Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 April 1955 |
| Citation | 282 P.2d 33,44 Cal.2d 321 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | L. E. CROWLEY, Individually and doing business as Crowley Sales Co., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MODERN FAUCET MFG. CO., a corporation, F. K. Robertson, Dan G. Liston and Ernest Bucknell, Defendants and Respondents. L. A. 23649. |
Nicolas Ferrara, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Myron J. Glauber, Los Angeles, for respondent.
On August 3, 1951, plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for breach of an oral contract. He alleged in his third amended complaint 'That on or about the 17th day of October 1950 the plaintiff and defendants entered into an oral agreement' whereby he was given the exclusive right to buy from defendants certain patented shower heads. He also alleged that 'a written memorandum of said agreement, signed by the defendants, is set forth in a letter dated October 17, 1950, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 'A' and made a part hereof as though set forth herein in full.' A demurrer to this complaint on the grounds that the written memorandum did not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds (Civ.Code, § 1624, Code Civ.Proc. § 1973) was sustained without leave to amend pursuant to a stipulation that 'if the demurrer be sustained, that it be sustained without leave to amend.' Judgment was entered that plaintiff take nothing in the action and that defendant recover its costs. Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment was dismissed.
On November 12, 1953, plaintiff brought the present action seeking an injunction, an accounting, and damages. The complaint alleges that 'On or about October 17, 1950, at Los Angeles County California, plaintiffs and defendants made and entered into an exclusive sales agreement, and on said date defendants made, signed and delivered to plaintiffs their written memorandum of said agreement, wherein and whereby defendants agreed that they will sell exclusively to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs agreed that they will purchase exclusively from defendants * * *.' Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the record in the first action offered in support of the motion was received in evidence. The motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds that the alleged agreement is identical with that alleged in the first action, that the prior judgment is res judicata, and that the action is sham and frivolous. A judgment of dismissal followed, from which plaintiff appeals.
The applicable rules are set forth in Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal.2d 826, 828, 249 P.2d 264, 265: (1) A judgment entered after a general demurrer has been sustained 'is a judgment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will, accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts.' (2) '(E)ven though different facts may be alleged in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the former judgment will also be a bar.' (3) 'If, on the other hand, new or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is not a bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint.'
A comparison of the records in the two actions reveals that the facts alleged in the present action are substantially the same as those adjudicated in the first action and that the case therefore falls squarely within the first rule in the Keidatz case.
Plaintiff contends that the prior judgment is not res judicata on the ground that the first action was based on an oral contract, whereas the present action is for breach of a written contract. The language of his complaint does not bear out his contention, but even if it did the result would be the same.
The prior complaint alleged an oral contract. The present complaint omits that allegation but does not expressly allege a written contract. It merely alleges that the parties 'entered into an exclusive sales agreement' and that defendants 'signed and delivered to plaintiffs a written memorandum' thereof. The written document is referred to only as a memorandum, and only one party is alleged to have signed it. A written memorandum is not identical with a written contract (see, Restatement, Contracts, § 207); it is merely evidence of it and usually does not contain all of the terms. (See, 2 Witkin, California Procedure 1228.) The very use of the word 'memorandum' implies that...
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Sharma v. HSI Asset Loan Obligation Tr. 2001-1
...of action, it will bar a second action on the same facts." Palomar Mobilehome Park, 989 F.2d at 364 (quoting Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 321 (Cal. 1955)); see also Janson, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33719, at *30 ("Courts in this District have routinely held that sustaining a genera......
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... ... See Furnace, 838 F.3d ... at 1024; see also Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th ... 666, 682 (1994) (“[T]he violation of a ... 364 (quoting Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 ... Cal. 2d 321 (Cal. 1955)); see also Janson, ... ...
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...constitute a cause of action, and will accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts.'" Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 321, 323 (1955) (citing Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal. 2d 826, 828(1952)). A judgment terminating an action on "technical or procedural" g......
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