Crump v. Thompson

• Citation: 9 Ired. 491,31 N.C. 491
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 30 June 1849
• Parties: DOE ON DEMISE OF REBECCA CRUMP v. JOSEPH H. THOMPSON.

9 Ired. 491

31 N.C. 491

DOE ON DEMISE OF REBECCA CRUMP

v.JOSEPH H. THOMPSON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1849.

A declaration in a deed, that the land, conveyed by it, had been before granted to a certain person, is not evidence for the parties to the deed, that in fact it was thus granted.

In cases of adverse possession of land, the statute of limitations begins to run from the ouster. If the one having the right be a feme covert, and the seven years have expired in the lifetime of her husband, she has three years, and only three, after the death of her husband, within which to commence her suit: when the seven years have not expired in the lifetime of her husband, the two periods of seven years from the ouster, and three years from the death of the husband are concurrent, until one of them shall have run out; and then the feme is entitled to the other and longer period, to enter or sue.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Davidson County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge DICK presiding.

The action was commenced on the 16th of August 1845. The plaintiff gave in evidence a grant for the premises to Thomas Monroe, dated on the 27th of November 1792, and that he died many years ago, and that the lessor of the plaintiff was his only child and heir at law, and intermarried with Mark Crump.

The defendant gave in evidence a Patent to one Henry Dolin, dated in 1752, for a large tract of land, and a deed from Dolin to Edward Williams for the same land, and a deed from Williams to Richmond Pearson for certain lands, therein described by metes and bounds, and dated in 1791. The defendant gave no direct evidence to show, what land the said patent and deed covered or that they included any part of the premises in dispute. But the defendant gave in evidence a deed from the said Pearson to one Nathaniel Peebles, dated in 1817, conveying a certain tract of land in fee, which is therein described by metes and bounds and also as being part of a tract of land conveyed by Edward Williams to the said Pearson in the year 1791; and the defendant then gave evidence, that the deed to Peebles covered that part of the land, claimed by the plaintiff, of which the defendant was in possession, and that he, the defendant, entered and claimed under the said Peebles.

Thereupon, the counsel for the defendant moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the recital in the deed from Pearson to Peebles was sufficient evidence to satisfy the jury, that the patent to Dolin covered the premises in dispute. The Court refused to give the instruction.

The defendant then offered evidence, that in the year 1837 or 1838, the land conveyed by Pearson to Nathaniel Peebles was divided between his heirs; and that the part thereof, which is covered by the grant to Monroe, was allotted to Hubbard Peebles, one of the heirs, under whom the defendant claims; that Mark Crump, then the husband of the lessor of the plaintiff, was present at the time, and objected to the allotment thereof, but that, nevertheless, the said Hubbard took the possession of the land in dispute immediately, and he and those claiming under him have continued in possession ever since. The defendant further gave evidence, that Mark Crump died in November 1838, after the said Hubbard had taken possession.

The counsel for the defendant thereupon prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that, if they should believe that Hubbard Peebles and those claiming under him had seven years continued possession of the premises, before the commencement of this suit, the lessor of the plaintiff's right of entry was barred by the statute of the limitations. But the Court refused to give the instruction, and, on the contrary, directed the jury, that,...