Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Grp., LLC

• Citation: 811 N.W.2d 332,339 Wis.2d 252,2012 WI 29
• Decision Date: 22 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2009AP3029.,2009AP3029.
• Parties: CROWN CASTLE USA, INC., Crown Castle Atlantic, LLC and Crown Castle GT Company, LLC, Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. ORION CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, Defendant,Orion Logistics, LLC, Appellant–Petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

2012 WI 29
339 Wis.2d 252
811 N.W.2d 332

CROWN CASTLE USA, INC., Crown Castle Atlantic, LLC and Crown Castle GT Company, LLC, Plaintiffs–Respondents,
v.
ORION CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, Defendant,Orion Logistics, LLC, Appellant–Petitioner.

No. 2009AP3029.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Oct. 7, 2011.Decided March 22, 2012.

[811 N.W.2d 334]

For the appellant-petitioner there was a brief filed by Charles D. Koehler, Michael C. Menghini and Herrling Clark Law Firm, LTD., Appleton and oral argument by Nicholas Andrew Wagener, Bollenbeck, Wagener, Spaude & Fyfe, S.C., Appleton.

For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief (in the court of appeals) by Eric M. McLeod, Nathan Moenck and Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP., Madison and oral argument by Nathan Moenck.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.

[339 Wis.2d 256] ¶ 1 We review a published decision of the court of appeals ¹ AFFIRMING AN ORDER Of the outagamie county circUit court, dee r. dyer, Judge. On the motion of Crown Castle USA, Inc., Crown Castle Atlantic, LLC, and Crown Castle GT Company, LLC, (collectively, “Crown Castle”), the circuit court ordered Orion Logistics, LLC (“Orion Logistics”), a non-judgment debtor third party,² to testify at a supplemental proceeding.

¶ 2 The question before us is whether Orion Logistics may be compelled to testify at a supplemental proceeding under Wisconsin Statutes section 816.06 (2007–08) ³ when it is not a judgment debtor.

[339 Wis.2d 257] ¶ 3 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 816.06 does not grant a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at supplemental proceedings. We base our conclusion on the language of the statute, on its context and statutory history, and on our prior holdings. Because Crown Castle had no right, under § 816.06, to compel Orion Logistics to testify at a supplemental proceeding, we reverse the court of appeals decision and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Orion Construction Group, LLC was a Wisconsin limited liability corporation that ceased operations in 2006. Its principal business was the construction of cellular telephone towers, and its sole member ⁴ was Douglas Larson (“Larson”). Orion Logistics, LLC is a Wisconsin limited liability corporation. Its principal business is the construction of wind turbines, and its sole member is also Larson. Orion Construction and Orion Logistics are entirely separate corporations. The record reflects only one commonality between Orion Construction and Orion Logistics: a common owner, Larson. In the course of its business operations, Orion Construction incurred a $480,231.50 liability, payable to Crown Castle.⁵

[339 Wis.2d 258]

[811 N.W.2d 335]

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. THE PENNSYLVANIA JUDGMENT

¶ 5 Crown Castle commenced an action against Orion Construction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, seeking monetary damages to satisfy an account receivable ⁶ of $480,231.50. That court entered default judgment against Orion Construction and in favor of Crown Castle for $496,239.17.⁷ Orion Construction did not contest the default judgment because it was winding up ⁸ its business operations.

B. THE WISCONSIN PROCEEDINGS

¶ 6 Crown Castle filed its foreign judgment in the office of the Clerk of Court for Outagamie County pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.24.⁹ Notice of the entry of the judgment was provided to Orion Construction. [339 Wis.2d 259] Outagamie County Court Commissioner Mary F. Coughlin (“Commissioner”) ordered Orion Construction to appear for a supplemental proceeding pursuant to § 816.03(1)(b).¹⁰ The Commissioner's order required Orion Construction to supply Crown Castle with Orion Construction's “tax records for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, and copies of all books, records[,] and documents pertaining to the company's assets, financial affairs[,] and transactions....”

¶ 7 Orion Construction responded to the Commissioner's order by providing Larson's personal tax returns from 2005, 2006, and 2007, and an accounting spreadsheet showing an account receivable from Crown Castle in the amount of $210,831. Orion Construction also provided records indicating that it had no assets (other than the $210,831 account receivable and less than $500 dollars in a business banking account), and no outstanding liabilities.

