Crumrine v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 14 November 1904
• Citation: 13 Wyo. 111,78 P. 402
• Parties: CRUMRINE ET AL. v. REYNOLDS
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

78 P. 402

13 Wyo. 111

CRUMRINE ET AL. v. REYNOLDS

Supreme Court of Wyoming

November 14, 1904

ERROR to the District Court, Albany County, HON. CHARLES W. BRAMEL Judge.

Replevin by Allan D. F. Reynolds against Eli Crumrine and Robert H Homer, for property previously delivered by the plaintiff to one A. E. Miller under a conditional sale contract, which had not been filed. The plaintiff recovered judgment, and defendants prosecuted proceedings in error. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Affirmed.

N. E Corthell, for plaintiff in error.

In replevin the plaintiff must succeed upon the strength of his own title, and not upon any weakness which he may point out in the title of the defendant. (Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall., 44; Johnson v. Neale, 6 Allen, 227; Cavanaugh v. Brodball (Neb.), 59 N.W. 517.)

The filing of the petition in bankruptcy operated as a caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction; and, from adjudication, title to the bankrupt property became vested in the trustee, with actual or constructive possession, and this placed it in the custody of the bankrupt court. (Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 14.) This court has already decided that a failure to file the statutory affidavit of renewal of a chattel mortgage has the same effect against the administrator of the estate of the deceased mortgagor, as it would have against creditors. (Bank v. Ludvigsen, 8 Wyo. 230.) The principle would be the same where the claimant is assignee or trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor. (Graham Button Co. v. Spielman, 50 N.J. Eq. 120; In re Leigh, 96 F. 806; In re Plow Co., 112 id., 308; In re Antigo S.D. Co., 123 id., 249; In re Rodgers, 125 id., 169; In re Reynolds, 127 id., 760; In re Legg, 96 id., 326; In re Wilcox & Howe Co., 39 A. 163; Cash Reg. Co. v. Woodbury, 39 id., 168; Plow Co. v. Spillman, 117 F. 746; In re Rabenan, 118 id., 471; Carriage Co. v. Wells, 74 S.W. 878; Shoe Co. v. Seldner, 122 F. 593; Logan v. Plow Co., 92 N.W. 129; 93 id., 1128 (Neb.); Spencer v. Silk Co., 112 F. 642.) In cases of this class reference is usually had to the provisions of the federal bankruptcy statutes, chief of which are the following: "Claims which for want of recording or for other reasons would not have been valid liens as against the claims of creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his estate." In providing the property which passes to the trustee: "Property which prior to the filing of the petition he (the bankrupt) could by any means have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him." (Secs. 67a, 70a.) Without such statute the title of the bankrupt's representative relates back to the act of bankruptcy and hence the statute does not materially alter the effect which the act or adjudication of bankruptcy would have had in the absence of such statutes. (Cooper v. Chitty, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas., 700; 1 Kenyon, 395; 1 W. B. L., 65.) The agreed facts determine the case upon its merits, and are equivalent to findings of fact by the court. They establish a clear right in the plaintiffs in error to a final judgment in their favor if their theory of the law is correct and such judgment should be directed by this court. (Brown v. Mott, 22 Ohio St. 149; Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 421.)

H. V. S. Groesbeck, for defendant in error.

Crumrine and Homer were simply the assignees of Miller. They were not trustees in bankruptcy; had no connection with the federal court, and in no sense could they have held the property for the use and benefit of the trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee was not a party to the suit. He is a stranger to the record. His very existence as an officer of the bankruptcy court at this date can be questioned. If the judgment be reversed and a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs in error, could it be expected that the latter would hand the property or its equivalent in money to any trustee in bankruptcy who never demanded the property nor brought suit for it?

