Cuevas v. Sdrales, 7973.

• Citation: 344 F.2d 1019
• Decision Date: 10 May 1965
• Docket Number: No. 7973.,7973.
• Parties: Theodore CUEVAS, Appellant, v. Tom SDRALES, dba The Seventy-Three Inn, Salt Lake City Corporation, and Police Officer Rex LeFevre, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

344 F.2d 1019 (1965)

Theodore CUEVAS, Appellant, v. Tom SDRALES, dba The Seventy-Three Inn, Salt Lake City Corporation, and Police Officer Rex LeFevre, Appellees.

No. 7973.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

May 10, 1965.

No appearance for appellant (Galen Ross, Salt Lake City, Utah, on brief).

No appearance for appellees (Mulliner, Prince & Mangum, Gerald R. Miller, Robert M. Yeates, Salt Lake City, Utah, filed a brief on behalf of appellees Tom Sdrales, dba The Seventy-Three Inn, Homer Holmgren and Jack L. Crellin, Salt Lake City, Utah, filed a brief on behalf of appellee Salt Lake City Corp., and Shirley P. Jones, Jr., Salt Lake City, Utah, adopted the brief of the aforesaid appellees on behalf of Police Officer Rex LeFevre).

Before PICKETT, BREITENSTEIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.

PICKETT, Circuit Judge.

Theodore Cuevas brought this action, seeking to avail himself and others similarly situated, of the injunctive relief provided for in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S. C. § 2000a et seq. He alleges that the defendant Tom Sdrales was the owner of a tavern in Salt Lake City, Utah, dispensing food to be consumed on the premises, which affected interstate commerce, and refused to serve him because he was a negro. Cueves refused to leave the premises and was arrested by a city policeman and taken to jail. The second count of the complaint asked for money damages because of this arrest.¹ On motion to dismiss it was shown that the tavern was primarily engaged in selling beer for consumption on the premises, and did not serve meals or other food to be eaten as is customary in restaurants, cafeterias, lunch rooms, lunch counters and soda fountains. The trial court held that the tavern was not a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the Act, and dismissed the complaint.²

Title II of the Act provides for injunctive relief against discrimination in places of public accommodation as such places are defined in the Act. The pertinent provisions of Title II are as follows:

"Sec. 201.(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

"(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

"(1) * * *

"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

"(3) * * *

"(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.

"(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this subchapter if * * (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce * * *."

The gist of appellant's contention is that when Sdrales sold beer in his tavern, he was selling food and was an "other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises." We are of the view that the contention is not supported by either the language of the Act or its legislative history.

Section 201(b) (2) of the statute refers specifically to restaurants, cafeterias, lunch rooms, lunch counters, and soda fountains, or other facility selling food. All the places specifically designated are facilities where food is sold to be eaten. Ordinarily, when specific terms in a statute are followed by general terms, the general terms are limited to matters similar to those specified, unless to do so would defeat the obvious purposes of the statute. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 70 S.Ct. 352, 94 L.Ed. 457; Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522; Bumpus v. United States, 10 Cir., 325 F.2d 264; Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J. v. Watson, 10 Cir., 261 F.2d 143; Sandack v. Tamme, 10 Cir., 182 F.2d 759; Cain v. Bowlby, 10 Cir., 114 F.2d 519, cert. denied 311 U.S. 710, 61 S.Ct. 319, 85 L.Ed. 462.

The obvious purpose of Section 201(b) (2) is to prevent discrimination in places where food is served to be eaten and the general provisions of the section are limited to such places. Beer, and similar drinks, might in some instances be classed as food, as they supply some nutriment to the body, but generally, beer is considered a drink, and although it may be served in eating places, a place serving only beer is not considered a restaurant, cafeteria, lunch room, lunch counter or soda fountain. See, generally, Words and Phrases, Beer, Food, and Restaurants.

The public accommodations provisions of the Act have been held to be a constitutional exercise of the commerce power given to Congress. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290. But this case appears to be one of first impression on the specific question of the businesses covered by Title II of the Act. The passage of the Act followed extensive hearings. A study of the hearings before the different committees and the debates in Congress illustrates, we think, that Congress did not intend to include all establishments to which its constitutional powers might extend. The legislation was aimed at the aggravated sources of discrimination which affected interstate commerce. Many business establishments were not included within the scope of the Act. It was thought that if the most flagrant and troublesome areas of discrimination were eliminated by law, the less bothersome would disappear through voluntary action and public effort. Senator Humphrey, in discussing before the Senate the limitations on the coverage intended in Title II,...