Cuffy v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 19 February 1987
• Citation: 513 N.Y.S.2d 372,69 N.Y.2d 255,505 N.E.2d 937
• Parties: , 505 N.E.2d 937 Eleanor CUFFY et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 372

513 N.Y.S.2d 372

69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937

Eleanor CUFFY et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 19, 1987.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel (Margaret G. King and June A. Witterschein, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Arthur N. Seiff and Charles F. McGuire, New York City, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

In a line of cases culminating in Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591, 482 N.E.2d 70, we recognized a narrow right to recover from a municipality for its negligent failure to provide police protection where a promise of protection was made to a particular citizen and, as a consequence, a "special duty" to that citizen arose (cf. Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 375 N.E.2d 763). Essential to recovery is proof that the plaintiff relied on the promise and that his reliance was causally related to the harm he suffered. In this case, there was proof of a promise of protection made by an agent of the City, but, for a variety of reasons, the reliance element was not established by any of these three plaintiffs. Accordingly, we now reverse the order appealed from, 118 A.D.2d 1049, 499 N.Y.S.2d 565, and hold that the complaint against the City should have been dismissed.

The violence that led to plaintiffs' injuries originated in a landlord-tenant dispute between Joseph and Eleanor Cuffy, who occupied the upper apartment of their two-family house in The Bronx, and Joel and Barbara Aitkins, who had leased the ground-floor apartment from the Cuffys for approximately a year. Even before the incidents that are directly involved in this action, there had been episodes between the two couples which the police had been called to mediate. Eleanor Cuffy had previously filed a formal criminal complaint against the Aitkinses, and a prior effort at supervised informal dispute resolution had terminated in an arbitrator's order directing Ms. Cuffy and the Aitkinses to avoid further contact. This history of repeated confrontation and police intervention forms the backdrop for the events at issue in the trial of the Cuffys' claims against the City.

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs (see, Derdiari v. Felix Contr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 312, n. 1, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666, the evidence at the trial showed that on July 27, 1981, the night immediately preceding the incident, Joel Aitkins physically attacked Eleanor Cuffy, tearing her blouse and bruising her eye. Officer Pennington, who had responded to reports of skirmishes between the Aitkinses and the Cuffys on two or three prior occasions, came to the house once again to investigate, but declined to take any specific action because, in his judgment, the offense was merely a matter of "harassment" between landlord and tenant and an arrest was not warranted.

In frustration, Joseph Cuffy, who had been to see the police four or five times before, went to the local precinct with a neighbor at about 11:00 that night to ask for protection for his family. Cuffy spoke with Lieutenant Moretti, the desk officer, and told him that the Aitkinses had threatened his family's safety. According to both Cuffy and his neighbor, Cuffy specifically told Moretti that he intended to move his family out of its upper floor apartment immediately if an arrest was not made. ^* In response, Moretti told Cuffy that he should not worry and that an arrest would be made or something else would be done about the situation "first thing in the morning." Cuffy then went back to his family and instructed his wife to unpack the family's valises, thereby signifying his intention to remain in the house. Despite Lieutenant Moretti's assurances, the police did not, in fact, undertake any further action in response to Cuffy's complaint.

At approximately 7:00 P.M. on the following evening, the Cuffys' son Ralston, who did not live with his parents, came to their house for a visit. Immediately after Ralston alit from his car, Joel Aitkins accosted him and the two men had an altercation, which culminated in Ralston's being struck with a baseball bat. Eleanor Cuffy, who observed the fight from her upstairs window, and another son, Cyril, rushed to Ralston's rescue. Barbara Aitkins then joined in the attack, slashing at both Eleanor and Cyril with a knife. Joseph Cuffy, who had come home from work at about 6:30 and then gone to his neighbor's house, arrived at the scene while the fight was in progress, but was not in time to avert the harm. By the time the fight was over, all three Cuffys had sustained severe injuries.

Eleanor, Cyril and Ralston Cuffy thereafter commenced this action against the City, alleging that the police had a "special duty" to protect them because of the promise that Lieutenant Moretti had made on the night preceding the incident (see, Sorichetti v. City of New York, supra). The ensuing trial ended in a verdict awarding each of the plaintiffs substantial damages. The City appealed to the Appellate Division, which unanimously affirmed the judgment, without opinion. We conclude, however, that the judgment should have been reversed.

As a general rule, a municipality may not be held liable for injuries resulting from a simple failure to provide police protection (see, e.g., Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141, 433 N.E.2d 124). This rule is derived from the principle that a municipality's duty to provide police protection is ordinarily one owed to the public at large and not to any particular individual or class of individuals (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896). Additionally, a municipality's provision of police protection to its citizenry has long been regarded as a resource-allocating function that is better left to the discretion of the policy makers (see, Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141, 433 N.E.2d 124, supra). Consequently, we have generally declined to hold municipalities subject to tort liability for their failure to furnish police protection to individual citizens.

There exists, however, a narrow class of cases in which we have recognized an exception to this general rule and have upheld tort claims based upon a "special relationship" between the municipality and the claimant (De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d 717; see, e.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, supra; Florence v. Goldberg, supra; Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534). The elements of this "special relationship" are: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking (see, Shinder v. State of New York, 62 N.Y.2d 945, 946, 479 N.Y.S.2d 189, 468 N.E.2d 27; see also, Sorichetti v. City of New York, supra, 65 N.Y.2d p. 469, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591, 482 N.E.2d 70; cf. Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606, 407 N.E.2d 451).

As was made clear in Yearwood v. Town of Brighton, 101 A.D.2d 498, 475 N.Y.S.2d 958, affd. 64 N.Y.2d 667, 485 N.Y.S.2d 252, 474 N.E.2d 612, the injured party's reliance is as critical in establishing the existence of a "special relationship" as is the municipality's voluntary affirmative undertaking of a duty to act. That element provides the essential causative link between the "special duty" assumed by the municipality and the alleged injury. Indeed, at the heart of most of these "special duty" cases is the unfairness that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality's voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and has thereby induced him either to relax his own vigilance or to forego other available avenues of protection (see, De...