Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 December 1929 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 39920,39929.,s. 39920 |
| Parties | CROZIER v. HAWKEYE STAGES, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; Ralph W. Hasner, Judge.
Action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff while a passenger on a motor carrier operated by the defendant Hawkeye Stages, Inc., for which corporation the Underwriters' Service Corporation had executed an insurance liability bond under the statute. The court directed a verdict in favor of the Hawkeye Stages, Inc. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against the Underwriters' Service Corporation. The plaintiff appeals from the action of the court in directing a verdict in favor of the Hawkeye Stages, Inc., and the Underwriters' Service Corporation appeals from the judgment rendered against it on the verdict of the jury. Reversed on both appeals.
Grimm, J., dissenting in part.Edwards, Longley, Ransier & Harris, of Waterloo, and Stuart S. Ball, of Des Moines, for plaintiff.
Wenner & Mosier, of Waterloo, for defendants.
The Hawkeye Stages, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the transportation of passengers for hire over certain highways in the state of Iowa, by means of motor vehicles. Said defendant was duly authorized to operate such a motor vehicle between the cities of Waterloo and Ames. As such motor vehicle carrier, said defendant procured from the defendant the Underwriters' Service Corporation a liability insurance bond as provided by statute, which said bond was filed with the board of railroad commissioners, as required by law. The plaintiff was a passenger on a motorbus being operated by the said Hawkeye Stages, Inc., near the town of Hudson, and was injured as the result of a collision between said bus and an automobile being driven on a crossroad. The plaintiff's petition, in one count, seeks to recover from the said Hawkeye Stages, Inc., for negligence in the operation of said motor vehicle; five grounds of negligence being specified. In a separate count negligence is pleaded generally. In another count of the petition the plaintiff alleges that the board of railroad commissioners granted to the Hawkeye Stages, Inc., a certificate authorizing it to furnish public service upon certain highways in the state of Iowa, and that the Underwriters' Service Corporation executed a liability insurance bond under the statute, under the terms of which the said last-named defendant obligated itself to make compensation for injuries to persons resulting from the operation of the motor vehicles of the defendant Hawkeye Stages, Inc. Separate answers were filed. As before stated, at the close of plaintiff's evidence the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant Hawkeye Stages, Inc. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover against the defendant Underwriters' Service Corporation, and submitted to the jury as the only issue for their determination the question of the amount of damages caused by the accident in question.
The evidence in behalf of the plaintiff disclosed that on June 6, 1927, in company with a lady companion, she purchased a ticket for transportation on a motorbus operated by said Hawkeye Stages, Inc., from Waterloo to Marshalltown. She and her companion sat in the same seat, directly back of the driver. The lady accompanying her sat next to the window, and the plaintiff was on her right. The bus left at 3:10 in the afternoon. The accident occurred shortly after the bus left the town of Hudson. The plaintiff testified that shortly after passing the town of Hudson the bus came to a crossroad. She said:
The plaintiff testified on cross-examination:
“Q. How far was this automobile from the bus when you first observed it? A. I don't know that I could tell you how far it was from the bus, it seemed to be--it was a little distance from the corner which we were approaching, I should say about as far distant from the corner as the bus was, which seemed to me like one good city block, perhaps, I can't judge much of distances when it is an open space and nothing to gauge by, it was just after we passed a large building, which I assume would be the schoolhouse you referred to. There were windows on the bus at my left and at the head of the bus. The glass was closed in the window next to us. I might have had a vision of the highway ahead of the bus but I didn't look ahead. I was looking at the side at the country. * * *
Q. What I am after is, what did you see as to the operation of the car after you first saw it approaching the intersection? A. Well, it was continued toward the intersection at a quite rapid rate of speed.
Q. Yes, what about the operation of the bus from that time on? A. The bus continuedat the same rate of speed, as far as I could judge, it was going when I first noticed the car, I didn't notice any diminution of speed or change of direction.
