Crumbley v. Solomon

• Decision Date: 28 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 33904,33904
• Citation: 254 S.E.2d 330,243 Ga. 343
• Parties: CRUMBLEY et al. v. SOLOMON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 330

254 S.E.2d 330

243 Ga. 343

CRUMBLEY et al. v. SOLOMON et al.

No. 33904.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued Oct. 11, 1978.

Decided March 15, 1979.

Rehearing Denied March 28, 1979.

Mills & Chasteen, Ben B. Mills, Jr., Fitzgerald, Rogers & McCord, John R. Rogers, Ashburn, for appellants.

E. Kontz Bennett, Sr., Waycross, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This court is again confronted with the difficult task of resolving a church property dispute. Franklin Tabernacle attempted to withdraw from the Holiness Baptist Association by a majority vote of its members. The opposing members of Franklin Tabernacle and trustees of the Holiness Baptist Association sued the withdrawing members to establish the right of the Association to control local church property. After trial, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the withdrawing members, finding that control of church property rested with a majority of the local congregation. We reverse.

Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322 (1976), identified two types of church government congregational and hierarchical. If the church government is congregational, then a majority of its members control its decisions and local church property. If hierarchical, then we use "neutral principles of law" to determine whether the local church or parent church has the right to control local property. Those "neutral principles" are state statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination. Carnes v. Smith, supra, at 37, 222 S.E.2d 322, citing, Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970).

A congregational church has been defined as one "strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and (one that) so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 722, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). On the other hand, "(h) ierarchical churches may be defined as those organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 110, 73 S.Ct. 143, 151, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). Careful consideration of the minutes from 1923 onward of annual meetings of the Association has persuaded us that the Association's annual meetings, at which local churches were represented by elected delegates, were "common ruling convocation(s)" with ultimate authority over all local churches.

Having determined that the Holiness Baptist Association is hierarchical, then we must refer to state statutes, relevant deeds, corporate charters, and the organizational constitution of the denomination to determine whether the general church or local church controls the local property.

In this case, F. B. McKinnon deeded the property in 1927 "to Franklin Tabernacle of the Holiness Baptist Church in Coffee County, Georgia, and to the deacons of said church, to be held in trust by them and their successors for said church. To have and to hold the said bargained premises . . . to the only proper use, benefit and behoof of Franklin Tabernacle . . . its successors, and assigns, in fee simple." In 1927, Franklin Tabernacle was a member of the unincorporated Holiness Baptist Association, which had been formed in 1894.

The Association was first incorporated in 1953, but while the corporate charter authorizes the Association to own property, it does not refer specifically to ownership of local churches. However, the Disciplinary Rules of the Association provide, "The Association shall hold all church property, regardless if all members vote to change the church to some other faith. Also, that deeds of new churches be drawn up to be property of the Holiness Baptist Association until sold by the committee appointed by the Association." The Association first adopted this rule in 1947. Since then, the rule has been printed each year in the Association's minutes.

In Carnes v. Smith, we identified the relevant state statutes as Code Ann. §§ 22-5507 and 22-5508. "Code Ann. § 22-5507 recognizes and validates deeds conveying land for church purposes according to the limitations set out in the deed and for use 'according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline . . .' Where the conveyance is made to trustees, Code Ann. § 22-5508 provides that such trustees hold the church property 'subject to the authority of the church or religious society for which they hold the same in trust . . .' " Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. at 38, 222 S.E.2d at 327.

From 1947, the trustees of Franklin Tabernacle held the church property subject to the disciplinary rule that "the Association shall hold all church property, regardless if all members vote to change the church to some other faith." We therefore find that a trust for the benefit of the general church has been implied by the Association's discipline. We note that Franklin Tabernacle participated in making this disciplinary rule and did not contest its validity for 30 years. Because Franklin Tabernacle remained a member of the Association and accepted the benefits flowing from that relationship, it cannot now deny the existence of a trust for the benefit of the general church.

The withdrawing members of the local church have attempted to rely upon the deed from F. B. McKinnon which places record title in the trustees of the local church. A trust is a creature of equity. Whenever a trust is implied on real property, the court recognizes that equitable title is in someone other than the record owner. If this were a contest between the Association and a bona fide purchaser who relied upon the record title, then protection of the bona fide purchaser would be reasonable. But the contest is between the original parties, and both participated in the creation of the trust through the passage of the church discipline.

In recent years this court has looked consistently to the requirements of the church discipline in hierarchical denominations to avoid offending the prohibitions of the First Amendment. For example, in Carnes v. Smith, this court rested the general church's right to the property on the church discipline. In Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 210, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978), we held that the local church had the right of control of the local property because "no language of similar import" was found in the discipline of the Presbyterian Church. Because the discipline of the Holiness Baptist Association implies a trust in this case, we hold that the parent church controls local property.

The local church also has claimed that to impress a trust on Franklin Tabernacle for the benefit of the general church offends the intent of the grantor. At the time of the conveyance, Franklin Tabernacle was a member of the Holiness Baptist Association, although the Association had not yet passed the property provision of the church discipline.

Code Ann. § 22-5507 specifically applies to deeds "heretofore" or " hereafter" made and states that the trustees hold the property for use " according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline." In the deed from F. B. McKinnon, the property was granted to "Franklin Tabernacle said Party of the second part its successors, and assigns, in fee simple." This language contemplates successors and assigns, which the Association has become under its disciplinary rule.

Moreover, we cannot now enforce the grantor's intent because that intent is uncertain. The property was deeded to "Franklin Tabernacle of the Holiness Baptist Church." At the time of the grant, Franklin Tabernacle had a connectional relationship with the Holiness Baptist Association. The grantor might well side with the Holiness Baptist Association and the nonwithdrawing members of Franklin Tabernacle. We will follow the clear and longstanding church disciplinary rule rather than make the forbidden determination of which is the "true" Franklin Tabernacle. See Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). As the Supreme Court has stated, "The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the governing body, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 725, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). Accordingly, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendants.

The complaint also contains prayers for injunctive relief, which require the exercise of the trial court's discretion. Because some of the requested relief may be inappropriate, the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was not error. ¹ Therefore, the direction of the verdict is reversed, and the case is remanded for further consideration in accordance with this opinion.

Judgment reversed and remanded.

All the Justices concur, except UNDERCOFLER, P. J., and JORDAN and BOWLES, JJ., who dissent.

JORDAN, Justice, dissenting.

The majority opinion makes a fatal mistake in concluding that the relationship between the local Baptist Church (Franklin Tabernacle) and Holiness Baptist Association was hierarchical. Such an assumption, even under the facts of this case, flagrantly collides with the traditional well known reality that a Baptist Church prides itself in being a "congregational church."

The deed is clear in conveying the property "to the deacons of said church, to be held in trust by them . . ." Under a congregational system of church government, the title is vested in a majority of the church members and the trial court was eminently correct in directing a verdict in their favor.

I would affirm and therefore dissent.

BOWLES, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this...