Crystal City Independent School Dist. v. Crawford, 16455

• Decision Date: 31 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 16455,16455
• Citation: 612 S.W.2d 73
• Parties: CRYSTAL CITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Robert S. CRAWFORD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 73

612 S.W.2d 73

CRYSTAL CITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Robert S. CRAWFORD et al., Appellees.

No. 16455.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

Dec. 31, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1981.

Peter Torres, Jr., San Antonio, Alonzo Villarreal, Jr., Uvalde, for appellants.

Edward Kliewer, III, Foster, Lewis, Langley, Gardner & Banack, San Antonio, for appellees.

OPINION

KLINGEMAN, Justice.

This is a companion case to Crystal City Independent School District v. Wagner, 605 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1980, writ filed). The points of error and contentions made by appellant, Crystal City Independent School District, are virtually the same in both cases and the problems and questions before this court in Wagner and in this case are basically similar. In Wagner, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of those plaintiffs who were granted the Agricultural Use Valuation, and the judgment in favor of those plaintiffs who did not qualify for the Agricultural Use Valuation was reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with such opinion.

This suit was brought by a number of plaintiffs to enjoin the collection of certain portions of the 1978 tax rolls of the Crystal City Independent School District. In the trial court the plaintiffs ¹ sought: (a) a declaratory judgment that the tax scheme and the valuations made pursuant thereto were fundamentally illegal and void; (b) a writ of mandamus compelling the school district to accept the amounts tendered as a basis for plaintiffs' valuations; (c) as to the five plaintiffs who sought Agricultural Use Valuations, that taxes be based upon 60% of the productive value under Agricultural Use Valuation; and (d) any further relief to which plaintiffs might be entitled.

Both plaintiffs and defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court overruled defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and decreed that as to those plaintiffs whose property did not qualify for the Agricultural Use Valuation, the tax liability would be the market value testified to by plaintiffs before the Board of Equalization, but that as to those persons who received the Agricultural Use Valuation the value of the property would be based upon an assessment ratio of 60% of the productive value. From this judgment, the school district has perfected an appeal.

In reviewing an order granting a motion for summary judgment, all conflicts in evidence are disregarded, and the evidence which tends to support the position of the party opposing the motion is accepted as true. Parrot v. Garcia, 436 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.1969); Great American Reserve Insurance Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1965). When two or more parties file motions for summary judgment and at least one is granted and the other overruled, we determine on appeal all questions presented, including the propriety of the order overruling the losing party's motion. Texaco Inc. v. Great Southern Life Insurance Co., 590 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1979, no writ).

By its points of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred (a) in not granting appellant's motion for summary judgment, (b) in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment because there are genuine issues of fact, and (c) in granting a judgment that does not set out the specific relief given to a named appellee.

The district's motion was based upon the pleadings and upon the affidavit of Matiana Tapia, the district's tax assessor-collector. Such affidavit stated that the Board of Equalization first met June 27, 1978, and that the plaintiffs were present either in person or by attorney; that no action was taken at that initial meeting; that plaintiffs were notified by certified mail of a subsequent meeting held July 20, 1978 (said letters dated July 15, 1978, addressed to six attorneys were attached to the affidavit); that notices of the meeting were posted (said notices were attached to the affidavit); that at the July 20, 1978, meeting the Board of Equalization reviewed the tax rolls and heard sworn testimony in support of those assessments; that plaintiffs were notified of the action of the Board by letter to their attorneys July 27, 1978; that plaintiffs were notified as to the reason some agricultural exemptions were rejected; that plaintiffs were notified they could contest the valuations at a meeting being held August 3, 1978; that notice of this meeting was posted; that a meeting was held August 18, 1978, which complied with the open meeting law, at which the Board completed its work and the tax rolls approved; that tax notices were sent to plaintiffs October 1, 1978; that those taxpayers who did not receive agricultural exemptions did not receive them because they did not timely file application or did not properly complete the exemption.

The motion for summary judgment filed by taxpayers was accompanied by the affidavit of Edward Kliewer, attorney for taxpayers. He stated that he appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs at the Board meetings held on June 27, 1978, and August 3, 1978; that all plaintiffs appeared either in person or by attorney at these two meetings and protested the valuation placed on their properties; that the only notices of the July 20, 1978, Board meeting were the letters of July 15, 1978, attached to Matiana Tapia's affidavit; that neither the taxpayers nor attorney appeared at the July 20, 1978, meeting; that no testimony was offered at the June 27, 1978, or August 3, 1978, meetings to refute the values at which taxpayers had rendered their property; that no notice of action taken by the Board was received until taxpayers received their tax statements; that taxpayers who were granted the agricultural exemption were taxed upon the basis of 100% of the productive value rather than the 60% assessment ratio; that taxpayers tendered what they assert to be the fair assessed valuation.

Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in not granting its motion for summary judgment is without merit. It is clear from the record before us that there are a number of issues including (a) sufficiency of...