Q. Now, you stated that there was an impact or collision between the automobile and the bus. What part of the automobile came into contact with the bus? A. I couldn't answer that question, I didn't actually see it. I felt the impact and saw the flash of the car, and felt the jar, but I couldn't tell you which part of the car struck the bus, of my own knowledge. * * *
Q. But you saw the car strike the bus, or the bus strike the car? A. I felt the impact of the two cars. I don't know which one struck. * * * I said the car struck, I don't know how to describe it exactly, they came together sidewise, instead of right hand collision, across, right angle collision.
Q. Well, now, just where on the bus, or on what part of the bus did the automobile strike sidewise? A. I don't know. * * *
Q. I believe you stated the driver of the bus turned the bus to the right? A. Yes.
Q. Was that before the impact? A. The turning and the impact were so nearly simultaneous, that I don't know which came first. * * *
Q. You stated that the bus turned to the right, the driver turned it, how far to the right did the bus turn? A. So that it turned into the crossroad. Turned from the road on which we were, into the crossroad, on the right.
Q. Do you know whether it turned parallel with the crossroad or even farther around? A. You mean whether it went directly into the crossroad.
Q. When it turned, when the bus turned? A. Well, it seemed to me parallel, but I was not familiar with the road, or just what angle it might lie, so I couldn't answer that definitely.”
I. We first consider the question as to the ruling of the court in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant the Hawkeye Stages, Inc. It is the contention of the plaintiff that she was entitled to go to the jury upon the question of the claimed negligence of the defendant Hawkeye Stages, Inc., in the manner of the operation of the motorbus at the time of the injury. The defendant Hawkeye Stages, Inc., is a motor vehicle carrier operating under the provisions of chapter 252A1 of the Code of Iowa 1927 (sections 5105A1 to 5105A39). As such motor vehicle carrier it obtained from the board of railroad commissioners of this state a certificate authorizing it to operate motor vehicles upon certain described highways of the state, and said defendant was so engaged in said business at the time of the injury complained of. Said defendant was what is commonly known in the law as a common carrier of passengers for hire, and its common-law duties and liabilities are such as pertain to a common carrier of passengers. It also has certain statutory duties, which, however, are not involved in this case.
[1] At this point the question is whether or not, under the record, the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on the question of the alleged negligence of the said defendant Hawkeye Stages, Inc. It is a familiar and well-established rule that a carrier of passengers is not an absolute insurer of the safety of the passengers, but is only liable for injuries which are caused by the negligence of the carrier in failing to exercise the proper degree of care, skill, and diligence for the safety of the passengers. Blumenthal v. Union Electric Co., 129 Iowa, 322, 105 N. W. 588;Cronk v. Wabash R. R. Co., 123 Iowa, 349, 98 N. W. 884.
[2] The rule of res ipsa loquitur has been recognized as of peculiar application in actions for negligence against carriers of passengers. This rule is most frequently applied in cases involving the transportation of passengers where the circumstances attending the injury are of such a character that the accident complained of could not well have happened in the ordinary course of events without the defendant being negligent, as, for example, in cases of railroads where the accident appears to have been due to a defective roadbed or machinery, or fault in the operation of a train. In such cases, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by showing the fact of the accident, and that it was of such a nature that it would not usually happen without negligence, and thereby throws upon the carrier the burden of showing its freedom from negligence with respect to the defect or fault which caused the accident. Whittlesey v. B., C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 121 Iowa, 597-602, 90 N. W. 516, 97 N. W. 66;Fitch v. Mason City & Clear Lake Traction Co., 124 Iowa, 665, 100 N. W. 618;Mitchell v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 138 Iowa, 283-286, 114 N. W. 622;Dieckmann, Adm'r, v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 145 Iowa, 250, 121 N. W. 676, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 338, 139 Am. St. Rep. 420;Dorn v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa, 140, 134 N. W. 855;Weber v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 175 Iowa, 358-365, 151 N. W. 852, L. R. A. 1918A, 626;Monaghan v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 184 Iowa,...
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