Crutchfield, Matter of

• Citation: 223 S.E.2d 822,289 N.C. 597
• Decision Date: 17 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 97,97
• Parties: In the Matter of Judge E. E. CRUTCHFIELD.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 822

223 S.E.2d 822

289 N.C. 597

In the Matter of Judge E. E. CRUTCHFIELD.

No. 97.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 17, 1975.

E. A. Hightower, Wadesboro, C. Frank Griffin, Monroe, Henry L. Kitchin, Rockingham, for Judge E. E. Crutchfield, respondent.

Millard R. Rich, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for Judicial Standards Commission.

ORDER OF CENSURE

EXUM, Justice.

This matter is before the Court upon the Recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission (Commission) filed with us on August 13, 1975, that Judge E. E. Crutchfield, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Twentieth Judicial District (Respondent), be censured for 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute,' as this phrase is used in Article IV, Section 17(2) of the North Carolina Constitution and N.C.Gen.Stat. 7A--376 (1974 Cum.Supp.). Having considered the record in the matter consisting of the verified complaint and answer filed with, the evidence heard by, and the findings of fact, conclusions, and Recommendation made by the Commission, and the briefs for Respondent and Commission filed with us (Respondent having elected not to argue the matter orally) we note the following procedure before and Findings of the Commission and we make the following Conclusions of Law and Order of Censure:

PROCEDURE BEFORE AND FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION

1. This proceeding was instituted before the Commission on December 12, 1974, by the filing of a verified complaint which alleged in substance that Respondent had engaged in wilful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in that he had:

(a) on May 6, 1974, signed a 'Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege' to one William B. Byrd despite the facts that Byrd when arrested and charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on April 6, 1974, refused to take the breathalyzer test and had not, as of May 6, 1974, even been tried for the offense;

(b) on May 4, 1974, signed a 'Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege' to one Lybon H. Nance despite the facts that Nance when arrested and charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on April 20, 1974, refused to take the breathalyzer test and Respondent was not the judge who tried Nance for the offense; and

(c) neither of the judgments was filed with the Clerk of Court nor forwarded to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles.

2. Respondent filed a verified answer admitting these allegations.

3. Upon due notice, Respondent was accorded a full adversary hearing before the Commission on April 3, 1975, at which time he was represented by counsel. At the hearing Respondent stipulated that the Commission could consider as evidence:

(a) the Court records pertaining to the driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor charges against Byrd and Nance;

(b) statements obtained from Byrd, Nance and Mrs. Nance by an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation;

(c) a letter Respondent had previously written to the Commission dated July 19, 1974;

(d) Respondent's earlier oral statement given to an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation;

(e) the complaint and answer; and

(f) Respondent's own sworn testimony before the Commission.

During the hearing, Respondent also consented to the Commission's considering statements taken from attorneys Charles Brown and Fred Stokes, whose clients were the beneficiaries of the judgments in question, by an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation.

4. Upon considering this evidence the Commission found certain facts as follows:

7. That on April 6, 1974, William Brooks Byrd, Route 1, Box 56, Norwood, North Carolina, was arrested in Stanly County by North Carolina State Highway Patrolman C. B. Blackmon, and charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and the possession of tax paid liquor with the seal broken in the passenger area of an automobile.

8. That the said William B. Byrd, at the time of his arrest, refused to take a breathalyzer test.

9. That on or about May 6, 1974, Respondent signed a 'Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege' to said Byrd and in which Judgment it was recited that he had been convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and which Judgment granted to him limited driving privileges as provided by G.S. 20--179.

10. That on the date said Judgment was signed, to wit: May 6, 1974, the said Byrd had not been tried on said charges of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and possession of tax paid whiskey and that said case was not tried until May 18, 1974.

11. That Respondent held no hearing with reference to the request of the said Bryd that he be allowed limited driving privileges, made no inquiry with reference to whether a trial of the said Byrd had been held and if so, by whom or as to whether or not the said Byrd had been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants.

12. That said Judgment and copies were signed by Respondent in the law offices of the attorney representing the said Byrd, at said attorney's request; that no copy of said Judgment was filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Stanly County nor was any copy sent to the Department of Motor Vehicles in Raleigh, as required by the provisions of G.S. 20--179.

13. That Respondent was aware at the time he signed said Judgment that only the Trial Judge was authorized by the provisions of G.S. 20--179 to allow limited driving privileges to the person convicted, and was likewise aware of the fact that the form of said Judgment set out in said statutes referred to a hearing and recited a conviction of such defendant in allowing said restricted driving privileges. That Respondent was likewise aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles was required to revoke the driving privilege of any person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants who refused to take a breathalyzer test and was aware that such a person was not entitled under the applicable statutes, to receive restricted driving privileges.

14. That on or about April 20, 1974, Lyvon Hampton Nance, 742 Best Street, Albemarle, North Carolina, was arrested in Stanly County by C. H. Sluder, a North Carolina State Highway Patrolman, and was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants.

15. That said Nance refused to take a breathalyzer test.

16. That on or about May 6, 1974, the said Nance was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants by District Court Judge A. A. Webb, who was the Trial Judge presiding over the trial of said case.

17. That on or about May 6, 1974, Respondent signed a 'Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege' in favor of the said Nance even though Respondent had not been the Trial Judge presiding over the trial of said Nance and even though Nance was not eligible to receive a limited driving privilege because of his refusal to take a breathalyzer test.

18. That Respondent held no hearing with reference to the request of the said Nance that he be allowed limited driving privileges, made no inquiry with reference to whether a trial of the said Nance had been held, and if so, by whom.

19. That Respondent signed said Judgment and copies thereof in the law offices of Nance's attorney and that copy of said Judgment was not filed in the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Stanly County, nor was a copy sent to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles in Raleigh.

20. That Respondent was aware at the time he signed said Judgment that only the Trial Judge was authorized by the provisions of G.S. 20--179 to allow limited driving privileges to the person convicted, and was likewise aware of the fact that the form of said Judgment set out in said statute referred to a hearing. That Respondent was likewise aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles was required to revoke the driving privilege of any person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants and who refused to take a breathalyzer test and was aware that such a person was not entitled under the applicable statutes to receive restricted driving privileges.

5. The Commission's findings are supported by the evidence. They are indeed not contradicted by any evidence. We, consequently, affirm these findings.

6. In order to meet squarely Respondent's arguments urging us to reject the Commission's Recommendation we observe that the uncontradicted (except where noted) evidence before the Commission tends to show the following facts:

(a) Respondent signed each judgment in question at the request of a reputable, local attorney who had never in the past misled him (there is some evidence that Respondent signed the Byrd judgment at the request of Byrd himself but we will assume for purposes of this order, in accordance with Respondent's testimony before the Commission, the request for each judgment came from the defendant's attorney);

(b) the attorney in each case prepared each judgment for Respondent's signature but otherwise made no express representations of any fact material to the judgment upon which Respondent relied;

(c) Respondent did not personally benefit, financially or otherwise, by reason of his signing either judgment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER OF CENSURE

1. This proceeding is neither criminal nor civil in nature. It is an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer, the purpose of which is not primarily to punish any individual but to maintain due and proper administration of justice in our State's courts, public confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and integrity of its judges. In Re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973) cert. denied Broccolino v. Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1586, 39 L.Ed.2d 885; In Re Kelly, 238 So.2d 565 (Fla.1970) cert. denied 401 U.S. 962, 91 S.Ct. 970, 28...