Cruz v. Miller

• Decision Date: 23 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3141,92-3141
• Citation: 989 F.2d 502
• Parties: NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Juan C. CRUZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles B. MILLER, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 502

989 F.2d 502

NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit.

Juan C. CRUZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles B. MILLER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 92-3141.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued March 2, 1993.

Decided March 23, 1993.

Before RIPPLE, KANNE and ILANA D. ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Juan C. Cruz, who is serving a twenty-three year sentence for robbery, brought this petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary because he misunderstood the nature of the charge against him, and because the state trial court failed to explain the elements of that charge during the plea proceeding. The district court found that the plea satisfied all constitutional requirements and dismissed the petition. We affirm.

I.

On May 2, 1983, after drinking at a local bar, Juan Cruz accompanied Daniel Morgan to the apartment of Morgan's former landlord. Morgan told Cruz he was going to "borrow some money" from the landlord who lived nearby. When they reached the landlord's apartment, they found the door unlocked, and Cruz followed Morgan inside. Morgan called out to the landlord and walked into the landlord's bedroom. ¹ Once inside the bedroom, Morgan began to beat the landlord with a leather glove containing a metal hockey puck. When the landlord started to get up, Morgan gave the glove to Cruz and told him to hit the landlord. Cruz refused but gave the glove back to Morgan, who resumed the beating until the landlord died. Morgan took $400 from two envelopes that were in the landlord's dresser and split it with Cruz, who left the apartment with Morgan. ² Cruz and Morgan went to a bar where, for the next several hours, they paid for drinks with the stolen money and played pool.

On May 12, 1983, Cruz was charged by information with murder and with murder in the perpetration of a robbery. On November 30, 1983, Cruz pled guilty to robbery pursuant to the Indiana accessory liability statute. ³ Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended a twenty-three year sentence, and Cruz agreed to testify against Morgan.

During the guilty plea hearing, the following colloquy took place between the sentencing judge and Cruz:

COURT: ... [I]f you plead guilty here today to that amended information, you are not only incriminating yourself, you thereby convict yourself. You are telling the Court, yes, I committed the crime of robbery as set forth in the amened [sic] information. In that on or about the 3rd day of May, 1983, that I, Juan Carlos Cruz, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly or intentionally take property, to-wit: Money, from another person or from the presence of said other person, to-wit: Walter Cieslak, and in the commission of the said taking I did then and there use or threaten the use of force on Walter Cieslak, and as a proximate result of the commission of the said taking the said Juan Carlos Cruz did then and there and thereby unlawfully and feloniously cause bodily injury to the said Walter Cieslak. You understand that?

CRUZ: Yes, sir....

COURT: You are pleading guilty to committing a robbery and as a result of the robbery causing bodily injury to the victim. You understand me?

CRUZ: Yes, sir.

COURT: Now if you participated in that robbery, even though you may not have been the person who, in fact, caused the injury to the victim, if you participated knowingly or intentionally participated in that robbery, then you are equally guilty with the person who, in fact, caused the injury to the victim. In fact, you did not, but again whether you caused the injury or not, if you participated in that robbery, then you are accountable for whatever may have happened during the course of that robbery under our law. You understand that?

CRUZ: Yes, sir....

COURT: Again as I indicated a moment ago, if you plead guilty here today, you have, in fact, convicted yourself by admitting to the Court that you committed that robbery or participated in that robbery wherein the victim was injuried [sic], sustained bodily injury. You understand that?

CRUZ: Yes....

COURT: Do you have any question at all about anything I told you? Is there anything that you want me to repeat or you want me to attempt to clarify? I will do so. It is important to you now. You are the person up here that is facing twenty-three (23) years imprisonment, if I accept your plea. Is there anything you do not understand? Now is the time for you to tell me.

CRUZ: I understand.

Following this colloquy, the prosecutor read into the record the statement Cruz gave to the police. It contained these questions and answers:

QUESTION: What do you know about this homicide?

