Crown Servs., Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co.

• Citation: 162 Ohio St.3d 564,166 N.E.3d 1115
• Decision Date: 15 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2019-0665,2019-0665
• Parties: CROWN SERVICES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. MIAMI VALLEY PAPER TUBE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

162 Ohio St.3d 564

166 N.E.3d 1115

CROWN SERVICES, INC., et al., Appellants,

v.MIAMI VALLEY PAPER TUBE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 2019-0665

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted February 26, 2020

Decided September 15, 2020

LoPresti, Marcovy & Marotta, L.L.P., Cleveland, Timothy A. Marcovy, and Christian D. Foisy, for appellants.

Rolfes Henry Co., L.P.A., Cincinnati, John A. Fiocca Jr., Columbus, and Matthew F.X. Craven, for appellee.

Stewart, J. {¶ 1} In this appeal we consider whether a trial court's order dismissing a case without prejudice based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. We hold that it is not, and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Appellant Crown Services, Inc., is an Ohio corporation with offices in Columbus, Ohio, and Florence, Kentucky. Crown provides temporary staffing services to its clients. Appellee, Miami Valley Paper Tube Company, is an Ohio corporation with a manufacturing facility in Crittenden, Kentucky. Miami Valley manufactures paper cores and tubes. Appellant American Zurich Insurance Company is an insurance company that does business as a workers' compensation insurer in Kentucky.

{¶ 3} On September 21, 2015, Crown entered into a "General Staffing Agreement" with Miami Valley to provide temporary employees at Miami Valley's Crittenden facility. The staffing agreement required Crown to maintain workers' compensation insurance for its employees in accordance with the laws of Kentucky. Crown's workers' compensation policy was with Zurich.

{¶ 4} Although Crown was required to maintain a workers' compensation policy in accordance with the laws of Kentucky, the staffing agreement contained a forum-selection clause establishing that the agreement is governed by the laws of Ohio. The clause provides:

The validity and interpretation of this Agreement shall be governed by and construed under, and the legal relations between the parties hereto will be determined in accordance with, the laws of the State of Ohio, without giving effect to such state's conflict of law principles. The parties agree to exclusive personal jurisdiction and venue in any court of competent jurisdiction located in the State of Ohio.

{¶ 5} On August 23, 2017, one of Crown's employees was injured while working at Miami Valley's Crittenden facility. As a result, Crown and Zurich became obligated under Kentucky law to pay workers' compensation benefits to the injured worker in the amount of $1,944,807. Crown and Zurich filed a lawsuit against Miami Valley on August 22, 2018, seeking to recover the amount they had been required to pay. The lawsuit was filed in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in Ohio. The complaint asserted that Crown's employee was injured as the direct and proximate cause of Miami Valley's breach of the staffing agreement, which required that Miami Valley properly train employees, provide employees with safe working conditions, and properly control and safeguard the premises of its facility.

{¶ 6} On October 2, 2018, Miami Valley filed a motion for change of venue to the Common Pleas Court in Franklin County, Ohio, the county of Crown's principal place of business. The motion asserted that no party to the lawsuit had any connection to Cuyahoga County and thus, venue there was improper under Civ.R. 3(C).

{¶ 7} Crown and Zurich opposed the motion, arguing that pursuant to the forum-selection clause in the staffing agreement, venue was proper in any Ohio court of competent jurisdiction. On October 23, 2018, the trial court denied Miami Valley's motion for change of venue.

{¶ 8} Crown and Zurich filed an amended complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on November 3, 2018. Miami Valley filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Specifically, Miami Valley argued that the action should be filed in the Circuit Court in Grant County, Kentucky. Crown and Zurich opposed the motion, asserting that the forum-selection clause in the staffing agreement controls where the action could be filed and that the clause should be enforced. They further argued that despite the fact that the workplace injury occurred in Kentucky, Kentucky does not have a greater interest in the contract than Ohio has.

{¶ 9} Notwithstanding the forum-selection clause in the staffing agreement, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, based on forum non conveniens. In its analysis, the trial court discounted the private interests of the litigants based on the staffing agreement's forum-selection clause. Instead, the trial court considered public-interest factors affecting the citizens of Cuyahoga County and the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and determined that the Kentucky court was a more convenient forum for this case because resolution of the dispute would involve the application of Kentucky workers' compensation law and would require a Cuyahoga County jury to hear and resolve a factual dispute based on conduct that occurred in Kentucky.¹ Accordingly, the court granted Miami Valley's motion to dismiss on the condition that the company stipulate that it would not contest jurisdiction in Kentucky. Miami Valley filed the stipulation and the trial court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice.

{¶ 10} Crown and Zurich appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Miami Valley filed a motion to dismiss the appeal arguing that the trial court's dismissal without prejudice pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02.

{¶ 11} Citing two cases from the Eighth District, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the basis that a dismissal without prejudice based on forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable order. See Siegel v. Boss , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101934, 2015-Ohio-689, 2015 WL 799521 ; Century Business Servs., Inc. v. Bryant , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 80507 and 80508, 2002-Ohio-2967, 2002 WL 1307400. The court's journal entry further explained that this court's decision in Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA at Your Serv., Inc. , 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663, is distinguishable from this case because Natl. City involved a dismissal without prejudice based on personal jurisdiction rather than forum non conveniens. Finally, the Eighth District noted that this court's decision in Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals , 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 519 N.E.2d 370 (1988), did not address whether Ohio's district courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a trial court's dismissal without prejudice based on forum non conveniens.

{¶ 12} We accepted Crown and Zurich's appeal on the following proposition of law: "A dismissal by a trial court of an action, otherwise properly venued, on the grounds of forum non conveniens constitutes a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02." See 156 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2019-Ohio-2892, 126 N.E.3d 1168.

ANALYSIS

{¶ 13} Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution provides that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review final orders and judgments. A final order " ‘dispos[es] of the whole case or some separate and distinct branch thereof.’ " Noble v. Colwell , 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989), quoting Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., Ltd. , 27 Ohio St.2d 303, 306, 272 N.E.2d 127 (1971).

{¶ 14} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines a final order and provides:

An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class action;

(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly * * *; (7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code.

{¶ 15} R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) provides that "[a]n order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is * * * [a]n order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment ." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 16} R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) defines "substantial right" as "a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect." Under the statute, however, the mere existence or implication of a substantial right in a case is insufficient to create a final order. Instead, the "crucial question" is whether the order "affects a substantial right." (Emphasis sic.) Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. , 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993). An order affects a substantial right "only if an immediate appeal is necessary to protect the right effectively." Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger , 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 7, citing Bell at 63, 616 N.E.2d 181.

{¶ 17} An order determines the action and prevents a judgment when it "dispose[s] of the merits of the cause or some separate...