Cruz v. People
| Decision Date | 06 July 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 21523,21523 |
| Parties | Cornelius J. CRUZ, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Samuel D. Menin, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.
Cornelius Joseph Cruz was convicted of aggravated robbery and in connection therewith was sentenced to a term in the State Penitentiary. During the trial Cruz was represented by court-appointed counsel, Cruz being an indigent person and hence unable to retain counsel of his own choosing.
Pursuant to the mandate contained in Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, Cruz upon order of the trial court was thereafter given at his request a free transcript of the record of his trial, but his further request that counsel be appointed to represent him on writ of error was denied, not just by the trial court but by this court as well. Accordingly, Cruz thereafter proceeded to prosecute his writ of error in this court pro se. Upon such review the aforementioned judgment and sentence was affirmed. See Cruz v. People, 147 Colo. 528, 364 P.2d 561.
Some three years after his conviction was affirmed by this court, Cruz filed with the trial court a motion under Rule 35, Colo.R.Crim.P., wherein he sought to vacate and set aside the aforementioned judgment and sentence. As ground therefor, Cruz relied upon the failure of the trial court, and this court, to provide him at the expense of the State with counsel to assist him in the perfection of his writ of error. The trial court denied this motion to vacate judgment and sentence and by the present writ of error Cruz seeks reversal of the order and judgment denying his motion to vacate.
Cruz contends that under Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, it was error to deny his request that he be provided with counsel to assist in the prosecution of his writ of error. To this contention the Attorney General takes no exception.
Cruz further contends, however, that this failure to provide him with counsel to represent him on writ of error, he having made a specific request therefor, so 'violated his constitutional rights' that the trial court under the circumstances committed grievous error in denying his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence. In other words, Cruz contends that this failure to appoint counsel to represent him on writ of error voids the conviction which obtained upon trial, even though at trial he was represented by court-appointed counsel. In support of his contention Cruz urges Ruark v. State of Colorado, 378 U.S. 585, 84 S.Ct. 1935, 12 L.Ed.2d 1042. With such contention we do not agree. Furthermore, we do not believe that Ruark v. Colorado, supra, requires any such result as is here urged, nor does the failure to appoint counsel, as such, authorize or even permit the setting aside of a judgment and sentence under Rule 35 Colo.R.Crim.P.
A brief analysis of the several Ruark cases is deemed helpful in an effort to place the present controversy in proper focus. Ruark was convicted of aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit the same, for which he was thereafter sentenced to a term in the State Penitentiary. Upon review this conviction was affirmed. See Ruark v. People, 150 Colo. 289, 372 P.2d 158. Sometime later Ruark filed in this court a petition for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, naming as the respondent therein Harry C. Tinsley, warden of the State Penitentiary. In that petition Ruark sought to be discharged and released from the State Penitentiary and as reason therefor he asserted that his request of the trial court that he be afforded court-appointed counsel to represent him on the aforementioned writ of error was denied. On February 27, 1964 this petition seeking the issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus was denied by order of this court. Ruark then filed with the United States Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari directed to this Court and its order of February 27, 1964 denying Ruark's petition for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court, which body thereupon vacated the judgment heretofore entered by this court denying Ruark's petition and then remanded the cause to this court for...
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Murphy v. People
...such a conflict harm the interests of the client, who is entitled to the assistance of a zealous advocate, 12 see Cruz v. People, 157 Colo. 479, 405 P.2d 213, 215 (1965) (describing the duties required of appointed counsel in a Crim.P. 35 motion), but the integrity of the entire judicial pr......
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People v. Shepard
...court agreed with defendant that he had been unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal. However, relying upon Cruz v. People, 157 Colo. 479, 405 P.2d 213 (1965), the court declined to vacate the conviction. Instead, it employed the remedy set forth in Cruz, a case involving similar circ......
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Cruz v. People, 19756
...U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811. his motion was denied by the trial court. Upon review of that order this court, in Cruz v. People, 157 Colo. 479, 405 P.2d 213, outlined the remedies available to Cruz in the following '* * * The fact that Cruz was improperly denied counsel to aid and ......
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Hammershoy v. Com.
...a reasonable time the state provides the movant an appeal on the merits, including assistance of counsel. See, for example, Cruz v. People, Colo., 405 P.2d 213 (1965). 'When counsel is appointed to represent an indigent in this jurisdiction he is to assist him throughout the proceeding, unl......