Crump v. Morgan

Decision Date31 December 1843
Citation38 N.C. 91,3 Ired.Eq. 91,40 Am.Dec. 447
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesLETITIA M. A. CRUMP BY HER GUARDIAN v. HENRY MORGAN.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

The marriage of a lunatic, during the period of lunacy, is absolutely void, and may be so declared by a Court of Equity.

Upon an application for divorce on that ground, when the fact of incapacity of mind is established, the court has no discretion, but is bound to pronounce a decree of nullity of marriage.

In a case of alleged insanity at the time of the marriage, subsequent acquiescence during long or frequent periods of undoubtedly restored reason would be cogent proof of competent understanding at the time of the marriage: but, if the insanity at that time be established, so that the marriage was void ipso facto, it seems that neither acquiescence, long cohabitation and issue, nor the desire of the parties to adhere can amend the original defect.

The canon and civil law, as administered in the ecclesiastical courts in England, are parts of the common law, were brought here by our ancestors as such, and have been adopted and used here in all cases, to which they were applicable, and whenever there has been a tribunal exercising a jurisdiction to call for their use.

A suit for nullity of marriage on the ground of insanity may be brought either in the name of the lunatic by her guardian or in the name of the guardian, though the former is, for some reasons, the preferable course.

The cases of Johnson v Kincade, 2 Ired. Eq. 470, and Shaw v Burney, 1 Ired. Eq. 148, cited and approved.

Cause transmitted by consent of parties to the Supreme Court from the Court of Equity of Motgomery county, at Fall Term, 1843.

This was a suit of nullity of marriage, instituted in August, 1841, by Letitia M. A. Crump, acting by her committee, R. D. Lindsay, against the pretended husband, Henry Morgan, and praying that a marriage de facto celebrated between those parties in October, 1839, may be pronounced null and void, by reason of the said Letitia being, at the time, of unsound mind, and not capable of assenting to the same.

The bill states that this person was of most respectable parentage in Guilford county, and that she was there well bred and educated, and formed a part of the best society there until her marriage in 1826 with Colonel John Crump, who resided in Montgomery county, and was a gentleman of fortune and character: That as his wife, this lady conducted herself with prudence and propriety and moved in the best circles, until she arrived to about the age of thirty and had five children: That, at the birth of the last of those children, she was attacked with puerperal fever attended by mania; and that she was then partially restored to her reason, but subject to occasional alienations of it: That, while in that unsettled state of mind, her husband died in 1836, and that by that event she became entitled to an independent property. The bill then states, that soon afterwards she became a confirmed lunatic, having no intervals perfectly lucid, and generally with but little glimmering of reason: That in July, 1838, she was duly found to be a lunatic and incapable of managing her affairs, and that she had so been continually from April, 1837; and that the court of Montgomery then appointed her brother, William R. D. Lidsay the guardian and committee of her person and property. The bill then states, that Mr. Lindsay removed his sister among her relations in Guilford, in the hope that the persons and places, that had been familiar to her, and the objects of her regard in early life, might soothe if not restore her mind; but that, after a trial of some months, it was found rather to exacerbate than to alleviate the malady?? That in consequence thereof he took her again to Motgomery and placed her in the family and under the care of Mr. Littleton Harris, a respectable person, and the friend and executor of her late husband. The bill then states, that in October, 1839, Mr. Harris, expecting a large company for some days at his house upon the occasion of the marriage of one of his children, placed Mrs. Crump under the care of a family in his neighborhood, named Palmer, of good reputation, that she might be duly attended to during the festivities in his own family; that on the succeeding Sunday Mrs. Palmer, having occasion to leave home for the day, took Mrs. Crump and her servant to the house of Charles Morgan, the father of the present defendant, who resided near, and requested that she might be received and kept out of harm; and she was accordingly so received by Mrs. Morgan and the family; and that, during the day, the defendant, Henry Morgan, a young man of the age of twenty or a little more, without education, standing, property or expectancy, and with a view to gain the property belonging to the lunatic, availed himself of the opportunity of having her in his power, and, with the help of the other members of the family, prevailed on her to agree to marry him; that she was then held under guard until a license could be procured, and the next day they were married by a justice of the peace clandestinely, in a field, at a distance from any house, and without the knowledge of any friend or relation of hers, and in the company only of the family and relations of the defendant; that Morgan resided in the mansion house situate on Mrs. Crump's dower, which he leased from her guardian, and that he and the defendant and the whole family had actual knowledge of the state of this person, and that it was notorious that she was lunatic and under the care of a guardian. The bill further states, that she has continued a lunatic ever since; though she has borne a child since the marriage.

