CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Tullahoma, Tenn., Civ. 4-87-47.

• Decision Date: 17 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 4-87-47.,Civ. 4-87-47.
• Citation: 705 F. Supp. 385
• Parties: CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF TULLAHOMA, TENNESSEE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

705 F. Supp. 385

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF TULLAHOMA, TENNESSEE, Defendant.

No. Civ. 4-87-47.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.

February 17, 1988.

Gareth S. Aden, Harris, Robinson & Aden, Nashville, Tenn., Sally J. Kircher, CSX Transp., Inc., Jacksonville, Fla., and Earl R. Layman, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Steve Worsham, Tullahoma, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JARVIS, District Judge.

This is an action seeking declaratory relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff, CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), seeks a declaration that Ordinance # 19-35 of the Tullahoma City Code is void as unconstitutional. The municipal ordinance in question limits the speed of trains passing through the City of Tullahoma to 25 m.p.h. Plaintiff contends that this ordinance is preempted by § 205 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. § 434, and therefore violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2. In the alternative, plaintiff contends that the ordinance violates the commerce clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3.

Currently pending is defendant's summary judgment motion on the question of federal preemption. In addition, CSX has filed a motion to allow the operation of trains through Tullahoma at speeds of up to 50 m.p.h. pending hearing of the summary judgment motion. The City of Tullahoma has filed a motion to stay any ruling on the summary judgment motion pending completion of discovery and to abstain from acting in this matter until a pending hearing on whether the conditions in Tullahoma present an "essentially local safety hazard" is held by the State of Tennessee's Department of Public Service. Since, as indicated below, the court is of the opinion that this case may be resolved at this time by resolving a question of law, CSX's motion for injunctive relief pending a hearing on the motion for summary judgment Court File # 18 is DENIED AS MOOT. Likewise, since this matter can be resolved by the resolution of a single legal question involving federal law, the City of Tullahoma's motion to stay the hearing of this matter and abstain from acting in this case Court File # 21 is DENIED.

Argument was heard on all pending motions before the undersigned on February 10, 1988. The State of Tennessee moved to and was permitted to appear amicus curiae and present its position in support of the City of Tullahoma.

I. Federal Preemption

The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes that when federal law conflicts with state or local law, the federal law must control. Article VI, cl. 2. The single issue around which this case revolves is whether the City of Tullahoma's municipal ordinance limiting trains to a 25 m.p.h. speed limit through the City is preempted by the FRSA and is therefore violative of the supremacy clause. It is purely a question of law.

Since the early 20th Century, the City of Tullahoma has had in effect a municipal ordinance limiting the speed of trains through the City to 25 m.p.h. In 1970, Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Act (the "Act"). There is no question that in creating the act Congress intended to provide for the creation of uniform, national safety standards for regulation of the railroad industry:

The railroad industry has very local characteristics. Rather, in terms of its operations, it has a truly interstate character calling for a uniform body of regulation and enforcement

. . . . .

H.R.Rep. No. 91-1194, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 4104, 4110. To carry out this goal of uniformity, Congress included in the Act an express provision regarding preemption:

The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue to enforce any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such state requirement. A state may adopt or continue to enforce an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, order or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate commerce.

45 U.S.C. § 434.

The language of § 434 makes it clear that the Congress intended to preempt state laws and regulations dealing with railway safety subject to two exceptions. The first exception is that a state may continue to enforce any "law, rule, regulation, order, or standard" until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of the state's requirement. In the matter of railway speed, the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Federal Railroad Administration, has enacted such regulations. See 49 C.F.R. Part 213.9 (establishing maximum speeds for passenger and freight trains for six different classifications of track); 213.57 (establishing maximum speeds for trains traveling on curved track).¹

The second exception provides that more stringent state regulations may be adopted or continued in force even where federal regulations govern the same subject, if three criteria have been met:

(1) The regulation is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard;

(2) The regulation is not incompatible with any federal regulation; and

(3) The regulation does not create an undue burden on interstate commerce.

See Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Company, 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.1973).

Within the last two years, CSX and the City of Tullahoma have attempted to work out a compromise between the 25 m.p.h. municipal ordinance and the 60 m.p.h. federal regulation. The failure to reach such a compromise has resulted in this lawsuit.

The City contends that because of the conditions in Tullahoma, railroad speeds greater than 25 m.p.h. create "an essentially local safety hazard" which may be the subject of regulation by the City. The railroad argues that the exception provides only for regulation by "states" and not for regulation by municipal ordinance. Courts which have considered this issue have unanimously agreed with the railroad's position. See, e.g., Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Company, 474 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973); The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. City of Piqua, Case No. C-3-85-312, (S.D. Ohio, June 30, 1986) 1986 WL 8254; Lara v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., Case No. H-85-697 (N.D. Ind., May 27, 1986) 1986 WL 15725; Johnson v. Southern Railway Company and City of Charlotte, 654 F.Supp. 121 (W.D.N.C.1987); Sisk, et al., v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 647 F.Supp. 861 (D.C.Kan.1986). This court is in agreement with the above-cited cases that § 205 of the FRSA does not permit an exception to preemption where a municipality acts by ordinance to regulate an "essentially local" railroad safety hazard. The plain language of the statute itself indicates that it applies only to states. It refers to state regulations by "law, rule, regulation, order, or standard" — it makes no reference to "ordinances", the method by which municipalities normally act. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the exception covered actions by municipal ordinance. Moreover, the court is mindful that Congress has shown concern with subjecting the railroads to conflicting safety requirements in 50 different state jurisdictions. Certainly, Congress would be particularly concerned if the railroads were subject to differing regulations in every municipality in the United States. The court is in agreement with the above-cited authorities that the "essentially local safety hazard" exception found in 45 U.S.C. § 434 does not apply to actions taken by municipalities.

Accordingly, the court finds that Tullahoma City Ordinance No. 19-35 is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 434, and is therefore void under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2.

CSX has asked this court to find as a matter of law that train speeds while in municipalities and grade crossings there are not "essentially local" within the meaning of § 205. Upon review of § 205, the court is of the opinion that the question which CSX asks the court to resolve is a factual question which Congress has left for state regulatory agencies. In Tennessee, the appropriate agency to make the decision of whether or not the conditions existing in Tullahoma present an "essentially local safety hazard" is the Public Service Commission, not this court. It may be that at some point a federal court will be required to resolve the question of whether such an action by the Tennessee Public Service Commission would be preempted by federal law. However, at this point, that question has not been presented to this court and is obviously not ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, this court makes no finding regarding whether or not the conditions in Tullahoma present an "essentially local safety hazard" or, if the Tennessee Public Service Commission should so find, whether that determination would be preempted by federal law.

II. Abstention

Alternatively, the City of Tullahoma argues, and the State of Tennessee concurs, that this court should abstain from hearing this case until Tullahoma's petition before the Public Service Commission has been heard. In October, 1987, the petition was filed and apparently requests...