Ctr. for Transitional Living v. Advanced Behavioral Health, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-CV-01362 (KAD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL LIVING, LLC, Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC., STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES, and STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES Defendants. |
This action arises out of the manner by which Advanced Behavioral Health, Inc. (“ABH”) fulfills its role as an intermediary in the State of Connecticut Mental Health Waiver/Money Follows the Person (W.I.S.E.) Program (the “Waiver Program”), a program which, inter alia, provides in-home health care services to eligible participants. Plaintiff Center for Transitional Living, LLC (“CTL”), a provider of such services, brings claims against ABH, as well as the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“CTDMHAS”) and the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“CTDSS”) (collectively the ).[1] Plaintiff alleges discriminatory referral practices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (Count III), and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq. (Count IV). Pending before the Court is ABH's motion to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ABH also seeks dismissal of any claim for injunctive relief on the basis that any such claim is moot. The motion to dismiss was fully briefed as of January 28 2021.[2]
The State Agency Defendants are responsible for administering the Waiver Program as authorized by § 1915(c) of the Social Security Act. (Compl. ¶ 10.) The Waiver Program allows the State of Connecticut to provide home and community-based services to Medicaid beneficiaries, helping those individuals avoid institutional care. (Compl. ¶ 11.) ABH contracted with the State Agency Defendants to be the sole Connecticut Medicaid Billing Provider and fiscal intermediary for the program. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff alleges that “[a]t all times relevant hereto, ABH acted as the agent of CTDMHAS and CTDSS in its administration of the Waiver Program.” (Compl. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff is a minority-owned home care agency that provides medical care and assistance to individuals living at home. (Compl ¶ 9.) In May 2013, Plaintiff completed a Waiver Program Credentialing Application to participate in the Waiver Program and thereby become eligible to receive Medicaid funds. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that CTDMHAS reviewed the application but that ABH credentialed Plaintiff for specific services. (Compl. ¶ 16.) On or about May 16, 2013, Plaintiff entered an agreement with ABH, in which Plaintiff would provide services under the Waiver Program to participants referred by ABH. (Compl. ¶ 17.) The agreement provided that ABH would facilitate payment for the Waiver Program services provided through the State Medicaid program, allegedly under the supervision of CTDMHAS and CTDSS. (Compl. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff claims that since at least September 22, 2017, ABH has engaged in discriminatory referral practices and that these practices have deprived Plaintiff of service contracts under the Waiver Program. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Specifically Plaintiff alleges that ABH passed along discriminatory client requests, e.g., a client request that the service provider not be African-American, and that, when CTL refused to honor such requests, ABH retaliated by not referring prospective clients to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 21 24-25).
Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 732 (2008)) (emphasis and alterations in Carter). “When the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is facial, i.e., based solely on the allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it . . . the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden.” Id. at 56. The task of the district court is to determine whether, after accepting as true all material factual allegations of the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the alleged facts affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 56-57. If, however, the Rule 12(b)(1) motion is fact-based and proffers evidence beyond the pleading and that evidence reveals factual questions as to the plaintiff's standing, then the plaintiff will generally need to come forward with evidence of its own to controvert that evidence. Id. at 57 (citations omitted). The plaintiff may rely on the allegations in the pleading if the evidence proffered is immaterial, however. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.” Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp., 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Constitution's case-or-controversy limitation on the federal judicial authority, Art. III, § 2, underpins both the standing and mootness aspects of a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, but the two doctrines have critical differences. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly described mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame” because “[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue through its existence (mootness), ” the Court has also acknowledged that this description is not comprehensive. See Id. at 189-90 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)) (further citations omitted). For example, the burdens under each doctrine are different. Mhany Management, Inc v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 2016). Whereas the burden of establishing standing falls on the plaintiff because standing “functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake, ” the burden of showing mootness falls on the defendant, in part, because by the time mootness normally becomes an issue, the courts have already invested resources into litigating the matter. Id. at 603 (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190-92).
The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing has three elements: “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citations omitted). Mootness, for its part, generally implicates the redressability requirement of standing. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S.Ct. 792, 796 (2021) ( )
ABH first asserts that the prayer for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot under the voluntary cessation doctrine because after ABH relayed Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination to CTDHMAS, CTDMHAS modified a patient intake form to prohibit participants from making discriminatory requests. “[A] defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, 568 U.S. 85, 92 (2013)). Specifically, “[a] defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful activities can render a claim for injunctive relief moot only if the defendant can demonstrate that (1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Easterling v. Connecticut Dep't of Corrections, 265 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D. Conn. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).
Here ABH has demonstrated neither. ABH has offered no evidence that if presented with another discriminatory request notwithstanding the updated...
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