Culbertson v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
| Decision Date | 18 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 981279, No. 981659. |
| Citation | 44 P.3d 642,2001 UT 108 |
| Parties | Alayna J. CULBERTSON and Diane Pearl Meibos, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY and Ken Jones, in his capacity as Director of Development Services for Salt Lake County, Defendants and Appellees. Eva C. Johnson, an individual; Diane Pearl Meibos, an individual; Alayna J. Culbertson, an individual; and Blaine Johnson, an individual, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership; Nick S. Vidalakis, an individual; J. Rees Jensen, an individual; Fort Union Associates L.C., a Utah limited liability company; and Does 1-10, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Ronald G. Russell, Jeffrey J. Hunt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Jay D. Gurmankin, Douglas R. Short, Patrick F. Holden, Chris R. Hogle, Salt Lake City, for Board of County Commissioners, Ken Jones.
Mark O. Morris, David N. Wolf, Salt Lake City, for Hermes Associates, Nick S. Vidalakis, J. Rees Jensen, Fort Union Associates, Does 1-10.
¶ 1 Plaintiffs Alayna J. Culbertson and Diane Pearl Meibos brought these actions, one against the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and Ken Jones (collectively, the County), and one against Hermes Associates, Ltd., Nick Vidalakis, J. Rees Jensen, and Fort Union Associates, L.C., (collectively, Hermes)1 for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages relating to the expansion of Hermes's Family Center in Salt Lake County. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed in each case, and summary judgments were granted to the defendants in both cases. In No. 981279, plaintiffs appealed after they allegedly exhausted their administrative remedies, and the case was transferred to the court of appeals, which had original jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). In No. 981659, plaintiffs appealed to this court from an adverse judgment over which this court has jurisdiction under section 78-2-2(3)(j). Because the issues in both cases share underlying common facts, the parties successfully petitioned the court of appeals for certification of No. 981279 to this court as permitted by rule 43(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. After certification, this court consolidated the two cases to assure consistent judgments in these intimately related appeals.
¶ 2 In 1991, Hermes sought to expand the Family Center, a shopping complex located between 900 East and Union Park Avenue in what was then unincorporated Salt Lake County.2 Although Hermes owned or was able to purchase most of the land it sought to develop, it was unable to acquire from plaintiffs and their predecessors in title, Eugene and Gloria Croxford, a tract of property (the Croxford property) on the south side of the proposed project site. Ultimately, Hermes's site plan excluded the Croxford property, and Hermes was required to obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County to continue the project. Hermes's site plan and CUP were given preliminary approval subject to several conditions including "[a]pproval of the street vacation plan by the County Commission."
¶ 3 The Croxford property abuts on the south side of North Union Avenue. The avenue had been used and maintained as a county street for many years, providing access to houses on the street, including two houses and garages on the Croxford property. To accommodate the expansion of the shopping center, the County in August 1994 passed Ordinance 1275 (the Ordinance), which vacated North Union Avenue between 1000 East and 1300 East, except for the segment of the avenue in front of the Croxford property. There, the avenue is 33 feet wide. The Ordinance vacated the north eight feet of the width of that segment which reverted to Hermes because Hermes owned the property abutting on the north side of the avenue. The Ordinance "permanently closed" the remaining twenty-five feet of the width of that segment. The County stated in the Ordinance that it was "closing" rather than vacating the twenty-five-foot segment so that it could "convey an access easement over said property to Hermes [and the owners of the Croxford property], which will allow better access to their respective properties than by having the property revert as a matter of law, half to each by vacation."3
¶ 4 The Ordinance also provided that the owners of the Croxford property would "still have direct access to 7240 South and [would] be provided additional access to the north side of the property from 7240 South through a 25 foot wide public right-of-way" that Hermes was to convey to the County. Pursuant to the Ordinance, Hermes granted the County an "easement for public right of way" extending north from 7240 South to the closed portion of North Union Avenue along the west border of the Croxford property. That public right-of-way has been designated 1070 East Street.
¶ 5 Hermes's site plan and CUP were given final approval by the County on July 28, 1994, and construction on the building labeled on the site plan "retail 3," or the Ernst Home Center Building (Ernst building), began shortly thereafter. The final version of the CUP requires that "[h]ighback curb, gutter and sidewalk . . . be installed along the property lines which abut any public road or street" (emphasis added), and the final site plan approval states, "Conditions of this approval are in addition to the requirements of other Salt Lake Co. Ordinances."
