Cuadra v. Bradshaw

• Decision Date: 24 March 1997
• Docket Number: Nos. A073632,A075040,s. A073632
• Citation: 53 Cal.App.4th 869,62 Cal.Rptr.2d 102
• Parties: Previously published at 53 Cal.App.4th 869 53 Cal.App.4th 869, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1448, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2123, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3890 Maria Luisa CUADRA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Victoria BRADSHAW, as Labor Commissioner, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 102

62 Cal.Rptr.2d 102

Previously published at 53 Cal.App.4th 869

53 Cal.App.4th 869, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1448,

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2123,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3890

Maria Luisa CUADRA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Victoria BRADSHAW, as Labor Commissioner, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. A073632, A075040.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

March 24, 1997.

Review Granted June 25, 1997.

H. Thomas Cadell, Jr., Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, San Diego, for Appellant.

Laura Ho, Lora Jo Foo, Asian Law Caucus, San Francisco, Cynthia L. Rice, Salinas, William G. Hoerger, California Rural Legal Assistance, San Francisco, for Respondents.

HANLON, Associate Justice.

In this case, we decide that the statute of limitations for an administrative claim filed under LABOR CODE SECTION 98¹ is tolled upon the date the claim is filed. Labor Commissioner Victoria Bradshaw contends that the applicable statute of limitations period is tolled only upon the date of the administrative hearing determining the claim. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioners filed claims for unpaid wages with the Labor Commissioner pursuant to section 98, subdivision (a). They alleged that due to the Labor Commissioner's policy of not tolling the statute of limitations upon the filing of claims, their claims for unpaid wages were limited to the three year period immediately preceding the hearing or decision on the claims. As a result, petitioners claimed that they were denied back wages due to routine delays of months and in some cases over a year in hearing and resolving claims. Petitioners therefore brought this declaratory relief action seeking a writ of mandate directing the Labor Commissioner to rescind its "no tolling policy." The trial court granted the writ, finding that the Labor Commissioner's act in not tolling the statute of limitations upon the date of a claim's filing was an abuse of discretion. The court entered judgment declaring that "for all claims processed under the Labor Code Section 98 administrative ("Berman") ² hearing process by any office of the Labor Commissioner and not finally resolved as of January 5, 1996, the Labor Commissioner shall calculate wages, damages, penalties and interest due, using the applicable statute of limitation, from the date of the claim filing, not the date of the actual administrative [h]earing." This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I.

1. Appropriateness of Mandamus

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, a writ of mandamus "may be issued by any court ... to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station...." The writ must be issued in all cases in which there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1086.)

Petitioners assert that the remedy at law is inadequate because to proceed to a trial on the issue of the amount of their claims for unpaid wages would thwart the very purpose of section 98, subdivision (a) ³ of providing a prompt administrative resolution of wage disputes. The Berman hearing procedure was created to provide an alternative to the expensive and time consuming process of a court trial on a wage dispute. (See

                Rogers v. Sonoma County Municipal Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1314, 1318, 243 Cal.Rptr. 530.)   Prior to the statute's enactment, the Labor Commissioner's only recourse was to prosecute an action for unpaid wages in the superior court.  (Former § 98.)   As the legislative history demonstrates, section 98 was proposed to "expedite the handling of disputed wage claims by the Labor Commissioner's office and [ ] discourage obstruction and stalling tactics engaged in by some employers knowing that the only recourse available to the Labor Commissioner to enforce a valid claim is to sue in the Superior Court.  That process often delays final resolution and many times when a court decision is finally rendered on a matter, the employer is no longer in business or has declared bankruptcy or has reorganized under a different name, all of which frustrates the purpose of the Labor Code protections regarding timely and complete payment of wages to California workers."  (Department of Industrial Relations, Enrolled Bill Report on Assem.  Bill No. 1522 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.), August 16, 1976, p. 1.)   The Labor Commissioner's theory that petitioners have alternatives to the Berman process and hence an adequate remedy at law is unpersuasive.  As petitioners point out, the alternatives to the Berman hearing--either litigating the statute of limitations in an appeal of the Labor Commissioner's decision on an individual claim or filing their claims in superior court--would defeat the statutory purpose of section 98, subdivision (a).  Many wage claimants would not have the funds to hire an attorney to proceed to file their claim in court.  Although sections 98, subdivision (a) and 98.3 grant the Labor Commissioner discretion to prosecute an action in court for wage claimants unable to afford counsel rather than proceed with a Berman hearing, there is no provision to provide counsel for claimants if they opt to file their claims in court independent of the Berman process. 4  Moreover, the delay resulting from proceeding in a civil trial would further frustrate the legislative purpose of the Berman process and inevitably lead to many claims being lost.  Given the inadequacy of a remedy at law, the trial court properly considered the mandamus petition
                

