Cullens v. Georgia Dept. of Transp.
Decision Date | 31 March 1993 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C81-0084-MAC. |
Citation | 827 F. Supp. 756 |
Parties | Bennie CULLENS, James Gonder and Larry Cooper, Plaintiffs, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Thomas D. Moreland, Individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Department of Transportation; Georgia Merit System of Personnel Administration, Charles E. Storm, Individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Georgia Merit System of Personnel Administration, and State of Georgia, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Robert H. Stroup, Stroup & Coleman, Atlanta, GA, J. Levonne Chambers, Ronald L. Ellis, New York City, John R. Myer, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiffs.
John A. Draughon, Sell and Melton, O. Hale Almand, Macon, GA, Lorraine C. Davis, E.E.O.C., Washington, DC, for defendants.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Bennie Cullens and James Gonder's motion for attorney's fees and costs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This court previously denied Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because Plaintiffs could not be considered "prevailing parties" on the class aspects of this case. Plaintiffs now seek to recover for work performed in successfully litigating the individual claims of Messrs. Cullens and Gonder. Judgment was entered in their favor, and Cullens was awarded $1,922.46 in back pay, and Gonder was awarded $5,384.93. In addition, the defendants were ordered to change Gonder's pay grade from Pay Grade 26, step 3, to Pay Grade 26, step 4, effective April 1, 1988. This court awarded them attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The issue before this court, then, is the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded.
The present state of the law in our circuit in the award of attorney's fees is found in Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.1988). Plaintiffs request attorney's fees in the amount of $116,375.00; paralegal fees in the amount of $1,365.00; and costs of $5,703.04. The court will first compute fees, under the teaching of Norman, and then consider an alternative approach.
To determine an objective estimate of the value of a lawyer's services, a court must multiply the hours reasonably spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. A reasonable rate is defined as "the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Id. The burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in line with the prevailing market rate rests on the movant. Id.
Plaintiffs request $175 per hour and submit supporting affidavits. Lawyer Richard H. Horder affirms that, in his opinion, the market rate for lawyers in employment discrimination cases in the Atlanta area ranges from $170 to $200 per hour and that $185 per hour would be appropriate in this matter. Lawyer Jeffrey O. Bramlett affirms that in employment discrimination cases of this complexity involving lawyers with more than fifteen years' experience, the range of hourly rates is $175 to $325 per hour.
While also challenging the accuracy of these lawyers' assertions, Defendants first contend that the prevailing rate should be that of Macon, Georgia. Plaintiffs disagree and have submitted the supporting affidavit of a Macon lawyer, Linda Mabry, who states that in 1981, when Plaintiffs' attorney accepted this case, few lawyers in Macon did civil rights work. Plaintiffs also point to the fact that a significant part of this case, which began in the Middle District of Georgia but which was taken over by the undersigned and tried, took place in Atlanta.
This court does not find Plaintiffs' argument persuasive. The presumption is that the rate of attorney's fees is that of the place where the case was filed. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 768 (7th Cir.1982); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38 (1st Cir.1983). The sheer fact that Plaintiffs consulted with an Atlanta lawyer, who happened to be representing some plaintiffs in another civil rights action and referred Plaintiffs in this action to a fellow Atlanta practitioner, is insufficient. Nor is the assertion that not too many lawyers were handling, civil rights actions in Macon, Georgia, in 1981 enough. The individual claims in this Title VII case were not complex. Lawyer Linda Mabry's statement that there were no attorneys in Macon handling "large" Title VII cases is also not applicable. The representation of these two individuals was not a large case. Plaintiffs have not shown that they actually attempted to retain a Macon lawyer with experience in Title VII discrimination cases but failed. Absent evidence of such an attempt, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing why a market rate other than that where the case was filed is appropriate. Thus, the prevailing rate in Macon applies.
Plaintiffs have not informed the court as to the prevailing market rate for Macon. This court can judicially notice the prevailing rate and set a reasonable fee. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303. The court knows that the fees charged for an experienced attorney in Macon, Georgia, handling a Title VII case range from $100 to $150 per hour. Although Plaintiffs' counsel has participated in a fair number of employment discrimination cases, the court cannot say that this case was prosecuted with efficiency and great dispatch. As this writer noted in Norman, Id. at 1300. Although Plaintiffs' counsel prevailed in these two claims, the time and effort expended for the results obtained do not reflect a practitioner at the peak of his practice. This is not to say that he performed inadequately, but rather to say that in a market he could not command the highest rate per hour. An hourly rate of $100 appropriately represents his efforts.
Defendants also object to the charging of all hours worked by Plaintiffs' lawyer at a partner's rate. They argue that much of the work could have been performed more than adequately by an associate billing at a lower rate. The question before the court, however, is not what the lawyer could have done, but rather what the lawyer actually did and whether it was reasonable. In this case the efforts expended at an hourly rate of $100 as enumerated below were reasonable. This rate is also less than the associate rate suggested by the defendants. The court, therefore, declines to bifurcate the rate charged by Plaintiffs' attorney in this matter.
The next step is the ascertainment of reasonable hours. "Hensley teaches that `excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary' hours should be excluded from the amount claimed." Id. at 1301 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). Exercising such billing judgment means that only the hours that would be reasonable to bill a client and, therefore, one's opposing counsel "irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience" of the lawyer may be counted. Id. The time spent should only be for successful claims where a discrete separation can be ascertained. Id. at 1312.
Plaintiffs seek to recover compensation for 665.695 hours expended for these two individual claims. Defendants have submitted an affidavit of Joseph M. Freeman, a specialist in labor and employment law, objecting to 228.355 hours. The court in its analysis seeks to eliminate the hours spent on the unsuccessful claims. This task is made more difficult because it is hard to tell from the generalized descriptions which of the contacts might have referenced discrete and unsuccessful claims. While the total for a seven-year period does not seem altogether unreasonable, this simple Title VII case certainly would not have taken seven years had the class aspects of this matter been present. Although Plaintiffs assert they have tried to eliminate hours spent on the class or unsuccessful claims, this court is unsatisfied that the total hours are at all proportionate to what was needed to prosecute this case successfully.
Plaintiffs' counsel has broken down his hours as listed below. The court's award of hours is listed in the second column.
Plaintiffs' Court Request Award DCX Defense Counsel Contacts 23.70 23.70 DIX Document Inspection, Review 45.46 33.97 DXX Deposition Preparation, Taking, Review 95.09 43.95 JCX Court Conferences 22.60 22.60 LRX Miscellaneous Legal Research 24.10 14.00 MIS Miscellaneous (atty. rate) 14.90 8.20 (paralegal rate) .50 NDI Investigation Other than Documentary 10.90 .90 PCX Contacts with Plaintiffs 53.47 53.47 PLX Conferences with Paralegals .40 .40 PXX Legal Research, Drafting of Court Pleadings Filings 181.955 181.955 TPX Trial Preparation 93.12 93.12 TXX Trial 44.80 44.80 XXX Post-Trial (other than fee petition) 30.10 30.10 FXX Fee Petition...
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