Cruz v. Commonwealth
| Docket Number | 22-P-580 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 2023 |
| Parties | ROBERTO CRUZ v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Heard: January 12, 2023
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 28, 2019. The case was heard by John T. Lu, J., on a motion for summary judgment.
Adam Hornstine, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
Steven J. Rappaport for the plaintiff.
Present: Meade, Rubin, & Blake, JJ.
Cruz was indicted on three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child, subsequent offense; one count of child enticement; and one count of assault and battery. A jury convicted Cruz of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child and acquitted him on a third count of indecent assault and battery and on child enticement.[2] The Commonwealth nol prossed the charge of assault and battery before the case went to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 93 Mass.App.Ct. 136, 136 n.1 (2018) (Cruz I). This court reversed the judgments, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the touchings were indecent. See id. at 139-140. Cruz then filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking compensation under the statute. The Commonwealth moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cruz failed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite to bring suit under the statute because his underlying convictions were not reversed on grounds tending to establish his innocence of all crimes charged in the indictments. See G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii). A Superior Court judge denied the Commonwealth's motion, finding that the Commonwealth's failure to present sufficient evidence of an essential element of the crime was probative of innocence, and therefore "it cannot be said that vacating the plaintiff's conviction was not on grounds which tend to establish innocence."
We recite the salient facts of the criminal case as set forth in our prior opinion. The indictments stemmed from a series of events that occurred in 2014 at an aviation company. See Cruz I, 93 Mass.App.Ct. at 137. Jane,[3] a thirteen year old girl with Asperger's Syndrome, was an intern at the aviation company and had met Cruz before at the airport. Id. Cruz, who was almost sixty years old at the time, waved Jane over to him and told her that he would like to give her a hug, but they should do that in a different room. Id. Jane then went into a hallway and waited for Cruz for a couple of minutes before returning to work. Id. Later, Jane saw Cruz and asked if he still wanted a hug. He hugged her briefly around the shoulders. Id.
Cruz then asked Jane if she wanted another hug before leading her into a separate room, with no one else present. Cruz I, 93 Mass.App.Ct. at 137. This time, he gave her a second hug, which was tighter, and he kissed her on the neck. See id. Cruz hugged Jane a third time, lower down on her waist and hips, and he held her "very tight." Id. Jane was "a little bit alarmed" by this hug. Finally, Cruz grabbed Jane's shirt at her right hip and lifted it up slightly before pausing and putting it back down. See id. He did not expose or touch any of her skin while lifting the shirt. See id.
Cruz also grabbed Jane's hand. See id. On direct appeal, Cruz argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We agreed and held that "the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant's conduct intruded upon a private or intimate area of the body so as to be considered 'indecent' within the meaning of the criminal statute." Cruz I, 93 Mass.App.Ct. at 140. Notwithstanding, we noted that because of the age disparity between Jane and Cruz and the fact that Cruz led Jane to a separate room before the alleged indecent touching, the jury could have found that Cruz knew that his actions were inappropriate. Id. at 139. Furthermore, we observed that "the defendant's general conduct toward Jane may well have crossed acceptable norms of appropriate behavior." Id. at 141. Importantly, we stated that "the defendant's behavior toward
Jane may have constituted the criminal offense of assault and battery, in the sense of an intentional, but unconsented to, touching." Id. at 141 n.8.
Discussion.
We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 842 n.18 (2013) (); Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 362 (2010), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).
The statute was enacted to allow individuals who were "erroneously convicted but factually innocent" to have the opportunity to obtain compensation. See Irwin, 465 Mass. at 847. To do so, "the Commonwealth has granted a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity under the erroneous convictions statute to that class of claimants who establish that they are eligible for relief." Id. at 842. A claimant must first prove that he is eligible to pursue compensation and at trial must then "prove, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . that he did not commit the charged offense." Id. at 839. This case pertains only to the eligibility aspect of the statute.
Section 1 (B) and (C) (vi) of the statute "perform a screening function" that limits the class of claimants that is eligible to bring suit. Guzman, 458 Mass. at 360. A claimant is eligible to bring a claim if he has "been granted judicial relief by a state court of competent jurisdiction, on grounds which tend to establish the innocence of the individual as set forth in clause (vi) of subsection (C)." G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii). In turn, § 1 (C) (vi) requires the plaintiff to show that "he did not commit the crimes or crime charged in the indictment or complaint or any other felony arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts supporting the indictment or complaint, or any lesser included felony" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (C) (vi).
Previous appellate cases that have analyzed the eligibility requirement of G. L. c. 258D have not addressed the incorporation of § 1 (C) (vi) into § 1 (B) (ii). See, e.g., Renaud v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 315, 318 (2015); Irwin, 465 Mass. at 839; Guzman, 458 Mass. at 356. At oral argument, both parties agreed that there were no appellate cases on the precise question presented here, and we have found none. Cruz argues that to meet the eligibility requirement under § 1 (C) (vi), he need show only that he was granted judicial relief on grounds that tend to establish innocence of the crime for which he was tried. In contrast, because Cruz was indicted for assault and battery, the Commonwealth argues that § 1 (C) (vi) makes him ineligible to sue. This is because reversal of his convictions was not on grounds tending to establish innocence on that charge.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Commonwealth v. Perella, 464 Mass. 274, 276 (2013).
"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished . . ." (quotation and citation omitted).
Mahan v. Boston Retirement Bd., 490 Mass. 604, 613 (2022).
To support his claim, Cruz relies on Renaud, in which the court stated, "Although [G. L. c. 258D,] § 1 (B) (ii)[,] references § 1 (C) (vi), the eligibility requirement is separate and distinct from the merits of the claim of relief that a claimant must establish at trial, namely that he or she did not commit the charged offense" (quotation and citation omitted). Renaud, 471 Mass. at 319. He argues that, as in Renaud, the Commonwealth conflated the eligibility requirement with the merits of the claim itself. While we agree that the eligibility requirement is distinct from the merits of the claim, Cruz's reliance on this isolated sentence is misplaced. In Renaud, the court responded to the Commonwealth's contention that eligibility under the statute was limited to those individuals who are "in fact, innocent." Id. Here, the Commonwealth does not argue, nor do we conclude, that the incorporation of § 1 (C) (vi) into the eligibility requirement means that Cruz must prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence to meet the eligibility requirements of the statute.
"In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we look first to the plain statutory language." Worcester v College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013). Here, the Legislature inserted G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (C) (vi), into the statute in part to define "innocence" under § 1 (B) (ii). In addition, § 1 (B) (ii) requires proof of "grounds which tend to establish . . . innocence." To answer the critical question of innocence of what, the Legislature expressly incorporated by reference the list of crimes in § 1 (C) (vi). Therefore, Cruz must show that he was granted judicial relief on grounds...
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