Crump v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 15 January 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 1401.)
• Parties: CRUMP v. SANDERS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

173 S.W. 559

CRUMP v. SANDERS.

(No. 1401.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

January 15, 1915.

Error from District Court, Bowie County; H. F. O'Neal, Judge.

Trespass to try title by W. D. Sanders against A. G. Crump. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

R. H. Jones, of De Kalb, and Mahaffey, Thomas & Hughes, of Texarkana, for plaintiff in error. Smelser & Vaughan, of Texarkana, for defendant in error.

HODGES, J.

This suit was instituted by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error to recover the title and possession of lots Nos. 6 and 7 in the town of De Kalb, Tex. The lots are described by reference to a plot of the town made by the Texas & Pacific Railway Company which was recorded in the office of the county clerk of Bowie county. The defendant in error answered disclaiming as to a portion of lot No. 7, and as to the remainder by plea of not guilty and title by adverse possession for a period of more than 10 years. He also in a supplemental answer suggested improvements in good faith. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court gave a peremptory instruction in favor of the defendant in error for the title and possession of all the property sued for. The following is the substance of the undisputed facts upon which the defendant in error relies to support the verdict and judgment rendered: A conveyance by the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to A. M. Getts in February, 1901; a general warranty deed from Getts and wife to A. G. Crump, the plaintiff in error, R. T. Lacy, and J. B. Hatchell, trustees of De Kalb Lodge No. 285 Knights of Pythias, dated August 22, 1908, and duly recorded; a general warranty deed dated September 11, 1908, from R. T. Lacy, A. G. Crump, the plaintiff in error, and J. B. Hatchell, trustees of De Kalb Lodge No. 285 Knights of Pythias, to himself. The plaintiff in error proved as the basis of his claim that in 1901 he received a conveyance from the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of block 4 as shown on the plot of the town of De Kalb; that about the time this purchase was made the agent of the railway company pointed out to him a point as his southwest corner, telling him that his land lay east of that point; that he relied upon that designation as his true southwest corner, and fenced all of lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and a portion of lot No. 7; that he had been in possession of the property, claiming the same adversely, since that date. As rebutting the adverse claim of the plaintiff in error, the defendant in error offered in evidence the deed made by the trustees of the lodge of the Knights of Pythias, among whom was the plaintiff in error, conveying the property to defendant in error in 1908, as estopping the plaintiff in error from asserting any adverse claim based upon possession prior to that deed.

The only assignments presented in the record are those which assail the right of the court to give a peremptory instruction. The proposition is asserted that the evidence was conflicting upon the material issues involved, and presented questions which the court should have referred to the jury. The first question, probably, which arises in discussing these assignments, is: Did the evidence raise an issue of fact as to the acquisition of a title by the plaintiff in error by 10 years' adverse possession? It should probably be conceded that it does, unless the plaintiff in error is estopped by his deed as a member of the board of trustees of the Knights of Pythias Lodge executed in 1908. That deed the record shows contained a general warranty. It is now well settled by the decisions, both in this state and out of it, that the rule of estoppel by deed applies to a grantor who executes it in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as well as to one who conveys property in his own right. Corzine v. Williams, 85 Tex. 499, 22 S. W. 399; Parks v. Knox, 130 S. W. 203; A. F. L. M. Co. v. Walker, 119 Ga. 341, 46 S. E. 426; 16 Cyc. 712, and cases referred to in the notes. If that rule be applied in this instance, the appellant is estopped from claiming any personal rights, either to the title to the land in...