¶ 6 Plaintiffs notified Hermes and the County (collectively, defendants) twice through legal counsel that the Ernst building encroached upon 1070 East Street, restricting access to their property. They asked the County to enforce the applicable ordinances, building codes, and Hermes's CUP to stop the encroachment and ensure that 1070 East Street complied with county roadway standards. Finally, plaintiffs filed an action (Culbertson I) challenging the adoption of the Ordinance both substantively and procedurally and requesting enforcement of county roadway standards and the CUP.4 The Culbertson I district court dismissed the 1994 action—all claims in the second amended complaint "relating to [the Ordinance] as passed by the Board of . . . [c]ommissioners" with prejudice and all other claims in the second amended complaint without prejudice, directing plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before refiling these claims. Plaintiffs appealed the court's ruling, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.
¶ 7 Shortly after the Culbertson I court's ruling, Hermes petitioned the County to except 1070 East Street and North Union Avenue from its roadway standards pursuant to chapter 14.12.150 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances.5 The County granted the exceptions in June 1995, after receiving favorable recommendations from the public works engineering division director, the division of development services, and the planning commission.
¶ 8 Plaintiffs, after pursuing certain administrative remedies, then filed the instant actions alleging that the Ernst building and the building labeled "retail 2" (the Future Shop building) on the site plan were built in violation of county zoning ordinances, county roadway standards, and the CUP because they encroached upon North Union Avenue and 1070 East Street and because the buildings were built without the proper setbacks and landscaping. The back wall of the Future Shop building was built on the vacated eight-foot-wide strip of the former North Union Avenue that ran in front of plaintiffs' homes, parallel to the closed twenty-five-foot segment. Plaintiffs alleged that these violations deprived them of adequate access to their property. They prayed for a declaration that the buildings violated the above ordinances and the CUP and sought to invalidate the roadway standards exceptions granted to Hermes by the County. In addition, they petitioned the court to order the County to enforce its ordinances and the CUP by removing the offending portions of the buildings, and also sought damages from Hermes.
¶ 9 Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims. Defendants cross-moved, contending that plaintiffs' actions were barred by res judicata because the claims had been fully litigated in Culbertson I and asserting that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Defendants also argued that plaintiffs had adequate access to their property, that the buildings were in full compliance with all ordinances and permits, and that because North Union Avenue and 1070 East Street are not public streets, they do not have to comply with the CUP or county ordinance requirements for public streets.
¶ 10 The Culbertson II district court held that res judicata did not bar plaintiffs' claims and that they had exhausted their administrative remedies. But it granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that North Union Avenue and 1070 East Street are not public streets and therefore do not violate the CUP or county ordinance requirements for public streets. The Culbertson II court also held that the "construction of the shopping center complied with all applicable zoning and roadway ordinances." Plaintiffs appeal from those judgments.
¶ 11 "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol., 2000 UT 61, ¶ 8, 6 P.3d 1129; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law." Id. (citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)).
¶ 12 Defendants contend that plaintiffs' actions are barred by res...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. HCIC
...relitigation of the particular claim or issue. E.g., Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶¶ 57-58, 44 P.3d 663; Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 12, 44 P.3d 642; Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶¶ 34-37, 16 P.3d 4. For a period of time, Williams, ......
-
Dahl v. Dahl
...¶19 When confronted with an ambiguous order, we will construe it using the same rules that apply to all legal documents. Culbertson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs , 2001 UT 108, ¶ 15, 44 P.3d 642, overruled on other grounds by Madsen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 2012 UT 51, 296 P.3d 671. We firs......
-
Dahl v. Dahl
...19 When confronted with an ambiguous order, we will construe it using the same rules that apply to all legal documents. Culbertson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 15, 44 P.3d 642, overruled on other grounds by Madsen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2012 UT 51, 296 P.3d 671. We first “......
-
Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.
...preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 13, 44 P.3d 642; see also Macris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93 at ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 1214. The party moving a court to dismiss on claim p......
-
Equity as Meta-Law.
...convenience or hardship involved'" (quoting Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. 1959))); Culbertson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 642, 658 (Utah 2001) ("[W]here the encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful and intentional taking of another's land, equity may require its......
-
PUTTING THE EQUITY BACK INTO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REMEDIES.
...convenience or hardship involved'" (quoting Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. 1959)); Culbertson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, [paragraph] 56, 44 P.3d 642, 658 ("[W]here the encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful and intentional taking of another's land, equit......