State v. Brockman

• Decision Date: 21 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 93,93
• Citation: 277 Md. 687,357 A.2d 376
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Harry Edward BROCKMAN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 687

277 Md. 687

357 A.2d 376

STATE of Maryland v. Harry Edward BROCKMAN.

No. 93.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 21, 1976.

Gilbert Rosenthal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Arnold M. Zerwitz, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, and George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Pub. lic Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, ^* JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

The appeal in this criminal cause concerns a plea bargain the terms of which were that the accused would provide the State with information and testimony concerning a murder in which he and others had participated, and that in return the prosecution would allow the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Asserting that the defendant-respondent Harry Edward Brockman had failed to fulfill his part of the bargain, the State repudiated the agreement before the defendant entered the contemplated confession of guilt. Brockman denies failing to honor his obligations and asks that we hold the State of Maryland to its promise. As we conclude that the accused's misstep amounted to no more than an inconsequential hesitation insufficient to nullify the understanding, and because we think it would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant as well as prejudicial to the administration of this State's criminal justice system to permit the prosecution to disavow this agreement, we shall allow Brockman to choose between the results of his already completed trial and the fulfillment of his plea bargain.

The facts are neither complicated nor in dispute. At the fountainhead of this case is a contract to commit murder. James Edward Ward, through an intermediary, hired Brockman and David Victor Maness to kill both Ward's wife and her friend, Gerald Godbout, Jr., the person they in fact murdered on April 28, 1972. Brockman and Maness were apprehended and, on June 6 of that year, indicted for premeditated murder, possession of a handgun, and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. After a number of lengthy delays, the reasons for which are not relevant here, their trial was scheduled to commence on July 8, 1974. It was on that day, after the joint trial of Brockman and Maness had begun, that the codefendants and the State first entered into plea negotiations. The prosecutor, in an effort to reach the initiator of the murder plan, made Brockman and Maness the following tempting offer: the State would accept pleas of guilty to murder in the second degree, recommend to the court a sentence of no more than ten years and nolle pros all other counts in their indictment; in exchange, Brockman and Maness were to provide the State with sworn depositions as well as testify both before the grand jury and at the trial of the author of the murder scheme. Maness agreed to this bargain posthaste and that very day gave the State a deposition which incriminated Ward, Brockman and himself. Brockman, however, declined at that time to accept the State's offer, but, perhaps as a result of sensing the strength of the Government's case and thus seeing the handwriting on the wall, agreed to do so the following day, July 9. At that point, because it had received such complete information from Maness, the State was disinclined to deal further with Brockman. Nonetheless, after a conference with the trial judge, the prosecution reluctantly reextended the offer and Brockman accepted.

In furtherance of the understanding, and while the trial was in recess, brockman was deposed in the office of the State's Attorney. Although, as the Assistant Attorney General noted at oral argument before this court, 'the parties (were) sparring with each other, (as) Brockman did not trust the State (and) the State did not trust Brockman,' the defendant answered questions for over an hour and completely incriminated Ward and Maness as well as himself. The Assistant State's Attorney conducting the deposition, Mr. Neal, then removed two photographs of Mr. Ward from a stack and presented one or both (the record is not clear as to the number) to Brockman, asking him if he recognized the person pictured. Mr. Camus, the Assistant Public Defender representing the deponent, described what then occurred:

'The picture has handed to Mr. Brockman, who looked at it for a significant period of time, enough time that I was starting to wonder why the delay and what was going through his mind. Mr. Brockman then said-when he was asked if he knew who that picture was of he said, 'No.' Mr. Neal hesitated, as I recall. I don't know if he showed him another picture of Ward or not, but it turned out that was a picture of Ward.

'There was-then Mr. Brockman leaned over to me shortly thereafter, because I knew something was wrong, and said to me, 'That was Mr. Ward, but he's trying to trick me with just one; he's showing me one photo and he's trying to trick me and I know that if I don't testify at Mr. Ward's trial that this plea bargaining deal won't go down, and I feel that Mr. Neal is trying to trick me and affect my testimony so bad that it won't be accepted by the Court.' In other words, it would be tainted by the single-photo lineup. And so tainted, as Brockman indicated to me, he would not be allowed to testify, would have no use and would be forced to trial thereafter.

((The taking of the deposition was recessed and, with Mr. Neal out of the room, Mr. Camus and his client conferred.))

'I explained to Mr. Brockman . . . that I agreed with him, that the one-photo spread tainted the case, but that would have nothing to do with the deal. We then offered to Mr. Neal to continue the deposition.'

The deposition was then resumed, with the transcript reading as follows:

'Q. ((Mr. Neal)): On the record. Showing you (the same photographs), do you have any further comment to make about those two exhibits?

A. ((Mr. Brockman)): Yes, sir. They are the pictures of Mr. Ward. They are at least pictures of the gentlemen I saw at (the intermediary's house) in December or January-early January of '71.

Q. You previously indicated you couldn't identify those photographs, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, that is true. It does not appear to me that my testimony would be worth anything. It did not appear at the moment when the pictures were placed in front of me that I had any position with the State with regard to my cooperation if I were to identify him at this time and at the trial.

Mr. Neal: I'm going to break for a minute. (Short recess).'

When the Assistant State's Attorney returned, he first told the defendant that '(i)n view of the fact you have already misrepresented the facts here I don't know whether to believe you or not'; shortly thereafter he announced, '(t)his man has committed perjury. . . . There is no deal. . . . Everything is off.' Although Brockman protested that he had been entirely truthful and desired to complete the deposition at the time, Mr. Neal indicated that the deponent's action had rendered the agreement null and void and declined to continue. ¹

Brockman's trial was thereafter resumed, but, for reasons not relevant here, ended in a mistrial. Before being retried, the defendant filed a 'Motion for Appropriate Relief (For Specific Performance of Agreement Between the State and the Defendant),' which was denied, the trial judge holding that Brockman had violated the compact. At his retrial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Robert B. Mathias, J.), the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree as well as of two handgun offenses, and was sentenced to life imprisonment plus eight years. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court, directing that Brockman be permitted to elect between the result of his trial and enforcement of the agreement. Brockman v. State, 27 Md.App. 682, 694, 341 A.2d 849 (1975). We granted certiorari to examine the propriety of this action; finding no error, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

We begin our analysis of the law by considering the role plea bargains now play in the administration of both this State's and the nation's criminal justice systems. ² The simple fact is that today plea agreements account for the disposition of an overwhelming percentage of all criminal cases. See J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas §§ 1.02, 1.03, 1.07(2) (1975); 5 Sw.U.L.Rev. 214, 215 & nn. 7, 8 (1973). If this were not so, but rather every case entailed a full-scale trial, state and federal courts would be flooded, and court facilities as well as personnel would have to be mutiplied many times over to handle the increased burden. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). These agreements, however, also serve other needs besides preventing, or at least relieving, the overcrowding of our courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States noted in Santobello, id. at 261, 92 S.Ct. at 498, the termination of charges after plea negotiations

'leads to (the) prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pre-trial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.'

Additionally, plea agreements eliminate many of the risks, uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law enforcement by permitting the...