Crutcher v. Hicks

• Decision Date: 20 March 1953
• Citation: 257 S.W.2d 539
• Parties: CRUTCHER et al. v. HICKS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 539

257 S.W.2d 539

38 A.L.R.2d 620

CRUTCHER et al. v. HICKS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 20, 1953.

Rehearing Denied May 22, 1953.

Boehl, Stopher, Kilgarriff, Graves & Deindoerfer, Louisville, for appellant.

Mahan, Davis & Mahan, Louisville, for appellee.

DUNCAN, Justice.

Appellee recovered a judgment for $12,000 for personal injuries and damage to his automobile resulting from a collision with a truck owned by appellant, W. E. Crutcher, and driven by appellant, George W. Beckett. The only grounds urged for reversal are: (1) that the court erred in failing to grant a new trial because of the failure of certain jurors to properly answer questions propounded on voir dire examination; and (2) the damages awarded were excessive.

Upon voir dire examination, counsel for appellants propounded the following question to the entire jury panel: 'Have any of you ever made claim against anyone for damages or have any of you filed suit against anyone for damages?' After the trial, it was discovered that two members of the jury, Paul Schum and W. G. Yager, whose silence was properly interpreted as a negative answer, had previously been involved in litigation in which they had asserted claims for damages. The records of the Jefferson Circuit Court disclose, and it is admitted, that Yager filed a suit for damages in 1934, and Schum was plaintiff in two similar actions in 1909. Appellants insist upon the authority of Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969, 88 A.L.R. 917, and Olympic Realty Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W.2d 293, that the failure of members of the jury to properly answer the question entitles appellants to a new trial as a matter of law. On the other hand, appellee insists that the ultimate question to be determined is whether or not appellants were in any way prejudiced by the failure of the jurors to disclose the information, and that the damage claims in which the jurors were involved are so remote in point of time that probable bias or resulting prejudice is neither shown nor can be presumed.

In the Drury case [247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 984], the entire panel of eighteen jurors was asked the question: 'Have any of you ever been in any way involved in an automobile collision, or is there now pending either by or against you, any litigation growing out of an automobile collision?' None of the panel responded, and it was discovered after the verdict that four of the jurors had been theretofore involved in automobile collisions. The opinion specifically points out that the collisions in which three of the jurors had been involved had occurred a number of years before, were of a trifling nature, and had probably passed out of their memories. As to the fourth juror, it was said:

'As to the juror Howard, a different situation is presented. He had been involved in an automobile collision comparatively recently, and a claim was pending against him which, however, had not reached the point of litigation.'

A careful reading of the opinion convinces us that it was only because of the action of the juror Howard that a new trial was properly awarded.

It is true that some of the language of the Drury opinion indicates that false information given on voir dire examination which prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise of the right of peremptory challenge affects the legality of the panel and the verdict is illegal. Even if we accept the extreme and highly technical view which some parts of the opinion would indicate, it does not necessarily follow that false or misleading information elicited on voir dire examination will invariably and in all cases result in an illegal verdict. If the false information is of such character as to indicate probable bias on the part of the juror, it may be presumed that a free exercise of the right of peremptory challenge has been so restricted as to result in prejudice to the party affected. However, if information innocently withheld or given, although false, is so insignificant or trifling as to indicate only a remote or speculative influence on the juror, the right of peremptory challenge has not been affected.

There is bound to be a point beyond which reason will not permit us to go in setting aside verdicts upon the falsity of information elicited from jurors. A wide...