Crown Point Community School Corp. v. Richards

• Decision Date: 20 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 3--972A58,3--972A58
• Citation: 154 Ind.App. 545,290 N.E.2d 449
• Parties: CROWN POINT COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Nicholas R. RICHARDS and Agnes B. Richards, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 449

290 N.E.2d 449

154 Ind.App. 545

CROWN POINT COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Nicholas R. RICHARDS and Agnes B. Richards, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees.

No. 3--972A58.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

Dec. 20, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1973.

Edmond J. Leeney, Hammond, Herman Barber, Jr., Crown Point, for appellants.

Kenneth D. Reed, Hammond, for appellees.

SHARP, Judge.

Defendant-appellant, Crown Point Community School Corporation (School Corporation) appeals from a decision which quieted title to certain real estate in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees (Richards), canceled a commissioner's deed and permanently enjoined the School Corporation from selling the real estate in question to a private third party.

In 1953, the predecessor of the School Corporation brought an action under I.C. 1971, 20--5--23--1 et seq.; Ind.Ann.Stat. §§ 28--4004 et seq. (Burns 1970) to acquire by condemnation certain lands of Richards. The proceeding culminated in a commissioner's deed being executed and delivered to the predecessor of the School Corporation and the sum of $8,000.00 being paid to the Richards. No appeal was taken from this initial action.

For sixteen years the land remained unused for school or any related purpose and in 1969 the School Corporation decided to sell the land at public sale. Upon learning of the intended sale, the Richards filed a complaint in the Lake Circuit Court asserting fee simple title to the land, and asked, among other things, that title be quieted in them. The Richards also asserted procedural defects in the attempted sale which allegedly rendered said attempted sale illegal and void. The case was venued to the Benton Circuit Court, which granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the School Corporation on the issue of title to the land but reserved for trial the other issues relating to the procedures followed for the public sale. The judgment of the Benton Circuit Court reads, in part, as follows:

'Comes now the Plaintiff and files counteraffidavit, which includes a photocopy of the record of Cause No. C53--187 in the Lake Circuit Court in which said cause a deed was ordered executed to the school city of Crown Point, Indiana, by one John R. Lynch, duly appointed Commissioner of the Lake Circuit Court for the execution of said deed in which affidavit and papers read as follows: to wit: (Here Insert) And come now again the parties by counsel, and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is submitted to the Court for findings and judgment. Argument heard.

And now the parties by agreement stipulate that the description of the land contained in plaintiffs' complaint in this cause is correct and is the real estate in question. And now the Court finds and adjudges that said motion for summary judgment should be sustained and the Court specifically finds and adjudges that the title in fee simple to said real estate is in the Crown Point Community School Corporation in Lake County and the Court further finds and adjudges that all matters not pertaining to the title of said real estate are at issue in this cause upon said complaint and the answers filed thereto.'

The School Corporation thereafter elected to abandon the sale. The Richards, however, attempted to appeal the partial summary judgment as an interlocutory order, but the appeal was dismissed without opinion. In ruling on the Petition for Rehearing, our Supreme Court, in Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp., Ind., 269 N.E.2d 5 (1971), wrote a per curiam opinion to clarify their position and stated:

'For all the foregoing reasons the court hereby finds that, the order and judgment as to the fee simple title in question having been a final order, the proper route of appeal lay in the filing of a motion to correct errors and a review before the Appellate Court. TR. 59(G).

The motion previously granted to dismiss the direct appeal to this court is therefore re-affirmed.'

In 1970, the School Corporation again sought to sell the land by public sale to a private third party. The Richards filed a complaint which was identical to the one filed in the earlier action and which contended that they were the owners in fee simple of the land in question and asked for the same relief. Thereafter the School Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss with exhibits attached showing the previous complaint filed, Motion for Summary Judgment filed, and a copy of the judgment of the Benton Circuit Court. No counter-affidavits were filed and the facts were not in dispute. The trial court overruled the Motion to Dismiss and thereafter the evidence was stipulated. On May 9, 1972, the trial court entered judgment quieting title in favor of the Richards. The School Corporation's Motion to Correct Errors was overruled and this appeal perfected.

The two primary issues presented here for review are as follows:

1. Whether a prior judgment of the Benton Circuit Court decreeing that the school corporation had a fee simple title to the land in question, and denying appellees' request for quiet title, was res judicata to this action.

2. Whether a condemnation proceeding commenced under IC 1971, 20--5--23--1 through 20--5--23--4, Ind.Ann.Stat. §§ 28--4004 to 28--4007 by a school corporation results in said corporation acquiring a fee simple title, or a title that will revert to the intial owner if the land is not used for school purposes within fave years.

Regardless of the correctness of the judgment of the Benton Circuit Court which quieted title to said real estate in the School Corporation, we must first determine whether said judgment conclusively decided the question of title as between the two parties and is, therefore, res judicata as to this action.

The requisite elements necessary for the application of the doctrine are enumerated in Wright v. Kinnard, Ind.App., 262 N.E.2d 196 (1970), where this court stated:

'The basic elements of res adjudicata are fourfold: (1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the matter now in issue was, or might have been, determined in the former suit; (3) the particular controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the present suit; and (4) judgment in the former suit must have been rendered on the merits.'

See also Amann v. Tankersley, Ind.App., 273 N.E.2d 772 (1971); Johnson v. Knudson-Mercer Company, 167 Ind. 429, 79 N.E. 367 (1906).

There is no question but that the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and that the parties are the same as in the prior suit. Although the Richards question whether summary judgment was a decision on the merits, the major thrust of their argument centers on whether the former judgment conclusively determined all questions relating to the title to the real estate. It is in regard to this element that the Richards advance several arguments, cumulative in nature, as to why the former judgment is not a bar to this present action.

The Richards first argue that the Benton Circuit Court judgment never did grant or deny their claim. The judgment simply found the fee simple title to said real estate was in the School Corporation, without deciding what interest,...