ANSWER: Me and Danny Morgan went to that apartment, but earlier I had met Danny Morgan about 9 p.m. on Monday in a tavern on Broadway and Hemlock. It was a political doing and the beer was free. It was about 11:30 p.m. and we both decided to leave. As we were walking down the street, he mentioned about this old man who he used to rent from, and he told me he had a lot of money. We then walked down the alley and into a yard and then up some back stairs to a second floor apartment.

QUESTION: What happened when you got to the second floor apartment?

ANSWER: Danny opened up both doors to the apartment. They weren't locked. It was dark except for one light. I don't know if it was the kitchen or bathroom light. I walked in a few feet and Danny kept on walking into the bedroom. I then heard the old man say something, and that's when Danny start [sic] beating him. I don't know how many times he hit him but it was a lot of times. After that, Danny turned on a little lamp, then Danny started going through some drawers. He found two envelopes with some money in it. He then came out to the dining room, took the money out of the envelopes and started counting the money on the dining room table. He counted all the money and then he split the money between us.

QUESTION: Do you remember in what denominations the bills were?

ANSWER: They were all twenty (20) dollar bills when we split the money.

QUESTION: When you entered the house, did you know where the man was?

ANSWER: He had to be in his bedroom. I don't know if he was in bed or not, but when I saw him he was laying on the bed.

QUESTION: When you saw him on the bed, was he covered up with the covers?

ANSWER: No, he was laying across the bed on his back. He wasn't covered. I remember seeing his legs.

QUESTION: Did the old man ever say anything to both of you?

ANSWER: He didn't talk except the time when we first went into the room.

QUESTION: Did you ever pick up the glove and hit the old man with it?

ANSWER: I'm pretty sure I didn't.

QUESTION: Did you ever have possession of the glove in the apartment?

ANSWER: When Danny was counting the money, he handed me the glove. Then the old man was getting up and Danny told me to go and hit him. I then handed the glove back to Danny, and Danny went back into the bedroom and hit the man again.

QUESTION: Did either you or Danny Morgan attempt to aid the old man?

ANSWER: No.

Cruz next recounted the details of the robbery to the judge. His account was consistent with the statement he gave to the police.

The judge then read to Cruz, for the second time, the amended information charging him with robbery, reiterating that "under the theory of accessory [liability], they [the State] would have to show that you ... participated in that crime." The judge again questioned Cruz regarding his understanding of the charge, the truthfulness of his statement to police, and his understanding of the English language and of the legal terms used by the court. At each instance, Cruz responded that he understood the proceedings. Cruz's counsel also responded affirmatively when asked if Cruz knew what he was doing. ⁴

At the end of the hearing, the sentencing judge concluded that Cruz was an accomplice to the robbery, and that a factual basis existed for his guilty plea. The sentencing judge accordingly accepted the plea and sentenced Cruz to twenty-three years in prison.

On November 20, 1984, Cruz petitioned for post-conviction relief in the Indiana state courts, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary. At the evidentiary hearing held on his petition, Cruz was the sole witness to testify. He testified that he mistakenly believed that his mere presence in Morgan's landlord's apartment made him guilty as an accessory to the robbery. The post-conviction judge, who was also the judge who presided at the guilty plea hearing, disbelieved Cruz's testimony and denied his petition after entering findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 8, 1990, the Indiana Appellate Court affirmed the judge's decision, and the Indiana Supreme Court later denied Cruz's petition for transfer.

On November 18, 1991, Cruz filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus which the district judge dismissed, concluding on de novo review that the guilty plea was voluntary and met the constitutional requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). This appeal followed.

II.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we defer to factual findings of state courts adequately supported by the record, and in so doing, we are not limited to express factual findings, but can rely on any resolution of factual disputes fairly inferred from that record. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 529-30 (7th Cir.1990); Bryan v. Warden, Indiana State Reformatory, 820 F.2d 217, 221 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867 (1987). On the other hand, questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law, such as whether a guilty plea is voluntary, are generally subject to plenary review. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1983); Bobo...