Cruz-Guzman v. State
| Decision Date | 26 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | A22-0118 |
| Citation | 980 N.W.2d 816 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Alejandro Cruz-Guzman, as guardian and next friend of his minor children, et al., Appellants, v. State of Minnesota, et al., Respondents, Higher Ground Academy, et al., Intervenors, Respondents. |
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-15-19117
Daniel R. Shulman, Shulman & Buske, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis Minnesota; and Richard C. Landon, Lathrop GPM, L.L.P. Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kevin Finnerty, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents State of Minnesota, et al.)
Jack Y. Perry, Brayanna J. Bergstrom, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
John Cairns, John Cairns Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Nekima Levy Armstrong, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for intervenor-respondents Higher Ground Academy, et al.)
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
An imbalance in the racial composition of schools within a school district or school system is not a per se violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, unless the imbalance is caused by intentional, de jure segregation of the type described in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Parents of public-school children seek to establish a violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides that the legislature has a duty "to establish a general and uniform system of public schools" and to "make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state." Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1. This interlocutory appeal is focused on a certified question. We answer the certified question by stating that the existence of a racial imbalance in the student body of a school, as compared to other schools in the same school district or school system, is not a per se violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, unless the racial imbalance is caused by intentional, de jure segregation.
This class action was commenced in 2015 by parents of children who are enrolled as students, or may in the future be enrolled as students, in a public school in Minneapolis or St. Paul. The parents sued the State of Minnesota, the senate, the house of representatives, the department of education, and the commissioner of education (to whom we refer collectively as the state for purposes of this opinion). In addition, three charter schools located in Minneapolis or St. Paul, and three parents of students in those charter schools, were permitted to intervene as defendants.
The parents' lawsuit is summarized in the second paragraph of their amended complaint as follows:
The Minneapolis and Saint Paul Public Schools have been in the past and currently are segregated on the basis of both race and socioeconomic status, such that plaintiffs and other school-age children attend schools the enrollment of which is disproportionately comprised of students of color and students living in poverty, as compared with a number of neighboring and surrounding schools and districts. The plaintiffs are therefore confined to schools that are separate and segregated in terms of both racial and socioeconomic composition. As a matter of both law and fact, such schools are not equal to neighboring and surrounding whiter and more affluent suburban schools. Because such schools are separate and unequal, the education the students receive is per se inadequate within the meaning of the Education Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Such discrimination also violates § 363A.13 subd. 1 of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
This appeal is concerned only with the parents' claims arising under the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution and, more specifically, only with the parents' theory that a racial imbalance among schools is a per se violation of the Education Clause.
The parties' various allegations, claims, and defenses are described in detail in a prior opinion in this case in which the supreme court concluded that the parents' claims are justiciable. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5-7, 7-12 (Minn. 2018). After the supreme court remanded for further proceedings, the district court granted the parents' motion for class certification. The parties thereafter engaged in alternative dispute resolution for more than 18 months but were unsuccessful in voluntarily resolving the case.
In July 2021, the parents moved for partial summary judgment on their theory of a per se violation of the Education Clause. In December 2021, the district court filed a 25-page order in which it denied the parents' motion. The district court reasoned that, to prevail on their claim under the Education Clause based on evidence of racial imbalance, the parents must prove that the racial imbalance is caused by de jure segregation. The district court's analysis is based in part on the premise that a remedy for a violation of the Education Clause would require the re-assignment of students based on race and the premise that such a remedy is permitted by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution only as a remedy for intentional segregation. The district court stated that the parents do not have evidence of de jure segregation. The district court also noted the parents' argument that "many state actions . . . contribute[d] to the current racial imbalance." The district court stated that "any challenged state action(s) must directly cause the racially imbalanced school environment" and concluded that the parents submitted no such evidence.
In the conclusion of its order, the district court certified the following question to this court pursuant to rule 103.03(i) of the rules of civil appellate procedure: "Is the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution violated by a racially imbalanced school system, regardless of the presence of de jure segregation or proof of a causal link between the racial imbalance and the actions of the state?" The parents filed a notice of appeal. The parents also petitioned the supreme court for accelerated review, as did the intervenor-respondents. The supreme court denied both petitions.
Is the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution violated by a racially imbalanced school system, regardless of the presence of de jure segregation or proof of a causal link between the racial imbalance and the actions of the state?
We begin by identifying and confirming the legal authority for this interlocutory appeal. The applicable rule provides: "An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . if the trial court certifies that the question presented is important and doubtful, . . . from an order which denies a motion for summary judgment." Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(i).
Although a certified-question appeal may be initiated by a district court and a party, appellate courts retain authority to determine whether a certified question is both important and doubtful. See, e.g., Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 696 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 2005); Jostens, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 878, 885-87 (Minn. 2000). A question is important if "(1) it will have statewide impact, (2) it is likely to be reversed, (3) it will terminate lengthy proceedings, and (4) the harm inflicted on the parties by a wrong ruling by the district court is substantial." Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d at 344. A question is doubtful "if there is no controlling precedent" and "there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion." Jostens, 612 N.W.2d at 884-85 (quotation omitted).
In this case, none of the parties has discussed-let alone questioned-whether the certified question is either important or doubtful. We believe that the certified question is important because the ultimate resolution of this case could have a significant effect on public schools in the two largest cities in the state as well as public schools elsewhere. See Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d at 344. Also, the district court stated that if this court were to agree with its reasoning, an appellate opinion might be determinative of the parents' Education Clause claim in light of the "profound difficulty in successfully proving intent." On the other hand, if this court were to disagree with the district court's reasoning, the parents might prevail on their Education Clause claim without the need to gather and introduce additional evidence, thereby avoiding additional expense and delay. We believe that the certified question is doubtful because, as a general matter, there is a lack of caselaw interpreting the Education Clause. See Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 8. In addition, there is "no controlling precedent" on the certified question itself. See Jostens, 612 N.W.2d at 884.
Thus, the certified question is important and doubtful.
We next consider the parties' requests that we rephrase the certified question. This court has discretion to reformulate a question that is certified pursuant to rule 103.03(i). See N.H. v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 950 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn.App. 2020); Ames & Fischer Co., II, LLP v. McDonald, 798 N.W.2d 557, 561-62 (Minn.App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011); Erdman v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 771 N.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Minn.App. 2009), aff'd, 788 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 2010); Professional Fiduciary, Inc. v. Silverman, 713 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn.App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2006).
The parents request that we reformulate the certified question by inserting the words "or socioeconomically imbalanced" after the...
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