2. Interpretation of Section 98

The Labor Commissioner contends that her interpretation that section 98 affords her no authority to toll the statute of limitations is entitled to great weight. Citing two bills that were introduced to toll the statute of limitations, she argues that the Legislature has acquiesced in her interpretation.

" 'It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that the contemporaneous and practical construction of a statute by those whose duty it is to carry it into effect, while not controlling, is always given great respect. And a contemporaneous interpretation long acquiesced in by all persons who could possibly have an interest in the matter, has been held to be sufficient to justify a court in resolving any doubt it might have as to the meaning of ambiguous language employed by the [L]egislature, in favor of sustaining such long unquestioned interpretation. [Citation.] Under these circumstances, the administrative practice will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.' " (Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1125, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, quoting Steelgard, Inc. v. Jannsen (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 79, 88, 217 Cal.Rptr. 152.) Here, however, the Labor Commissioner did not act contemporaneously with the enactment of section 98 in implementing its policy on the statute of limitations. Although the Labor Commissioner asserts that its policy was adopted in 1977, a year after section 98 was promulgated, she fails to cite to anything in the record to support this fact. As the appellant, it is the Labor Commissioner's duty to cite evidence to support her position. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 15.) We are not required to make an independent search of the record when that duty is ignored. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 475, pp. 467-468; Haynes v. Gwynn (1967) 248 Nor is the Labor Commissioner's reliance on two unpassed bills ⁶ entitled to any consideration. First, the proposed legislation was not presented to the trial court, and the general rule is that an appellate court should not take judicial notice of matters that have not been presented and considered by the trial court in the first instance. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 134, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781; Coy v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1077, 1083, fn. 3, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 215.) Second, it is well settled that very limited guidance can be drawn from the Legislature's inaction on a proposed amendment to an existing statute. (Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 922-923, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 226, 844 P.2d 545.) ' " 'The unpassed bills of later legislative sessions evoke conflicting inferences. Some legislators might propose them to replace an existing prohibition; others to clarify an existing permission. A third group of legislators might oppose them to preserve an existing prohibition, and a fourth because there was no need to clarify an existing permission. The light shed by such unadopted proposals is too dim to pierce statutory obscurities. As evidence of legislative intent they have little value.' " ' (Ibid., quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 735, fn. 7, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)

                Cal.App.2d 149, 151, 56 Cal.Rptr. 82.)   Petitioners cite evidence to the effect that the policy was not contemporaneous as it was either formulated "at least twenty years [ago]" (see Letter from H. Thomas Cadell, Jr., Chief Counsel, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement to Lora Jo Foo and Laura Ho (August 28, 1995), p. 1) antedating the enactment of section 98 or on October 28, 1994, the date of the issuance of the "DLC (Division of Labor Standards Enforcement) Policy and Procedure Guidelines No. 94-5 DLC." 5  In either event, the Labor Commissioner did not establish that the policy was contemporaneous with the enactment of section 98 and we need not defer to her interpretation of the statutory scheme
                

The Labor Commissioner also argues that tolling the statute of limitations is improper because it would interfere with her administration of wage claims. She contends that section 98 requires her to investigate claims and that she cannot notify an employer of a potential claim until this investigation is complete. Hence, she...