At common law the assignee had no better standing than the assignor. (Bank v. Ludvigsen, 8 Wyo. 230.) The common law has been adopted as a part of the law of this state. (R. S., Sec. 2695.) The title of the conditional vendor is good as against everyone except as against a purchaser or judgment creditor, though the contract be not filed. (Warner v. Roth, 2 Wyo. 63; Bunce v. McMahon, 6 id., 24.) A purchaser within the meaning of the statute is one who pays a fair value for the article. (Anderson's Law Dict., p. 846; 23 Ency. Law, 461-463.) A judgment creditor is one whose claim has been merged in a judgment. (Anderson's Law Dict., p. 292.) Where a conditional sale is not filed and recorded, such omission is only available to such creditors and persons mentioned in the statute, as have perfected a lien upon the property by execution or levy. (Wilson v. Lewis (Neb.), 88 N.W. 690; Locomotive Works v. Lumber Co., 91 Ga. 639.) An assignee for the benefit of creditors can acquire no title to property which has not become vested in the assignor by the performance of required conditions. (6 Ency. Law, 494; Romberg v. Hughes, 18 Neb. 581; Peterson v. Tufts, 34 id., 8; Warner v. Jameson, 52 Iowa 70; Peet v. Spencer, 90 Mo. 384; Tufts v. Thompson, 22 Mo. App., 564; Adams v. Lee, 64 N. H., 421.) A conditional bill of sale unrecorded, a trustee in bankruptcy takes no better title than the bankrupt. (In re Kellogg, 112 F. 52; In re Hinsdale, 111 id., 502.) Even a mortgagee is not a purchaser. (McCormick Harv. Co. v. Callen (Neb.), 67 N.W. 863; Campbell P. P. & M. Co. v. Dyer (Neb.), 65 id., 904.) The case of Bank v. Ludvigsen, 8 Wyo. 230, is not in point. In that case a chattel mortgage was considered. The acts concerning chattel mortgages and conditional sales are vastly different in their terms and limitations. As to conditional sales, the limitation is not as to creditors in general, but to a specific class; judgment creditors--those who have protected their claims by procuring judgment and taking possession under a levy.

POTTER, JUSTICE. CORN, C. J., and KNIGHT, J., concur.

OPINION

POTTER, JUSTICE.

This is a suit in replevin. The chattels in controversy, consisting of a typewriter and table, had been delivered by the then owner, the plaintiff below and defendant in error here, into the possession of one A. E. Miller under a written contract of sale providing for monthly payments, and that until final payment of the purchase price the title should remain in the vendor, and that, if required, the property should be restored to the vendor's possession in the event of default as to any payment. It was also stipulated in the contract that the vendee should not part with possession without the written consent of the vendor, under penalty of forfeiture of the property and the money paid thereon. Miller, the vendee named in the contract of sale, was a member of the firm of A. E. Miller & Co., his wife being the other member of the firm. While he was in possession of the property under the contract aforesaid, and the greater part of the purchase price remained unpaid, the firm above named and the individual members thereof entered into a trust agreement for the benefit of their creditors with the plaintiffs in error, Crumrine and Homer, as trustees, and thereupon surrendered to said trustees the possession of certain property, including the chattels here involved. Nothing further, however, was done toward carrying out the provisions of the trust agreement; but it appears that after its execution the trustees were informed that Miller & Company intended to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and they then agreed to hold the property that had come into their possession as aforesaid until it could be delivered to the proper representative of the bankrupt estate; and it was subsequently turned over to the trustee in bankruptcy, except the chattels in controversy, which had been taken on the replevin writ in the present suit.

On February 19, 1902, less than a month after the execution of the trust agreement aforesaid, the firm of Miller & Company, and its individual members, were adjudicated bankrupts upon their voluntary petition. On the same day this suit was instituted before a justice of the peace, and possession of the typewriter and table was delivered to the plaintiff below under the replevin writ, and he was adjudged both by the justice of the peace and by the District Court, on appeal, to be entitled to possession, and was awarded judgment accordingly and for costs. It is contended here on error that the judgment of the District Court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and that it is contrary to law.

It was stipulated on the trial that default had occurred in the conditional contract of sale by reason of the non-payment of the monthly installment due February 7, 1902, and for the further reason that the vendee had without consent parted with possession. The right of the plaintiff below as against Miller, the original vendee, is not disputed, but as the contract was not filed for record it is contended that its conditions as to reservation of title ceased to be valid as against the creditors of Miller on the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy; and that the absolute title with right of possession vested as of that date in the trustee in bankruptcy, for whom it is maintained the plaintiffs in error were holding possession when the present suit was commenced.

Plaintiffs in error rest their contention upon the rule that a party suing in replevin must recover, if at all upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of the title of his adversary, and upon the apparently well settled principles under the bankruptcy act that the title to the property of a bankrupt...