Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System
| Decision Date | 02 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-5466,00-5466 |
| Citation | 269 F.3d 703 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) Keith Vaughn; Jennifer Vaughn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lawrenceburg Power System, Defendant-Appellee. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Columbia. No. 99-00012, Thomas A. Higgins, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Dana C. McLendon, Ernest W. Williams, Franklin, Tennessee, for Appellants.
H. Rowan Leathers, III, Todd C. McKee, MANIER & HEROD, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: BOGGS and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; and WEBER, District Judge*
Plaintiffs Keith Vaughn and Jennifer Vaughn, former employees of defendant Lawrenceburg Power System ("LPS"), filed an action in Tennessee state court alleging that their terminations from LPS in February 1998 violated their rights under the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. Specifically, the Vaughns objected to LPS's "anti-nepotism" policy, which requires the resignation of one spouse in the event two employees marry. They claim this policy is unconstitutional under either rational basis or strict scrutiny review. They also asserted claims of retaliatory discharge under the THRA and the First Amendment. The magistrate judge initially evaluating their complaint recommended dismissing all claims. The Vaughns objected to certain aspects of this report. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report in full, and granted summary judgment to LPS in a one-page order in February 2000. The Vaughns filed a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, based on our contemporaneous decision in Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2000). The district court was unpersuaded and denied this motion by marginal order in March 2000. The Vaughns have timely appealed both decisions. We affirm in part, but reverse as to one issue.
Keith Vaughn began work for LPS in 1987, and has worked there in several capacities over a ten-year period. In 1997, he was responsible for maintaining LPS's grounds and buildings. Jennifer Vaughn, nee Paige, began working at LPS while in high school, and after her graduation in 1996, started a full-time job as a cashier. During the spring and summer of 1997 Keith and Jennifer became romantically involved. In September 1997, they became engaged.
Unfortunately for the Vaughns, their marriage was against power system policy. The "employment of relatives" or "anti-nepotism" portion of the LPS manual, which it is undisputed that both Vaughns received, reads as follows:
It is the policy of the System to employ only one member of a family. No immediate relatives of employees, officers, members of the city governing body, by blood, marriage or adoption, shall be employed for permanent positions at the Lawrenceburg Power System. For purposes of this policy, said relatives are as follows: Spouse, parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent, grandchild, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and sister-in-law.
When two employees working for the Lawrenceburg Power system are subsequently married, one must terminate employment.
(Emphasis added.) The Vaughns ran afoul of the second part of this section forbidding marriages within the system, which may be termed LPS's rule of "exogamy."
It soon became common knowledge that the Vaughns were to be married. In late September, LPS Superintendent Ronald Cato met with Keith Vaughn, and pointed out the relevant language just quoted. Over the course of that autumn, Cato met with the Vaughns several times to inform them of the policy and to request that they decide which one of them was going to leave LPS. Cato told them he would need a decision before the marriage took place; he also told them that if they remained unmarried and merely lived together there would be no problem with the exogamy rule. The Vaughns were reluctant to pursue this option, in large part because Jennifer had become pregnant that fall with Keith's son, who was born the following July.
The Vaughns disagreed with the policy's applicability to their situation. Mr. Vaughn knew of three other groups of relatives working at LPS, two brother-in-law/sister-in-law dyads, and a father-in-law/son-in-law pair. Keith Vaughn interpreted the overall anti-nepotism policy as being contravened by the presence of these related co-workers.1 He states that he so informed Michael Meek, the Administrative Services Manager, who Vaughn claims told him that the other employees were "grandfathered in" and that Vaughn also "should be" grandfathered in. Despite urging from Cato, neither of the Vaughns indicated they would resign. Instead, they took their case to a meeting of the Power Board in mid-December 1998, where Keith argued he should be "treated like everybody else." The Power Board was not convinced by the Vaughns' interpretation, apparently distinguishing between the first part of the employment of relatives policy, which does not mandate termination, and the second part, the exogamy rule dealing specifically with employee intermarriage, which does. The Board also refused to change the rule or make an exception, as Cato informed the Vaughns in late December, when he again demanded a decision.
Jennifer and Keith's wedding day was January 16, 1998. Keith had met with Cato the previous day and said "okay" in response to Cato's request for a decision. But Keith did not then tell Cato whether he or Jennifer would leave LPS. When the couple arrived back from their honeymoon, they found a letter suspending both of them for minium of two weeks, until February 9, 1998 (or until they reached a decision). If during that time they came to a decision, they were to let Cato know. On February 6, 1998, Keith Vaughn met with Ron Cato and told him the couple planned to have Keith, who was paid more than Jennifer, continue working at LPS while Jennifer resigned. According to Mr. Vaughn, Cato responded by asking for a letter of resignation from Mrs. Vaughn, which apparently had not previously been requested. Vaughn states that he told Cato he didn't know anything about a letter, and had just come by to inform Cato of the long-awaited decision. To this, Cato allegedly said "okay."
The following Monday, February 9, Keith Vaughn, but not Jennifer Vaughn, arrived at LPS at 8 A.M. to begin work. Cato called Vaughn and Michael Meek into his office. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, when Vaughn left Cato's office, he had been fired.2 The parties dispute exactly what was said during the fateful meeting.
According to Vaughn, Cato asked him for a letter from Jennifer, which Vaughn did not have. Vaughn states that he asked Cato whether he needed the letter "for personal reasons or legal reasons." Cato responded: "I take it you don't fully agree with our policy." Vaughn claims that he responded, After this speech, Cato then mentioned the Tennessee right-to-work law, and fired Keith Vaughn.
Cato's contrasting version is that when told again on February 9 of the couple's decision, he said, "I really need to hear it from her." Vaughn offered to call his wife, but Cato states that he refused to accept this and said, "I'd really rather have a letter." Cato then claims to have asked Vaughn: "Would you consider yourself a disgruntled employee?" Cato states that Vaughn replied in the affirmative. Cato then agrees that he mentioned the right-to-work law. Vaughn supposedly asked if he was fired. Cato states that it was only then that he said: "[I]f you're going to be disgruntled and upset, you are." Vaughn supposedly responded, "I am, then." Mike Meek remembers Cato's ultimatum as being, "If you're disgruntled to the point that you don't feel like you can carry out your duties, yes, you're fired."
Cato claims that when he mentioned Tennessee law, he was thinking Vaughn would respond differently. According to Cato, "I thought he was going to say, 'Yeah, I can put it behind me, go and do my job.'" Cato had a planned response: "I was setting him up to say, 'Yeah, but we are going to be watching you every day to make sure you are doing your job . . . .'" Cato claims that he did not want Vaughn to quit, but that Cato explained that the issue was that Keith Outside of the policy, Cato had no problem with the Vaughns.
Vaughn, however, flatly denies that he ever said he was a "disgruntled employee" or that he remembers this phrase being used until he saw it in a letter he received after his termination. This letter, dated February 9, explained that the Vaughns had not "fully accepted" the policy, and terminated Keith Vaughn for "insubordination." For good measure, it terminated Jennifer for the same reason, Cato writing that because he did not "yet have a written resignation[,] I have no choice[.]"3
In January 1999, shortly before their first anniversary, the Vaughns filed a lawsuit against LPS in the Circuit Court for Lawrence County. The complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on "the fundamental right of marriage and freedom of association." The complaint also alleged that the policy was selectively enforced against the Vaughns, knowing that a pregnant Jennifer would be the one to leave, and that this constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.4 The complaint made specific allegations regarding the termination of Keith Vaughn, claiming that such action "constitue[d] a denial...
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