required to be subtracted from medical no-fault benefits otherwise payable where neither the injured person, his spouse, nor a relative domiciled in the same household owns an automobile insured under the no-fault act. We hold that amounts paid by the United States government for medical care furnished a member of the armed forces are benefits required to be provided under the laws of the federal government required to be subtracted from medical no-fault benefits otherwise payable where neither the injured person, his spouse, nor a relative domiciled in the same household owns an automobile insured under the no-fault act and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, 144 Mich.App. 394, 375 N.W.2d 754.
Chad Crowley, while in the service of the United States Navy, was seriously injured when an automobile, in which Crowley was riding as a passenger and which was owned and operated by Richard Belloni, struck a tree in Detroit. Medical care was provided and paid by the United States government pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq.
The circuit court ruled that the defendant, Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, the no-fault insurer of Belloni's automobile, was obligated to pay the reasonable charges 1 incurred for providing Crowley's medical care in the amount of $145,149.50, plus accrued interest without deduction for the value of the medical care provided by the United States government.
The Court of Appeals held, relying on earlier decisions of that Court, 2 that military medical benefits are benefits provided by the federal government within the meaning of § 3109(1) 3 of the no-fault act. 4 The Court reviewed this Court's decision in LeBlanc v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 173, 301 N.W.2d 775 (1981), where this Court held that benefits paid under the Medicare program are "other health and accident coverage" within the meaning of § 3109a of the no-fault act (requiring a no-fault insurer to offer coordinated health care benefits at reduced premiums), and that where a no-fault policy is issued to the injured person without coordinated benefits he may recover for the reasonable charges incurred for his medical care without reduction pursuant to § 3109(1) for Medicare benefits paid in respect to the automobile accident that gave rise to the claim for no-fault medical benefits.
The Court of Appeals said that it had concluded it should not extend LeBlanc to military medical benefits because this Court in LeBlanc had specifically limited its holding to Medicare and had stated that this Court would not "express an opinion with regard to the inclusion of other possible forms of health and accident coverage within the purview of § 3109a." 5 The Court of Appeals added that it found the Medicare and military medical care programs distinguishable, and concluded that the circuit court had erred "in awarding duplicate benefits," 6 stating that the test for determining whether the benefits were within § 3109(1) was stated by this Court in Jarosz v. DAIIE, 418 Mich. 565, 577, 345 N.W.2d 563 (1984), that "military benefits serve the same purpose as no-fault benefits," and that "[b]oth benefits would be for plaintiff's medical care from the same injury for the exact same procedures, tests, care and doctors." 7
Section 3109(1) of the no-fault act provides:
"Benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of any state or the federal government shall be subtracted from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury."
This Court has held that workers' compensation benefits, 8 social security survivors' benefits, 9 and social security disability benefits 10 10 are required to be subtracted from no-fault benefits otherwise payable because they were benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of this state or the federal government. In Jarosz, this Court held that social security retirement (old age) benefits were not required to be subtracted pursuant to § 3109(1) because they do not serve the same purpose as no-fault work loss benefits and are not provided or required to be provided as a result of injuries received in a motor vehicle accident giving rise to a claim for work loss benefits. In so holding, this Court said:
"2) Are provided or are required to be provided as a result of the same accident." Jarosz, supra, p. 577, 345 N.W.2d 563.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that medical benefits provided by the United States government to a member of the armed forces pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1071 et seq. in respect to injuries suffered in an automobile accident in Michigan serve the same purpose as no-fault medical benefits, and that such benefits are provided as a result of the same accident.
Crowley asserts that military medical coverage does not serve the same purpose as no-fault benefits because military medical coverage is not limited to automobile accidents, includes family members of a member of the armed forces, is provided as a fringe benefit contingent upon the employment relationship, and is designed to improve employee morale. Recognizing these possible distinctions, we are persuaded that a purpose of both the military medical care program and of no-fault medical benefits is to provide for the medical care of a member of the armed forces, as well, indeed, as of other persons, who might be injured in an automobile accident that occurs in this state, and for that reason both programs "[s]erve the same purpose." Similarly, while Crowley would have been entitled to military medical care benefits without regard to whether his injury was the result of an automobile accident in this state, the military medical benefits provided to him were in fact required to be provided "as a result of the same accident" that gave rise to his claim for no-fault medical benefits.
Nor do we find merit in Crowley's claim that the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions are violated by the classification providing for the subtraction of military medical benefits from no-fault medical benefits otherwise payable. There is a reasonable relationship between the classification, requiring the subtraction of benefits otherwise required to be provided by state or federal law, and the objective of providing benefits at a reasonable cost to those who are not otherwise provided for by such state or federal programs. In providing medical benefits under the no-fault act only to those who do not otherwise have mandatory medical benefits under some other state or federal program, the Legislature does not deprive those who already have benefits under another state or federal program of equal protection. It provides rather the protection of governmentally mandated medical benefits to those not already covered in that regard by a mandatory state or federal program.
Crowley claims that military medical benefits are "other health and accident coverage" within the meaning of § 3109a of the no-fault act, and relies on the following statement in LeBlanc as indicating that this Court's holding in that case--despite its statement that it expresses no opinion regarding the inclusion of other possible forms of health and accident coverage within the purview of § 3109a--was not limited to Medicare and included all governmental health and accident coverage "from whatever source":
"The legislative history of § 3109a suggests that the Legislature, in leaving the phrase 'other health and accident coverage' unmodified by the word private, intended to give unrestrained application of § 3109a to health and accident coverage from whatever source." LeBlanc, supra, p. 202, 301 N.W.2d 775.
Section 3109a provides:
Section 3109a was not enacted as part of the original no-fault act in 1972, 11 and was added in 1974. 12 Thus, as originally enacted, military medical benefits would have been required, for the reasons stated in part II to be subtracted pursuant to § 3109(1). The question then is whether the amendment of the act that added § 3109a requires a different result.
We have concluded that there is no need to decide in the instant case whether military medical benefits are "other health and accident coverage" within the meaning of § 3109a because § 3109a applies only to benefits payable to the person named in a no-fault policy, his spouse, and any relative of either domiciled in the same household.
In LeBlanc, a no-fault policy had been issued by State Farm...
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