The answer admits previous attacks of derangement, and also that the party has labored under them since the marriage. But it alleges that, during the whole time, there have been frequent lucid intervals; and it avers that she was in a lucid state at the time of the marriage, and understood and assented to it. The defendant denies that she was put under restraint to induce her to agree to the marriage, or that he desired it for the base motive of interest; and he says, he was actuated by his attachment to her for her personal attractions, amiable disposition and mental accomplishments. He admits that he did not regret the favorable opportunity of making a proposal at his father's, and that he availed himself of it. He says, that she at first declined it on account of the difference in their ages, but that, upon his pressing his suit with all the ardor of a sincere attachment, she finally yielded, and without any influence from his parents or any other person. He admits that she expressed fears that she might be demanded by Mr. Harris on behalf of her guardian, and that, when he went for the license, he gave directions that she should not be surrendered to any person, while he was gone; and also that he, fearing some such interference, soon after obtaining her consent, went ten miles in the night for the license, and engaged a magistrate to come the next morning to perform the ceremony; and, the justice of the peace having delayed coming longer than he thought he ought, the party set out to get another, when they were overtaken on the road by the one previously engaged, and were there married about eleven o'clock in the morning.

The plaintiff entered replication to this answer, many depositions were taken on both sides, and, the cause being set for hearing, was removed to the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to recite the facts offered in evidence, as they are sufficiently referred to in the opinion delivered in this court.

Badger and Mendenhall for the plaintiff .

Strange for the defendant .

RUFFIN, C. J.

It is not usual for the court to discuss evidence in detail; and, to every one conversant with the proofs in this cause, the reasons will be obvious, why we should decline it upon this occasion. It is sufficient to state its effect to be fully to sustain, and even more than sustain, the statements in the bill. Upon the questions of fact there is not the slightest doubt. There is a vast mass of depositions; and all of them, including even those of the defendant, and we may almost say the answer too, taken as a whole, establish incontestably the want of capacity in this woman to make any contract, or do any act requiring reason. From the birth of the last child of the first marriage, she was subject to frequent fits of lunacy. The paroxism became more and more frequent, and more and more violent, until her reason seems almost to have become entirely extinguished, leaving, however, her bodily health good and her sensual appetites inflamed and uncontrolled. Her moral principles and sentiments declined with the decay of her mental faculties. Once a well bred and virtuous young woman and then an exemplary matron, she soon lost, after these attacks, the characteristic delicacy of her sex, and seemed literally to be possessed with a fury of animal passion. With a view to its gratification, she constantly, forgetful or insensible of the death of her husband, invoked his return. She was considered and treated by all as an insane person, and she acted as if she was always insane. She conducted no household affairs, performed no maternal duties, professed no maternal affections. No one gives the particulars of a single rational and connected conversation sustained for a moderate length of time. The answer states that she had lucid intervals, and that in one of them she was courted and married by the defendant. But no one else thought she was then of sound mind, though not reduced to a state in which her mind was so extinguished, as to present to a stranger the idea of never having had any. The courtship and marriage may, under the circumstances, be called acts of madness in themselves; and must satisfy any one that the defendant was fully aware of her state. Not one word appears ever to have been...

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  • Carpenter v. Carpenter
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 26, 1956
    ...a void marriage is a nullity and may be impeached at any time. Schouler's Marriage, etc., § 1081; Johnson v. Kincade, 37 N.C. 470; Crump v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91; Williamson v. Williams, 56 N.C. 446; Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941, L.R.A.1916C, 704. In Gathings v. Williams the princ......
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