¶ 8 Crown Castle, dissatisfied with the information Orion Construction provided, moved the circuit court to expand the scope of supplemental examination to “copies of all books, records, and documents that pertain to the assets, financial affairs, and transactions for each and every business entity in which [Larson] [339 Wis.2d 260] has any interest.”

[811 N.W.2d 336]

The requested order was issued and subjected Orion Logistics to supplemental examination by the Commissioner pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 816.03 and 816.06.¹¹

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

¶ 9 Orion Logistics appealed the circuit court's order subjecting it to supplemental examination. In a published decision, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Grp., LLC, 2011 WI App 9, 331 Wis.2d 74, 794 N.W.2d 272. The court of appeals considered a single issue: whether Wis. Stat. § 816.06 grants a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding.

¶ 10 The court of appeals determined, based on its prior holding in Courtyard Condo. Ass'n v. Draper, 2001 WI App 115, 244 Wis.2d 153, 629 N.W.2d 38, that Wis. Stat. § 816.03 and § 816.06 are ambiguous. Crown Castle, 331 Wis.2d 74, ¶ 10, 794 N.W.2d 272.¹² In resolving this perceived ambiguity, it concluded that § 816.06 grants a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. Id., ¶ 12.

¶ 11 The court of appeals supported its conclusion with the proposition that “[p]roperty transfers between a judgment debtor and related business entities[339 Wis.2d 261] present the ... risk of fraud....” Id., ¶ 12. Therefore, the court of appeals ultimately concluded that court-ordered examination of non-judgment debtor third parties provides the only avenue for the judgment creditor to protect itself against fraud. Id., ¶ 12. Orion Logistics then sought review before this court.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 This case requires us to construe the supplementary proceeding statutes found in Wis. Stat. ch. 816. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 WI 59, ¶ 17, 326 Wis.2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398. We interpret statutes independently, but benefit from both our prior analyses and that of the lower courts. State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶ 29, 328 Wis.2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 784, 181 L.Ed.2d 489 (2011).

IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

¶ 13 When interpreting a statute, “we begin with the language of the statute, because it is the language that expresses the legislature's intent.” Hocking, 326 Wis.2d 155, ¶ 18, 785 N.W.2d 398 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 44–45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 45, 681 N.W.2d 110. We attempt to give reasonable effect to every word, avoiding both surplusage and absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ¶ 46; see also Hocking, 326 Wis.2d 155, ¶ 18, 785 N.W.2d 398.

[811 N.W.2d 337]

[339 Wis.2d 262] [6] ¶ 14 In addition to the language of the statute, “scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute.” Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 48, 681 N.W.2d 110. So too is statutory history. Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52,¶ 22, 309 Wis.2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (“A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.”); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis.2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (“By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we examine the language, context, and history of the statute here while undertaking our plain meaning analysis.

V. DISCUSSION

¶ 15 This case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 816.06, Wisconsin's supplemental proceeding statute, in order to determine whether it grants a judgment creditor the right to compel a non-judgment debtor third party to testify at a supplemental proceeding. Originally codified in 1856, Wisconsin's supplemental proceeding legislation replaced the creditor's bill, ¹³ the common law proceeding that allowed a judgment creditor to enforce a judgment.¹⁴ [339 Wis.2d 263] Clark v. Bergenthal, 52 Wis. 103, 107, 8 N.W. 865 (1881). Because the supplemental proceedings statute provided a new right to judgment creditors that did not exist at common law, it is a statutory right.¹⁵ Holton v. Burton, 78 Wis. 321, 328, 47 N.W. 624 (1890) ( “[T]he right to institute and carry on supplementary proceedings is a mere statutory right, and may be taken away or modified at the pleasure of the legislature.”); see also Clark, 52 Wis. at 107, 8 N.W. 865.

¶ 16 Statutory rights—like those at issue in this case—are rights granted by the legislature, not the United States or Wisconsin constitutions. See State ex rel. R. v. Schmidt, 63 Wis.2d 82, 89, 216 N.W.2d 18 (1974); cf. Harvot v. Solo Cup Co., 2009 WI 85, ¶ 50, 320 Wis.2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 176. Because there is no constitutional guarantee to a statutory right, “it is for the legislature, not the courts, to prescribe” the scope of the right. Schmidt, 63 Wis.2d at 89, 216 N.W.2d 18; see [339 Wis.2d 264] Harvot, 320 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 50, 768 N.W.2d 176; In re Ogg's Estate, 262 Wis. 181, 186, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952); Relyea v. Tomahawk...