Cuffley v. State
| Decision Date | 28 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-K-02-001015,No. 136,136 |
| Parties | RAYMOND B. CUFFLEY, JR. v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Maryland Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance and mandates that the State's Attorney and defense counsel state clearly on the record at the plea proceeding all the terms of the plea agreement before the court accepts the agreement and agrees to be bound by it. Any question thereafter about the sentencing term of the agreement must be resolved solely by resort to the record developed at that plea proceeding, to determine what the defendant reasonably understood about the sentencing term at the time of the plea. Extrinsic evidence of the defendant's understanding is irrelevant to resolution of that question. If the court later imposes a sentence exceeding the sentencing term, as the defendant would have reasonably understood it, then the court has breached the agreement and the defendant is entitled to correction of the illegal sentence.
CRIMINAL LAW-BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT; INTERPRETATION OF BINDING PLEA TERM TO SENTENCE "WITHIN THE GUIDELINES":
If the parties to a binding plea agreement agree that the defendant will be sentenced "within the guidelines" without making clear on the record of the plea proceeding that the guidelines sentence refers only to actual incarceration, then the court may not impose a sentence that includes a suspended portion in excess of the maximum sentence provided by the guidelines.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
We consider in this case whether and, if so, under what circumstances, a judge who agrees to be bound to the terms of a plea agreement that calls for a sentence "within the guidelines" may impose a sentence that involves a term of incarceration that exceeds the guidelines but suspends all but the part of the sentence that falls within the guidelines. The answer to that question is of great concern to Petitioner Raymond B. Cuffley, Jr., who pleaded guilty pursuant to a binding plea agreement and was sentenced in the fashion we have described. We hold that, under the circumstances presented here, the sentence imposed exceeded the terms of the plea agreement, rendering the sentence illegal. Petitioner is entitled to the remedy of specific performance of the plea agreement, requiring re-sentencing in conformance with it.
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of robbery, at a hearing in the Circuit Court for Harford County on October 23, 2002. At the outset of the hearing, the State set forth the terms of the parties' plea agreement:
Mr. Cuffley is here today charged with robbery. There were plea discussions and he has indicated he will enter a guilty plea. As a consequence of the plea, the State will recommend a sentence within the guidelines as formulated by myself and Miss Casper [defense counsel], we came up with four to eight years. The sentencing will be deferred [until disposition of a pending probation violation].
Defense counsel's only addition to the State's proffer was that "certainly no promises--but that the court might consider somewhere later down the road a commitment to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for purposes of treatment."
The court restated its understanding of the agreement: Petitioner would plead guiltyto the charge of robbery, which "carries a maximum possibility [sic] penalty of 15 years incarceration[,]" and
The Circuit Court engaged Petitioner in a colloquy to ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The State then recited the factual basis for the plea. Following that, the Circuit Court accepted the plea agreement, bound itself to its terms, and deferred disposition.
At the sentencing hearing several months later, the court recalled correctly that "the guidelines in the case were four to eight years." The State asked the court to sentence Petitioner "within the guidelines" and to make the sentence consecutive to a six-year sentence that was imposed in the probation violation case that had precipitated the deferral of disposition in the present case. Defense counsel asked the court to sentence Petitioner at the "bottom of the guidelines," and "to consider at least part of that time to be concurrent to the time he is now serving, with a later consideration for modification to a drug treatment program." The court sentenced Petitioner to
Four-and-a-halfyears later, Petitioner filed a "Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, "pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a).1 The motion came on for a hearing before the sentencing judge. Petitioner argued that the sentence violated the plea agreement. He testified that he understood the agreement to call for a total sentence of no more than eight years, and "not to [his] knowledge" did the lawyer who represented him at the time tell him that he could receive suspended time above the eight-year sentencing guidelines cap. Petitioner further testified that he would have remembered had his counsel advised him that his total exposure included suspended time because he is "always concerned" about how much time he "will have over his head." He also testified that he did not understand that the sentence imposed was illegal until his then-current counsel explained that to him.
Ms. Casper, the lawyer who represented Petitioner at the plea, testified that she could not recall her conversation with Petitioner concerning the sentencing term of the plea agreement. She further testified, however:
I believe that what we discussed, and what the plea agreement was, was that the time to serve was going to be within that four to eight years. That was the plea agreement, was the time to serve. The suspended sentence period and theperiod of probation are up to the court. And I believe it's the practice in this court that that wouldn't be determined until the day of the actual sentence being handed down.
The court denied the motion. The court noted preliminarily that "standard procedure in this court, and it still is today, is that suspended time and conditions of probation are within [the court's] discretion." The court explained that these discretionary powers were "alluded to" at the plea hearing, even if not specifically stated on the record. With regard to the advice Petitioner received from counsel concerning the meaning of the "within the guidelines" sentencing term, the court stated to Petitioner's then-counsel: "I'm quite confident that your client was advised, even without hearing from Miss Casper, but having heard from her, I'm certain that she advised him that there would be suspended time." The court added that Petitioner "got exactly what he bargained for."
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion. The court recognized that the term "sentence" can mean a combination of suspended and executed periods of incarceration. The court also noted statements in the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual that "[s]uspended time is not considered in determining whether the sentence falls within the recommended guidelines range[,]" and "[t]he guidelines range represents only non-suspended time." Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 12.1, at 42 (2005).2 Basedon those statements, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that "for the purposes of determining whether a sentence is within the guidelines... only the active portion of the sentence is considered[.]" The intermediate appellate court found "substantial evidence in the record" to support the Circuit Court's finding that defense counsel had informed Petitioner that a sentence "within the guidelines" meant a sentence of actual incarceration only, which supported the Circuit Court's conclusion that the sentence was consistent with the plea agreement.
We granted Petitioner's writ of certiorari, Cuffley v. State, 406 Md. 743, 962 A.2d 370 (2008), to address the following question:
Where petitioner pled guilty pursuant to a binding plea agreement, which called for a sentence within the sentencing guidelines range of four-to-eight years incarceration, is a sentence of fifteen years incarceration, with all but six years of that term suspended in favor of probation, illegal?
It is well documented that plea bargains play a crucial role in the system of criminal justice in Maryland and throughout the United States. In addition to relieving over-burdened courts, the termination of charges following plea negotiations:
"leads to [the] prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned."
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1976) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971)). Plea agreements, moreover, "eliminate many of the risks, uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary...
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