Cruse v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P.
| Decision Date | 05 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20-cv-5939 |
| Parties | WENDELL CRUSE, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
With the consent of the parties and by Order of Reference (ECF No 17), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court for consideration of the Motion of Defendant Franklin County for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40 (“Franklin County's Motion”)), Plaintiff Wendell Cruse's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability of Defendant Franklin County for Violating His Constitutional Rights Against Overdetention (ECF No. 42 (“Plaintiff's Motion”)), and Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 48 (“Walmart's Motion”)). The Motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. (See ECF Nos. 79-85.) For the following reasons Franklin County's Motion (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 42) is DENIED, and Walmart's Motion (ECF No. 48) is GRANTED.
The factual allegations of this case are largely undisputed. Plaintiff, an African American male, was incarcerated in the Franklin County Corrections Center and the Franklin County Community Based Correctional Facility from April 29, 2019 through October 29, 2019. (ECF No. 34 at PAGEID ## 224, 226, ¶¶ 8, 17; ECF Nos. 42-3, 42-5.)
On October 9, 2019, Plaintiff was accepted into the Franklin County Common Pleas Court's Treatment is Essential to Success program, which meant he was eligible to be sent home on October 31, 2019, to live under house arrest while he participated in the program. (See ECF No. 42-6.) On October 30, 2019, Franklin County employee Teresa Kidd initiated the process to release Plaintiff to house arrest, but noted that Plaintiff was subject to an arrest warrant which had been issued by the Canal Winchester Mayor's Court on September 5, 2019 for an offense committed on August 17, 2019 - while Plaintiff was incarcerated. (ECF No. 34 at PAGEID ## 227, 230, ¶¶ 24, 52, 56.)
Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, on August 17, 2019, an unknown individual stole a hoverboard from the Walmart Canal Winchester Supercenter (the “Canal Winchester Walmart”). (Id. at PAGEID # 227, ¶ 24.) In investigating that theft, Defendant Daniel Campbell, an Asset Protection Associate for Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. (“Walmart”), ultimately (mis)identified Plaintiff as the individual who committed the theft. (Id. at ¶ 32.) As a result, on August 29, 2019, Mr. Campbell filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff in the Canal Winchester Mayor's Court. (Id. at PAGEID # 228, ¶ 38.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Campbell characterized Plaintiff as a “repeat offender” who had “trespassed on a prior occasion,” while in reality Plaintiff had never been to the Canal Winchester Walmart. (Id. at PAGEID ## 227-228, ¶¶ 29, 34, 41.) Because Plaintiff had never been to that store - let alone on the day of the theft -Plaintiff alleges that such Mr. Campbell had used facial recognition software to misidentify Plaintiff. (Id. at PAGEID # 229, ¶ 43.)
After reviewing Mr. Campbell's complaint, Fairfield County Sheriff's Deputy Trena Kohler completed an Affidavit in Support of Probable Cause, assigned it a criminal case number, issued it under signature, and requested an arrest warrant. (Id. at PAGEID ## 228-229, ¶¶ 41, 45.)
Plaintiff alleges that neither Mr. Campbell nor Deputy Kohler reviewed Walmart's video footage of the shoplifting, nor did they consult the Ohio Law Enforcement Automated Data System (“LEADS”) as part of their investigation, and that doing either would have exonerated Plaintiff given Plaintiff's incarceration at the time of the shoplifting. (Id. at PAGEID ## 229230, ¶¶ 47-51.) Regardless, on September 5, 2019, the Canal Winchester Mayor's Court issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff and set a bond of $500. (Id. at PAGEID # 230, ¶ 52.) Plaintiff did not learn of the warrant while he was incarcerated, however. He, therefore, did not post bond and the warrant remained valid on October 30, 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-55.)
Because of the outstanding arrest warrant, Plaintiff was not released to house arrest as scheduled. (Id. at PAGEID # 231, ¶ 65.) Plaintiff alleges that he told various Franklin County Jail staff that it was impossible for him to have committed the offense on August 17, 2019, and that “[o]ver the next several days” Plaintiff attempted to contact his public defender without success. (Id. at ¶¶ 66, 68.) Plaintiff alleges that despite the fact that “[h]is situation had become known to other jail staff and prisoners, and he was observably suffering from being unjustly imprisoned,” he remained incarcerated at the Franklin County Jail instead of either being released to house arrest or transferred to Fairfield County, the adjacent county where the outstanding arrest warrant was issued. (Id. at PAGEID # 232, ¶¶ 71-72.) On November 13, 2019, Plaintiff was able to communicate to the Canal Winchester Mayor's Court that he could not have committed the offense on August 17, 2019. The Canal Winchester Mayor's Court issued a recall of the outstanding warrant. (Id. at PAGEID # 233, ¶¶ 79-83.) Then, on November 14, 2019, Plaintiff was released on probation to house arrest. (Id. at ¶ 85.)
On November 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the subject action. (ECF No. 1.) Over the course of the litigation, Plaintiff amended his allegations three times, ultimately filing the operative Third Amended Complaint on December 8, 2021. (See ECF Nos. 8, 31, 34.) In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Campbell and Walmart (the “Walmart Defendants”) committed malicious prosecution and acted negligently, and that Defendant Franklin County and various John and Jane Doe Defendants (the “Franklin County Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights by delaying his release to home arrest. (ECF No. 34 at PAGEID ## 235-237.)
On May 16, 2022, Defendant Franklin County filed its Motion, generally arguing that the Franklin County Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims against them. (ECF No. 40.) Also on May 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Motion, generally arguing that he is entitled to summary judgment on his claims against only the Franklin County Defendants. (ECF No. 42.) On June 6, 2022, the Walmart Defendants filed their, generally arguing that the Walmart Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims against them. (ECF No. 48.) The subject briefs have been fully briefed and are thus ripe for judicial review.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls on the moving party, “and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stransberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2001); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) ().
“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must ‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Kimble v. Wasylyshyn, 439 Fed.Appx. 492, 495-496 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (). “The nonmovant must, however ‘do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,'. . . there must be evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to create a ‘genuine' dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 432 Fed.Appx. 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
In considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment, the Court “must afford all reasonable inferences, and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). “When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Stransberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
Here, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against the Walmart Defendants and one cause of action against the Franklin County Defendants. (See ECF No. 34 at PAGEID ## 235-237.) All three causes of action are implicated in the subject summary judgment briefing. Accordingly, the Court will discuss Plaintiff's claims against each set of Defendants in turn.
Plaintiff's first two claims are against the Walmart Defendants for Malicious Prosecution (First Claim) and Negligence (Second Claim). (ECF No. 34 at PAGEID ## 235-236.) In Walmart's Motion, Walmart argues that “[t]his case resolves on immunity,” stating that “[t]he Walmart Defendants' act of filing charges invokes broad and absolute immunity from these claims” and that “[a]t worst, the Walmart Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.” (ECF No. 48...
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