Crystal Bay Estates Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Cox

• Decision Date: 25 March 2022
• Docket Number: Case No. 119,287
• Parties: CRYSTAL BAY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Sarah COX and James Cox, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

521 P.3d 812

CRYSTAL BAY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.Sarah COX and James Cox, Defendants/Appellants.

Case No. 119,287

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.

Filed: March 25, 2022

Mandate Issued: November 9, 2022

Gina Carrigan-St. Clair, CARRIGAN LAW OFFICE, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee

Matthew L. Winton, WINTON LAW, Edmond, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants

OPINION BY DEBORAH B. BARNES, PRESIDING JUDGE:

¶1 Defendants Sarah and James Cox (the Coxes) appeal from a temporary injunction issued by the district court restraining them from continuing construction on their tract of land. Based on our review, we affirm the temporary injunction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2019, Crystal Bay Estates Homeowners' Association, Inc., (Crystal Bay HOA) filed a Petition for Injunction seeking to enforce certain restrictive covenants relating to real property located in Crystal Bay Estates, a subdivision overlooking Skiatook Lake in Osage County. In particular, Crystal Bay HOA requested that the Coxes "be ordered to immediately cease installation of the materials" being installed to the exterior of their residence "not in conformity with their approved building plans and to remove all said materials already installed." Crystal Bay HOA pointed out in its petition that the covenants provide: "all of the property within Crystal Bay Estates shall be held, sold, and conveyed subject to" the covenants, "which shall run with the land and be binding on all parties having any right, title, or interest in such property, ... and shall inure to the benefit of each owner thereof."¹ Crystal Bay HOA further pointed out that the covenants contain an article — Article VII — entitled "Architectural Control," which provides, in part, as follows:

No septic system, building, fence, wall or other structure shall be commenced, erected or maintained upon any Lot, nor shall any exterior addition to or change or alteration therein, or in the contours of any Lot, be made until a[n] application for approval, to include the plans and specifications, plot plan and elevation with a complete set of construction plans, showing the nature, kind, shape, height, materials, and location of the same, and compliance with the restrictions set forth in Article IV hereof, shall have been submitted in writing to, and a written reply received by the applicant from, an Architectural Committee comprised of three (3) or more representatives appointed by, and subject to the control of, the Board of Directors.

¶3 Crystal Bay HOA asserted the Coxes submitted building plans in March 2019 "which were duly approved" by the Architectural Committee (AC), and subsequently approved by the Board of Directors for Crystal Bay HOA (the Board) on April 1, 2019. However, Crystal Bay HOA asserted the Coxes' plans "explicitly stated that the exterior building materials would include ‘Fiberglass SIP construction with board and batten siding ....’ " Crystal Bay HOA asserted that in October 2019, "the [Board] became aware that a metal garage was being built on the [Coxes'] property immediately drawing objections from members of the Crystal Bay HOA." Crystal Bay HOA asserted the Coxes' communicated they had

unilaterally decided to change the material to be used for the external structure from wood to metal siding. On or about October 18, 2019, [James Cox] requested that [Crystal Bay HOA] agree to the metal siding. On October 19, 2019, the [Board] met in conjunction with the [AC] and unanimously voted not to retroactively approve the metal siding as a substitute for the wood and batten siding.

¶4 Crystal Bay HOA asserted that "[o]n October 27, 2019, the [AC] met with [the Coxes] to seek resolution of the issue," but that the Coxes "expressed an intent again not to comply with the building plans approved by the [AC], and continued thereafter to install the metal siding." Crystal Bay HOA asserted, "The sheet metal siding ... is more consistent with a construction trailer or an industrial building," and "is wholly inconsistent with the architecture, design, and quality of materials reflecting the other homes in the subdivision." As set forth above, Crystal Bay HOA requested that the Coxes "be ordered to immediately cease installation of the materials not in conformity with their approved building plans and to remove all said materials already installed."

