Cruz v. Kamlis Dresses & Sportswear Co.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1997
• Citation: 238 A.D.2d 103,654 N.Y.S.2d 778
• Parties: Nellie CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. KAMLIS DRESSES & SPORTSWEAR CO., et al., Defendants. PHILIP & TONY ICE CREAM CO., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WESTOVER REALTY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 778

654 N.Y.S.2d 778

238 A.D.2d 103

Nellie CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. KAMLIS DRESSES & SPORTSWEAR CO., et al., Defendants.

PHILIP & TONY ICE CREAM CO., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WESTOVER REALTY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

April 1, 1997.

Elizabeth Anne Bannon, New York City, for Philip & Tony Ice Cream Co.

Brian M. Supranowitz, Brooklyn, for Westover Realty.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and WALLACH, RUBIN and WILLIAMS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.), entered December 1, 1995, which denied third-party defendant Westover Realty's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion granted and the third-party complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Plaintiff Nellie Cruz brought this negligence action for injuries she sustained in a fall at premises owned by Westover Realty and leased to various commercial tenants, including defendant/third-party plaintiff Philip & Tony Ice Cream Co. Philip & Tony served an answer and cross complaint seeking contribution and indemnification from Westover. As the result of plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery demands despite issuance of a conditional order of preclusion, Supreme Court granted Westover's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it by order dated October 8, 1992.

In February 1994, Philip & Tony impleaded Westover, claiming that Westover had been negligent in maintaining the premises where plaintiff fell. The allegations of the third-party complaint against Westover are identical to those of plaintiff's original complaint against it. Based upon the prior award of summary judgment in its favor, from which no party has appealed, Westover moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. Supreme Court denied the motion, reasoning that the October 8, 1992 order granting summary judgment is not a dismissal on the merits and concluding that it does not bar Philip & Tony from maintaining a third-party action. On this appeal, Westover contends that Supreme Court erred in failing to give the prior order preclusive effect.

We agree. The two requirements of collateral estoppel have been met, "that an issue in the present proceeding be identical to that necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and that in the prior proceeding the party against whom preclusion is sought was accorded a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue" (Allied Chem. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 271, 276, 532 N.Y.S.2d 230, 528 N.E.2d 153 [citations omitted], cert denied 488 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 785, 102 L.Ed.2d 777; Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725). Westover's summary judgment motion sought and obtained dismissal of all claims against it. Philip & Tony opposed the motion in responsive papers and, therefore, had standing to appeal from the award of summary judgment as a party aggrieved by the ruling (see, Stone v. Williams, 64 N.Y.2d 639, 641, 485 N.Y.S.2d 42, 474 N.E.2d 250). Judgment based on violation of a preclusion order is an award on the merits (see, Strange v. Montefiore Hosp. and Med. Center, 59 N.Y.2d 737, 463 N.Y.S.2d 429, 450 N.E.2d 235; Barrett v. Kasco Constr. Co., 84 A.D.2d 555, 443...