Croy v. A.O. Fox Memorial Hosp.
| Citation | 68 F.Supp.2d 136 |
| Decision Date | 28 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-CV-1836.,No. 98-CV-1847.,97-CV-1836.,98-CV-1847. |
| Parties | Dan J. CROY, Plaintiff, v. A.O. FOX MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Arnold Bucove, M.D., John Remillard, and David G. Evelyn, Defendants. Dan J. Croy, plaintiff, v. A.O. Fox Memorial Hospital, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Jacobs, Jacobs Law Firm, Stamford NY, Michael A. Jacobs, of counsel, for plaintiff.
Thuillez, Ford Law Firm, Albany NY, Donald P. Ford, of counsel, for defendants A.O. Fox Memorial Hosp., John Remillard, and David Evelyn.
O'Connor, O'Connor Law Firm, Albany NY, Justin O. Corcoran, of counsel, for defendant Bucove.
Plaintiff Dan Croy ("plaintiff") commenced the instant lawsuits against defendants asserting: (1) common law claims for defamation and negligent misrepresentation (97-CV-1836); and (2) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged deprivation of his liberty and property interests as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (98-CV-1847). Presently before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss the Complaints pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) and/or 12(c) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R.CIV.P. 56.
Plaintiff is a licensed psychiatrist in the State of New York. In May 1993, plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant A.O. Fox Memorial Hospital (the "Hospital"). Certain persons within the Hospital became concerned with plaintiff's treatment of two patients in October 1993. Defendant Arnold Bucove, M.D. ("Bucove") and another hospital administrator met with plaintiff regarding his care and treatment of these two patients. As a result of the meeting, plaintiff and the Hospital negotiated an agreement whereby plaintiff left the Hospital in exchange for payment of a certain sum of money. Accordingly, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding terminating the employment contract effective November 5, 1993.
On November 23, 1993, Bucove drafted a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Medical Staff ("ECMS") regarding the incidents involving plaintiff. The memorandum summarized plaintiff's treatment of the two patients and also stated that plaintiff "manifested grandiosity paranoia and mood swings." The memorandum also noted that plaintiff often smoked in his office contrary to Hospital policy. Bucove continued to write that plaintiff failed to make notes of his interactions with patients, "felt free to override carefully thought out treatment plans made by other professionals and favor his own treatment plan after a brief contact with patients [and] often found reason not to return patients to referring physicians or ... agencies as he thought his own treatment abilities were far more superior to the referring sources." Finally, Bucove noted that "[w]hen [plaintiff] learned that there would be an investigation into the 2 incidents ... he perceived the investigation as others were `out to get him.'" The memorandum also noted that Bucove had reported plaintiff to the New York State Department of Health Office of Professional Medical Conduct ("OPMC") as an impaired physician.
OPMC conducted an investigation which included a review of the two patients' medical records and having plaintiff undergo a psychiatric evaluation. OPMC discontinued the investigation and closed the case without taking any disciplinary action.
In July 1997, plaintiff applied for a license to practice medicine in the State of Alaska. Question number eighteen of the application asked:
Have you ever been the subject of an inquiry or under investigation by any state board or other licensing agency concerning a violation or alleged violation of any state regulation, statute, or law, for any violation or alleged violation of the medical practice act, or unprofessional or unethical conduct, or for sexual misconduct?
Plaintiff responded in the negative. As part of its investigation, the Alaska State Medical Board ("ASMB") contacted the Hospital regarding plaintiff's application. In response to the ASMB's inquiry, Defendant David Evelyn ("Evelyn"), who was vice-president of medical affairs for the Hospital, reviewed plaintiff's file, including the memorandum drafted by Bucove, and drafted a letter reading as follows:
Dr. Daniel Croy was employed as a locum tenens psychiatrist at our facility from May 1993 until his resignation in October 1993. This reference is based upon my review of his credentials file. On at least two occasions Dr. Croy was found to have not followed acceptable standards of care, causing significant harm to at least one patient. When confronted with these incidents, he stated that his qualifications allowed him to deviate from the acceptable standards of care. He was also noted to exhibit mood swings, signs of paranoia and manifested grandiosity. Because of these behaviors he was reported to the NYS Dept. of Health as an impaired physician. Based upon my review, I would not recommend him.
On October 6, 1997, the ASMB sent a letter to plaintiff stating that his application to practice medicine had been denied. The reason for the denial was plaintiff's failure to truthfully respond to question number eighteen on the application. The letter stated that:
Alaska Statute 08.64.240(b) gives the board the authority to refuse to grant a license ... if it finds that a licensee "has secured a license through deceit, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation."
You responded "NO" to question 18 on the application for licensure.... Contrary to that response, information came to the board's attention that a complaint had been filed against you by a hospital in New York and that the state of New York had indeed conducted an investigation into the complaint....
Therefore, following its review of information gathered and after meeting with you, the board denied you application based on its determination that your response to question 18 on the application was false.
Plaintiff appealed this adverse decision and a settlement was reached with Alaska whereby he would obtain his license after paying a $1,000 fine.
Thereafter, plaintiff also applied for a license to practice medicine in the State of Kentucky ("Kentucky"). The Kentucky State Medical Board ("KSMB") requested information regarding plaintiff from the Hospital. In February 1999, the Hospital responded to the KSMB.
Plaintiff commenced the instant litigation claiming that defendants' response to the ASMB (i.e., the August 25, 1997 letter from Evelyn) was defamatory and constituted negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff commenced a second lawsuit claiming that the Hospital's failure to timely provide the KSMB with the requested information, and the Hospital's having submitted defamatory information to the ASMB, deprived him of his constitutional rights. Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaints pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12 or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56.1
Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 42, the Court may, sua sponte, order the consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or fact. See Devlin v. Transportation Communications Intern'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir.1999). The Second Circuit has instructed that the "Rule should be prudently employed as a valuable and important tool of judicial administration invoked to expedite trial and eliminate unnecessary repetition and confusion." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The decision whether to consolidate entails considerations of both equity and judicial economy. See id.
Because the two actions currently pending before the Court involve common issues of law and fact, arise out of the same transactions, and there is no reason to belief that justice would be sacrificed by consolidating these actions, the Court hereby consolidates actions 97-CV-1836 and 98-CV-1847 for purposes of this motion.
Because the parties were on notice of a potential conversion to summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV. 56, see Defendants' Notices of Motion (noticing motions pursuant to Rule 12 and/or Rule 56); Mar. 10, 1999 Jacobs Aff., at ¶ 3 (); defendants' and plaintiff's Rule 7.1(a)(3) statements, the parties have had ample time to submit, and have submitted, supporting affidavits and evidence, and the Court has decided to consider materials outside the pleadings, the present motions will be treated as motions for summary judgment. See Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 868, 142 L.Ed.2d 770 (1999); Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir.1998).
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment may be entered in favor of the moving party if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, all facts must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.; Buttry v. General Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1492 (2d Cir.1995). Where the moving party has supported the motion by affidavits and/or documentary evidence, the non-movant FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v....
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