¶5 On the same date as the filing of the Petition for Injunction, Crystal Bay HOA filed an application for a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction in order "to preserve the situation of the parties in status quo until a final determination of the controversy." Crystal Bay HOA asserted the Coxes were proceeding "to erect an industrial type metal building in a well-established subdivision of upper-end lake homes," and had "quickened and hastened the installation of metal siding after [Crystal Bay HOA] repeatedly advised that the siding was not in compliance with [the Coxes'] approved building plans and would not be approved by the [AC] or Board." Crystal Bay HOA asserted, "The Estates and the HOA will suffer irreparable harm without immediate relief as [the Coxes] speedily seek to complete their structure before final judgment can be entered. These injuries cannot be remedied by an award of money damages." Crystal Bay HOA asserted that, "[i]n contrast, [the Coxes] do not face any particular hardship from compliance with the Covenants" as the Coxes "currently live at their primary residence in Tulsa, Oklahoma, having owned the subject property since 2008 for an intended second lake home." Crystal Bay HOA asserted:

Allowing [the Coxes] to continue to flaunt the Covenants and the authority of the Board to enforce the covenants to which [they] agreed to comply will inflict irreparable harm on the Board and all of the homeowners of the Crystal Bay Estates, thereby undermining the very purpose of the Act itself.²

¶6 On the same date as the filing of the application for a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction, the district court entered a temporary restraining order in favor of Crystal Bay HOA; in addition, the court set the application for a temporary injunction for an evidentiary hearing which was subsequently held over the course of two days on January 13, and March 2, 2020.

¶7 Prior to the hearing, the Coxes filed a Response and Objection to the application for a temporary injunction, and also filed an answer to the Petition for Injunction. Among other things, the Coxes "admit[ted] that for aesthetics, durability, and cost considerations, a metal panel was utilized rather than a SIP," and also asserted the AC "operates under a we-know-it-when-we-see-it aesthetic standard, which is absent from the recorded Covenants."

¶8 At the end of the temporary injunction hearing, the court stated it would grant a temporary injunction. The district court's order granting a temporary injunction, filed December 2, 2020, states, in pertinent part, as follows:

[I]n order to preserve the status quo, [the Coxes] and their agents are hereby restrained from continuing any construction on [their tract of land in] Crystal Bay Estates, absent approval of any proposed changes through the process set forth under Article VII of the Covenants or otherwise in compliance with [the Coxes'] plan that was previously approved under Article VII.³

¶9 The Coxes appeal.⁴

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 "The standard of review for the grant or denial of an injunction is whether there was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge." Murlin v. Pearman , 2016 OK 47, ¶ 17, 371 P.3d 1094 (footnote omitted). "Whether to grant injunctive relief is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless the lower court has abused its discretion or its decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence."

Farmacy, LLC v. Kirkpatrick , 2017 OK 37, ¶ 12, 394 P.3d 1256 (citation omitted). "[I]t must also be stated that injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and relief by this means is not to be lightly granted." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley , 1980 OK 6, ¶ 50, 609 P.2d 733. Moreover, "[m]atters involving the granting or denial of injunctive relief are of equitable concern. Accordingly, this Court will consider all evidence on appeal." Edwards v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Canadian Cnty. , 2015 OK 58, ¶ 11, 378 P.3d 54 (citations omitted).

Injunction is an extraordinary remedy and relief by this means should not be granted lightly. Equity courts exercise discretionary power in granting or withholding extraordinary remedies, particularly where injunctive relief is sought, and its granting rests in the sound discretion of the court to be exercised in accordance with equitable principles and in light of all circumstances.

Dowell v. Pletcher , 2013 OK 50, ¶ 6, 304 P.3d 457 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶11 "The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent the perpetuation of a wrong or the doing of an act whereby the rights of the moving party may be materially invaded, injured, or endangered." Edwards , 2015 OK 58, ¶ 10, 378 P.3d 54 (citations omitted). Also, "[a] temporary injunction protects a court's ability to render a meaningful decision on [the] merits of the controversy." Id. (citations omitted).

To obtain a temporary injunction, [plaintiffs] must show that four factors weigh in their favor: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm to the party seeking the relief if the injunction is denied; 3) their threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and 4) the injunction is in the public interest.

Id. ¶ 12 (citations omitted).

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

¶12 Keeping in mind that "[t]he purpose of a court sitting in equity is to promote and achieve justice with some degree of flexibility," Merritt v. Merritt , 2003 OK 68, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d 878 (citation omitted),⁵ and that "the trial...