Crozier v. Goldman, (No. 2780.)

• Decision Date: 18 March 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 2780.)
• Citation: 153 Ga. 162,111 S.E. 666
• Parties: CROZIER. v. GOLDMAN et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

153 Ga. 162

111 S.E. 666

CROZIER.

v.GOLDMAN et al.

(No. 2780.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 18, 1922.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Lincoln County; E. T. Shurley, Judge.

Bill of interpleader by the Farmers' State Bank against John Crozier, Jr., and J. H. Goldman, as administrator of Wilkes Goldman. Judgment in favor of Goldman, and Crozier brings error. Affirmed.

This was a bill of interpleader filed by the Farmers' State Bank against John Crozier, Jr., and J. H. Goldman, as administrator of Wilkes Goldman. On January 23, 1920, Wilkes Goldman deposited with this bank $1,500, taking therefor its certificate payable six months after date. Wilkes Goldman died in 1920. On July 28, 1920, Crozier brought suit on this certificate against the bank. Crozier claimed that the money represented by said certificate was his property, and that the deposit was made by his grandfather, Wilkes Goldman, who at the date thereof was very old and in a very poor state of health, and realized that he could live but a short time, and after making said deposit gave to him the certificate therefor, delivering it to him personally, but not indorsing same, and telling him that the money represented thereby should be his property absolutely in the event of the death of Wilkes Goldman who instructed him to pay his funeral expenses out of said fund and keep the remainder as his own. Wilkes Goldman was in full possession of his mental faculties at the time of making this gift.

The administrator of Wilkes Goldman alleged that said certificate belonged to the estate of Goldman, and that Crozier had no right or title to the same; that he held the same as against the right of said estate; and that, if he was in possession of the certificate, it was put in his possession to be kept for Wilkes Goldman, or he got possession of it wrongfully.

The bank prayed that these claimants be required to interplead, so that it could be determined to which one of them the bank should pay said money.

The jury trying the case returned a verdict in favor of the administrator, whereupon Crozier made his motion for a new trial, which, as amended, was overruled bythe court, and error was assigned upon this Judgment.

Burnside & McWhorter, of Lincolnton, for plaintiff in error.

John T. West & Son, of Thomson, and C. J. Ferryman, of Lincolnton, for defendant in error.

HINES, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] 1. There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, and a new trial should not be granted upon the formal grounds of the motion for new trial.

2. In the first ground of the plaintiff's amendment to his motion for a new trial it is alleged that the court erred in admitting in evidence, over objection of plaintiff, the following testimony of John Crozier, Sr., on cross-examination:

"I didn't get the money from the sale of that house. Jack got it. Monk hadn't got none up to that time as I know of."

It is alleged in this ground that the witness referred to the disposition of part of the proceeds of a place which was not involved in this suit. The objection to this testimony was that it was irrelevant, and did not elucidate any issue involved in the trial of this case. Ordinarily the admission of irrelevant testimony is not cause for the grant of a new trial, unless, from its peculiar nature, or from statements in the assignment of error, it is shown to have had a prejudicial effect on the party complaining. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 119 Ga. 455 (s), 46 S. E. 678; Thompson v. Thompson, 77 Ga. 693' (7), 3 S. E. 261. It is not pointed out in this ground of the motion, however, that this testimony, if irrelevant, was prejudicial to the plaintiff, and prejudice does not appear from the peculiar nature of this evidence. So we cannot say that the court erred in admitting this evidence.

3. In the second ground of the plaintiff's amendment to his motion for a new trial it is alleged that the court erred in permitting Hogan Goldman, the administrator of Wilkes Goldman, one of the parties to the case, over objection by the plaintiff, to testify as follows: "He wanted me to take it and put it in my place." It is alleged that the evidence referred to a conversation the witness had with his deceased father as to what the deceased said he wanted to do with his money. The objection to this testimony was that it was irrelevant, and, further, that it was a conversation between the witness and his father, who had subsequently died, the witness being interested as an heir at law in the estate of his deceased father, which was involved in the case on trial. What is said in the preceding section of this opinion disposes of the question whether a new trial should be granted because this testimony is irrelevant It is not alleged how or in what manner it is prejudicial, and prejudice does not appear from the nature of this evidence. The second objection to the admission of this testimony is not sufficient to raise the question of the competency of this witness. The objection made is to the admissibility of this testimony, and not to the competency of the witness to testify. So we cannot consider this objection as raising the question of the competency of the witness.

4. In the third ground of the plaintiff's amendment to his motion for new trial it is alleged that the court erred in overruling his motion to rule out all the testimony of Hogan Goldman, the administrator, in regard to the conversation had with his deceased father in regard to what disposition his father wanted to make of his money, as contained on page 27 of the brief of evidence, and the testimony of all other witnesses, who were heirs at law of said deceased, in regard to conversations or transactions had with him in regard to the deposition he desired to make of his money, or intended to make of it. This motion was based upon the ground that these witnesses were interested in the estate of said deceased, and could...